

JPRS-UMA-90-021  
20 SEPTEMBER 1990



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# ***JPRS Report***

## **Soviet Union**

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***Military Affairs***

# Soviet Union

## Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-90-021

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20 September 1990

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### Party Organizations Assisting in Officer Promotion Decisions

90UM0527A Moscow KOMMUNIST  
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 6, Mar 90  
(Signed to press 16 Mar 90) pp 33-37

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel N. Khudenko under the rubric "Reflections Prior to the Congress": "The Question Has Been Decided. Write A Letter of Recommendation Quickly..."]

[Text] About the author. KHUDENKO, Nikolay Nikolayevich has been in the USSR Armed Forces since 1969. In 1974, he graduated from the Novosibirsk Higher Military-Political Combined-Arms Command School and in 1983, from the V.I. Lenin Military-Political Academy. He began his service as a deputy company commander in a political unit. He served as a propagandist and a regimental deputy commander in a political unit. He currently holds a responsible position in the Party political apparatus.

"Rude to subordinates, arrogant, tactless..." and "Inconsiderate toward people, brushes aside their requests...". Each phrase struck painfully at his pride. Did Lieutenant Colonel N. Lokalin think on his way to the Party meeting that his communist colleagues would express their opinion of him so candidly and scrupulously? Did he think it was conceivable that he, the unit deputy commander, and a competent and promising officer as his superiors have asserted, would be considered unworthy of promotion? It is doubtful. But the Party members had a different opinion. Taking into account the serious flaws in CPSU member Lokalin's moral character, they decided that it was still rather early for him to rise to the next rung on the administrative ladder.

The unit commander felt uncomfortable at the meeting. The efficiency report written by him made casual mention of Lokalin's shortcomings. But what is more—it talked about his professional competency, high degree of assiduousness, etc. Does it turn out that he did not come to know all the particulars of his deputy? Was he unaware of the negative aspects of his deputy's personality? Of course not. He merely considered them less important than his practical qualities. The Party members in the unit taught him a lesson in this area, firmly expressing the opinion: a person who shows a lack of respect for his comrades and "blows his own horn" should not advance in the military service.

It should be stated that the officer managed to draw the correct conclusions from his comrades' criticism. He became much more equable in social situations and more attentive to people's needs and concerns. Of course, he remembered the Party members' dispassionate remarks with anything but delight and a latent resentment smoldered in his soul. However, to Lieutenant Colonel Lokalin's credit, he did not allow it to flare up. In this instance a sense of objectivity prevailed and helped to get rid of unnecessary self-importance and elements of selfishness and conceit. And his colleagues

evaluated this at its true worth. A year later, they concluded with good reason that the officer was deserving of appointment to a higher position.

What of it, such results always cause joy. First of all, criticism proved to be effective and secondly, the Party organization actually was convinced of how much weight its word carries in deciding personnel questions.

Unfortunately, the aspiration of the Party collectives to participate in personnel policy does not receive understanding and support in many places. When the matter concerns advancement of their subordinates and awarding them the next higher rank, decorations, and assignments for training, the label "omnipotent" still applies to certain commanders and supervisors. True, they do not reject the Party organization's opinion "straight off," as has frequently happened in the past. Being afraid to be considered reactionaries and opponents of renewal, for the sake of appearances they even listen to it. But they frequently have it their own way. As for protests, they imperturbably respond: "No one has rescinded unity of command. I am the commander and the final word rests with me..."

Let us ponder this, why do some commanders aspire to personally decide personnel issues? Even if they have sufficient experience, they cannot manage without support and without reliable assistants. It is precisely the Party organization that should provide this support. In lending support to the commander, the Party organization at the same time, figuratively speaking, weighs each of the commanders deeds and each action on the scales of adherence to Party principles. But for a person who has become accustomed to considering his own opinion to be "the truth of the highest instance", this situation is hardly acceptable. And he begins to create his own "support", molding it from officers and warrant officers "close to him". While doing this, he does not stop to think that authority is not issued with the position. It is earned by persistent daily labor and concern for people's welfare.

True, there is another way. While seeking to arbitrarily decide all personnel issues, some leaders think that by promoting "obedient" officers and holding back "disagreeable" ones, they will be able to, as they say, keep their subordinates in hand. According to the principle: fear breeds respect...

Experience has shown that in the long run such an attitude leads to very sad results. Knowing that advancement in the military service depends entirely upon the commander's personal attitude, many officers are more worried about doing whatever it takes "to get along with the boss" than about the interests of their occupation. Because of this, flattery, servility, and eyewash still thrive.

When Lieutenant Colonel V. Kolotilo became the leader of a military unit, the parent unit's command element and political section hoped that he would be able to introduce proper order in the subordinate units and



organize the training and indoctrination process in accordance with the demands of the times. There were rather substantial grounds for these hopes: Kolotilo was considered an exacting officer and he had handled his duties successfully in his previous place of service.

From the very first days, the new commander energetically undertook his work. He studied his subordinates, analyzed the state of affairs, and looked for ways to intensify the training process and strengthen discipline. Lieutenant Colonel Kolotilo even had a conversation with Major L. Semchenko, the secretary of the Party organization. The Party leader was frank:

—We still have not "stirred up" the Party members. Some people doubt the reality of changes for the better, exhibit signs of passiveness, and remain silent. We have to raise their activity and also strengthen the authority of our local Party organizations. For example, the position of battalion chief of staff is being vacated soon. Let us discuss possible candidates with the Party members beforehand, then let us listen to these comrades at the meeting and sanction their letters of recommendation...

The commander listened attentively to Major Semchenko and even sympathized with him a little. True, he did not make a definite reply to the suggestion. He stated that there was no need to hurry, the time would come and they would think about it then. As it subsequently turned out, he had his own view on the role of the Party organization. He regarded it as an executor of the ranking officer's will.

After some time, when the position of battalion chief of staff became vacant, the officers in the unit learned that Kolotilo was attempting to secure the appointment of Captain Shaushiyev to this position—who, in the opinion of the majority of his colleagues was a slippery person given to breaches of discipline and who had two Party penalties in addition. But on the other hand, Shaushiyev was always prepared to perform the commander's very "delicate" errands and openly adulated him. The Party secretary received an "order" from the commander to prepare a letter of recommendation on Shaushiyev when the question of his appointment was essentially decided.

The political section had to intervene. The appointment did not take place. Of course, we took the overzealous commander to task. And at the same time, the Party organizations also condemned a conciliatory posture. It turned out that Lieutenant Colonel Kolotilo had ridden roughshod over the entire Party collective. Neither the secretary nor the rank and file communists had enough courage to block his "despotism."

This thought comes to mind in this connection: are not the Party organizations themselves frequently to blame for the fact that they at times remain somewhat aloof to the solution of problems that are vitally important to the units and subunits? And also for the fact that the commander keeps them on a short leash, so to speak?

For example, how is the procedure of discussing candidates for promotion handled in other units? Very simply. The commander summons the Party secretary to his office and gives the instructions: "The question concerning the promotion has been decided. Write and sanction a letter of recommendation quickly". And the mechanism, which had been set aside, is put in action: a smooth letter of recommendation is quickly drawn up for the candidate, a Party meeting is convened, and hands are raised "in favor of"... It is no secret that at times after voting for the candidate proposed by the leadership, afterwards the Party members complain in the lobby—they say, this officer was promoted, but there are more deserving officers. Where is the justice? Apparently, it never occurred to them that it is necessary to fight for justice. No pains, no gains.

Furthermore, such unscrupulousness ultimately gives rise to a sense of "anything goes" in some ranking officers and places them above the Party organization, as it were.

I will return to that collective which I discussed earlier. Not long ago CPSU member Captain N. Kazimirskiy rose to the next higher official level there. In spite of the fact that he had a number of serious censures at his previous place of service. But Lieutenant Colonel Kolotilo put pressure on the secretary of the Party organization, and the latter, having closed his eyes to Kazimirskiy's shortcomings, wrote quite an ingratiating letter of recommendation on him. The Party elective body endorsed it and the Party meeting sanctioned it almost unanimously...

It seems that even today, the magic of unity of command at times turns out to be more powerful than Party integrity. But perhaps, some of the Party members act against their conscience for the sake of personal gain. Every now and then one hears from people carrying a Party membership card in their pocket: "...what do I need most of all? My date for promotion consideration is approaching. It is the commander who will decide." "I am as deserving as anyone else. But I also do not have an apartment..." It is worthwhile to stop and think about all this.

Now that one comes to think of it, how has it come about that obviously undeserving officers, who have messed up in their work, find themselves in high positions? Was it really impossible to foresee that in a number of cases the person would not be able to handle the job, with which he was entrusted? By way of illustration, the officers A. Puzyr and V. Yeroshkin were appointed to higher positions. The Party organizations sanctioned excellent letters of recommendation on these individuals, noting various positive qualities.

But only a few months passed and it was discovered that Yeroshkin, after becoming a company commander, was exhibiting signs of professional incompetence and had turned out to be a worthless teacher. In essence, he

ruined the unit and reduced to naught the results of his predecessor's work. A similar thing occurred in the case of the officer A. Puzyr.

Did the Party members, who endorsed the very flattering epithets that embellished the "promotables" letters of recommendation from the Party, know that those officers "had not grown into" the new positions? Of course they knew. Yeroshkin and Puzyr were not notable for their particular activity and initiative in the past. However the Party organization displayed unscrupulousness and issued "promissory notes", which turned out to be unpaid. And in the long run, the cause suffered.

It would probably be wrong to reduce everything only to the interrelations between the ranking officer and the Party organization. There are also other causes of distortion in deciding personnel issues. Lately, we frequently talk over and over again about the need to strengthen the authority of the local Party organization in every way possible, to expand its rights, and to increase its influence on all aspects of life in the military unit. But as they say in the East, no matter how many times one repeats "halva" (translator's note: paste of nuts, sugar, and oil),—one's mouth will not become sweeter... In my opinion, the lack of legal foundations for its work in the Armed Forces remains one of the very substantial reasons hindering the development of the local Party organizations' activity. And if one looks into it, the legality of its participation in deciding personnel issues is doubtful. There is a single phrase in paragraph 58 of the CPSU rules: "...participates in the conduct of the Party's personnel policy"? But how does it participate? How does one apply this clause under the conditions of unity of command in the army. There remains a margin for very broad interpretation of this clause. Therefore we frequently encounter cases of this type: the Party collective supports one candidate for a vacant position and sanctions an unbiased letter of reference, but the commander makes a willful decision, and another officer is promoted.

For example, this was the case with the promotion of Major S. Fillipenko to the position of chief of staff. After a heated and principled discussion, the Party members decided that precisely this officer was deserving of advancement. Lieutenant Colonel V. Rubtsov read aloud his letter of recommendation with the appropriate conclusions. The Party members sanctioned the letter of recommendation. They voted unanimously for the promotion. They knew this person, they had together with him solved problems facing the collective, and they saw that he would be fully up to his new official duties. But it was as if there was a clap of thunder in a clear sky. The higher command element simply ignored the Party organization's opinion and the officer did not receive the appointment.

It is precisely this approach on the part of the command element that has a very negative influence on the atmosphere in the collective and causes a loss of Party members' activity in deciding personnel issues.

In view of this, I have some suggestions. First of all, it is apparent that a clause stating, a question concerning the advancement of a communist officer cannot be considered without coordinating with the local Party organization, should be included in the new Instructions to CPSU Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy and in the appropriate regulations. Furthermore, it is necessary to establish realistic times for submitting documents for promotion in order to give the Party collective the opportunity to thoroughly discuss the candidates and select the most deserving candidates.

Secondly, it is apparent that it is time to make it incumbent upon personnel agencies not to send in personal files and recommendations for promotion without Party letters of recommendation on the officers, in which it must be indicated—whether or not the Party collective considers the given communist worthy of a higher position. Presently questions of personnel transfers are more often than not decided without any Party letters of recommendation.

What steps are being taken by the body politic to correct the errors that have been committed and to set the matter right according to Party requirements? The request from the supervisory personnel for maximum consideration of the Party organizations' opinion in deciding personnel questions has been strengthened. We are aspiring to scrutinize more carefully the conclusions in the letters of recommendation and are verifying whether or not the appraisal of a CPSU member's or candidate member's political, practical, and moral qualities is valid. In order to do this, we are turning first and foremost to the Party members, who serve in the given unit, and are talking with them. This requires a lot of time and effort. But on the other hand there are less chances for a mistake.

But at present, we consider the formation of an atmosphere of genuine exactingness and adherence to lofty principles in every Party organization, and the involvement of all Party members in deciding personnel questions to be a most important matter. And we have made definite progress in this area.

Let us take the Party organization, in which Major Belyayev is a member of the Party committee. There the Party members directly participate in personnel policy. Thus, the position of chief of staff became vacant in this unit. By an order "from above", Major S. Timokhin should have filled this position. But the Party collective responded with a decisive "no." Timokhin was well-known in the unit and it was believed that for the present, there were no grounds for promoting him. The political section supported the position of the Party collective and a more deserving officer was appointed to the vacant position.

And here is another example. According to the recommendation of the Party organization, of which Major V. Krasovitskiy is a member, the promising officers A. Kalinin, V. Kayota, and certain others were appointed to

higher positions. At present, it is already obvious that they warrant the trust of the Party members: they are raising the theoretical standard, improving practical skills, and looking for the most effective forms of working with people.

Today, the Leninist requirement to evaluate personnel from the standpoint of their conscientiousness, political positions, professional knowledge, and organizational abilities is more timely than ever. We are confident that by concerning ourselves with the objective and principled solution of personnel questions and by erecting a firm barrier against complacency, willfulness, and favoritism, the local Party organizations will promote the growth of the Party members' social and political activity. But without this, it is impossible for perestroika to move forward.

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#### **Komsomol Decline, Potential Solutions to Problems Examined**

90UM0560A Moscow *KOMMUNIST*  
*VOORUZHENNYKH SIL* in Russian No 7, Apr 90  
(Signed to press 26 Mar 90) pp 42-44

[Unattributed article: "Not to Become Lost in Discussion"]

[Text] What needs to be done to restore the Komsomol's lost prestige? How can it be taken out of its dilemma? Will the crisis in the youth organization be overcome? These and many other questions are urgent ones for the Komsomol today. It is persistently seeking by trial and error the answers to them. The Komsomol of the Armed Forces is no exception, a fact demonstrated once again at the 1st, enlarged plenum of the All-Army Council of Komsomol Organizations held in Moscow in February. The participants, delegates to the 21st Komsomol Congress and the 1st Congress of Russia's Komsomol Organizations, heatedly and self-critically discussed current affairs in the military Komsomol and its pressing problems and attempted to define ways to resolve them. How much progress did they make? Plenum participants reflect on this.

Gds Sr Lt Yu. Pavlyuk, chairman of a formation council of Komsomol organizations (Red Banner North Caucasus Military District):

There are many causes of the Komsomol's drop in prestige. One of them, in my opinion, is the fact that for many years it has been in the powerful "embrace" of senior comrades. And although the latter have assured the Komsomol of their respect and their recognition of its rights, everything is different in reality. Bureaucratic rule, excessively close supervision, petty tutelage, pressure.... These methods, unfortunately, are still being used. I say this because, as the secretary of a regimental Komsomol committee, I have personally experienced just this kind of "party supervision." Even today,

heading a council of Komsomol organizations, I still fairly frequently encounter all the same old highhanded methods of pressuring the subunit Komsomol secretaries. For example, certain commanders and political workers are still not averse to using them now as vehicle commanders, now as capable supply men, now "eternal" duty men.... Because of these special assignments it is sometimes impossible for them to engage in the Komsomol work. Or take this occurrence. A subunit commander cancels a class prepared by the Komsomol activists for the political club. Policing the grounds, it seems, is more important.... How, one asks, could the Komsomol's prestige not drop, when it is squeezed from all sides? When they can goad it as they like?

Certain changes have recently taken shape, to be sure. I will say that many of the senior comrades are beginning gradually to abandon the old habit of merely commanding the Komsomol organizations, of preaching to the aktiv when this is appropriate and when it is not. They are entering into a dialog with us more and more frequently and trusting us more boldly with this or that job. The processes of democratization, glasnost... have played a role. The situation is also being affected by changes within the Komsomol itself. The establishment of a council of Komsomol organizations in our formation's political section, let us say, vested at least some authority in us. At our recommendation an outstanding soldier or sergeant may be given a leave. The command element listens to the aktiv for assigning personnel to positions of junior commanders. The council may submit requests to the service chiefs. And, incidentally, we do so. I believe that we shall gain greater independence in the future. We are also encouraged by the fact that the draft Central Committee Platform for the 28th Party Congress defines relations between the party and the Komsomol entirely differently. While in the past this was not the case, the party will now work with the Komsomol on the basis of comradely cooperation and interaction. The adoption of this tenet will unquestionably untie our hands and we shall truly acquire the independence about which Vladimir Ilich Lenin said the following many decades ago: "...without full independence the youth will be unable to develop into good specialists or prepare themselves to lead socialism forward."

Capt I. Korobeynikov, chairman of a formation council of Komsomol organizations (Ground Forces):

In the past few years Komsomol membership has dropped by 10 million. The number of Komsomol members in the military has also fallen. What is this? Self-purging of passive and do-nothing members? The abandoning of a sinking ship? Lack of faith in the strength and the capabilities of the Komsomol? I consider it to be the latter. And I believe that many people will agree with me that the Komsomol has to a considerable degree lost its strength. Many young people today state straightforwardly: "What does your Komsomol



offer us? Absolutely nothing. It cannot protect its members. It is defenseless itself. The initiative it demonstrates is ordinarily what pleases the commander. And that means volunteer Komsomol Saturdays and Sundays of policing the grounds, servicing the equipment...."

Unfortunately, that is the way things are. This is why the non-league youth are not eager to join it. They do not trust it. But I want to mention something else too. The matter of replenishing the ranks with new members is not a problem in those Komsomol organizations in which the aktiv is strong, where the work performed with the youth is top-notch, so to speak.

If we want to regain trust in the Komsomol, if we want it to be a strong organization, we must give priority to the "primaries" and revive their functioning. The newly created councils of Komsomol organizations must focus on this. In my opinion, the "primaries" should now be expected to "dictate" their own will without waiting for instructions "from above." If this takes place, we shall have a strong Komsomol....

**PO 1st Class A. Murzayev, deputy secretary of a company Komsomol organization (Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet):**

I was elected a delegate to the 21st Komsomol Congress at a Komsomol conference of the Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet. That in itself is unusual. Previously, the civilian Komsomol nominated delegates from among the military personnel. What does this tell us? That the military Komsomol is gradually "winning back" its rights and becoming independent. I am disturbed by the fact that we continue to concern ourselves with the form rather than the substance of our work, however. We recently set up the councils of Komsomol organizations. Something entirely new. Many people are extolling them today, singing their praises, as they say. I myself am refraining from such elation for now. Perhaps these councils are to the liking of workers in the apparatus, but they have not yet given the lower organizations a thing. The "primaries" are still without rights and are still assigned the role of mere agents. I make this judgement from my own detachment. I recall an incident in which we were given the "order" severely to punish one of the junior commanders through the Komsomol. No one could understand it. Was the Komsomol organization itself not capable of dealing with its own member who had violated discipline...? This is the kind of tutelage and the kind of pressure which frequently weigh most heavily upon the Komsomol organization and its members. I believe that this kind of pressure is possible because the youth collective does not have status, and many aspects of its functioning are not defined. Its relations with commanders, chiefs..., for example. In my opinion, the pertinent provisions in the Instructions to Komsomol Organizations of the Soviet Army and Navy are hopelessly obsolete. We need to find a middle ground. Specifically, many Komsomol workers and activists at our plenum proposed adding the chapter "The Commander

and Public Organizations" to the Internal Service Regulations, as has been done in the armies of other Warsaw Pact nations. This would immediately eliminate many problems.

But I want to return to the councils of Komsomol organizations. It seems to me that this version contains many elements which have not emancipate the Komsomol organs but, on the contrary, have actually constrained them even more. For example, the Statute on Councils states that they function under the supervision of the political organs. Is this not "harnessing" the Komsomol to the party political apparatus? Or take this point. The political organ may nominate its own candidates for the council of Komsomol organizations.... One has to ask why this was done? Is it that the Komsomol members cannot themselves decide whom they should nominate for their elective body...? I absolutely do not understand also the point which indicates that at the assignment of the Main Political Directorate the All-Army Council prepares certain proposals for improving the Komsomol work. It would appear that the council, which has a membership of 80—no more and no less—is incapable of doing this.... How can the "primaries" have any kind of independence when the councils themselves are in a state of bondage...?

**From the editors:** As we see, there are diverse opinions on the councils of Komsomol organizations. How viable is the new military Komsomol entity? How can we get it to function at its fullest? What should we perhaps abandon immediately? The editors hope to receive answers to these and other questions from you, respected readers. We await your letters.

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#### **Case of 'Protectionism' Recounted, Protested**

90UM0595A Moscow *KOMMUNIST*  
*VOORUZHENNYKH SIL* in Russian No 8, Apr 1990  
(Signed to press 12 Apr 90) pp 84-85

[Letter to the editor: "The More Infractions You Commit the Higher You Climb?"]

[Text] Issue 1 of your magazine for this year carried an interview with Colonel-General V. Arapov: "Protectionism: An 'Apparition' or Reality?" Our feelings about it are mixed. On the one hand, there is satisfaction with the editorial board finally beginning to raise these acute issues. On the other hand, there is disappointment because locally everything remains as it used to be. Look at, for example, our collective.

In October 1987, Lieutenant-Colonel Stanislav Gelliyevich Uborevich was appointed to the position of Oktyabrskiy Rayon military commissar of the city of Vilnius by an order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces. The lack of interest in his work, the use of his service position for personal gain, and an attitude



toward his service as a sinecure have become his standard since his very first days on the job. Drinking on a regular basis, including on duty, rudeness with his subordinates, and the conviction that everything is allowed and will go unpunished are the main features of the behavior of Lieutenant Colonel Uborevich. The violations of the standards of party life by him were repeatedly discussed at party meetings in the military commissariat, and they were brought up at the party conference of the military commissariats of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] in October 1988. However, in response to the criticism Uborevich immediately organized a virtual campaign of persecution of the communists, and attempted to discredit them in every way.

The categorical rejection of criticism, overdeveloped self-esteem and self-conceit, reluctance to change anything in his attitude toward the service and his subordinates brought about the expulsion of communist S.G. Uborevich from the ranks of the CPSU on 9 June 1989.

We are aware of the fact that the party organization which admitted him to the party knew that this man needed the party as a stepping stone in his position-seeking endeavors. The circumstances of his admission to the party testify to that. Out of the 76 communists present at the meeting, 74 voted against it. However, under the influence of protectionist forces, he was urgently transferred to a separate battalion where communists were soon forced, once again under pressure, to admit him to the party.

His subsequent membership in the party is described by the following infractions:

- in March 1978—severe reprimand with entry in the records for hooligan actions with regard to foreign citizens and extremely poor moral and political traits;
- in May 1981—severe reprimand with entry in the records for abuse of the official position for personal gain and for disrupting regular operations of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] organs;
- in July 1986—severe reprimand without entry in the records for abusing alcoholic beverages and being rude with his superiors;
- in March 1989—reprimand with entry in the records for being rude and insulting a communist.

Besides, he was repeatedly brought before the officers' court of honor for various violations.

This collection of infractions of discipline and penalties would have been more than enough to cause any officer to not only surrender his party membership card and insignia, but also to have criminal charges filed against him. However, time after time Uborevich was reassigned to a new post and promoted after drawing yet another penalty. The reason is that he is the grandson of an outstanding Soviet military commander, hero of the Civil War, Army Commander First Rank Ieronim Petrovich Uborevich.

Lieutenant-Colonel Uborevich was saved from the well-deserved "organizational measures" by his mother N.I.

Uborevich who did not shrink from using any means for the defense of her overgrown son: She wrote a great deal of complaints and sent them to all echelons; strange as it is, all the lack of proof notwithstanding, they worked. As far as the situation which has emerged in our military commissariat is concerned, Uborevich and his mother explain it by the fact that, supposedly, the collective of the military commissariat consists of immoral people whom the officer has embarked on fighting. According to a public statement of Uborevich's mother, there is a conspiracy against her son which is headed by a "Yid-Masonic lodge" to which some employees of the military commissariat belong. Can one imagine more preposterous political accusations in order to justify the mean traits of her son? Is there a limit to the infantilism of the 40-year-old lieutenant colonel? As Lieutenant Colonel Uborevich himself stated, his mother, rather than he, wrote an appeal regarding his expulsion from the ranks of the CPSU to the party commission at the Political Administration of the Baltic Military District.

Last year alone, several commissions and specially delegated individuals worked here in conjunction with all the complaints of the Uborevich family including those from the Main Political Directorate, Main Military Procuracy, and the Main Directorate of the General Staff, Political Directorate and Staff of the Baltic Military District, and the Cadre Directorate of the Ground Forces... The conclusions of all of these commissions and individuals with regard to Lieutenant Colonel Uborevich coincided. He was expelled from the party by an absolute majority of the communists. The Party Committee confirmed this decision. The appeals of Uborevich to the Party Commission at the Political Directorate of the Baltic Military District were unanimously rejected.

It should be said that all of these decisions were made in an environment of powerful counteraction by the protectionist forces. What about Uborevich himself? Confident of his absolute impunity, he continued to flout the elementary norms of mutual human relations throughout this period of time.

He punished his subordinates without due cause; he dismissed from his job an employee of the Soviet Army M.A. Belousov (by a decision of the court of Sovetskiy Rayon of the city of Vilnius dated 30 November 1989, he was reinstated in his position, and S.G. Uborevich was assessed the costs); he threatened and still threatens undesirable individuals with physical reprisals; he neglected the service; he repeatedly violated the rules of financial and economic operations of the rayon military commissariat for personal gain (the protocol of an audit is available).

His unprincipled and opportunistic behavior was crowned with his joining the Communist Party of Lithuania which split away from the CPSU in December 1989. We repeatedly heard from him at the service meetings that officers should not belong to the CPSU, that he was going to set up a cell of the alternative party in the military commissariat, and so on.

The degree of immorality and, at the same time, power of the protectionist forces which defend such individuals gives rise to extreme indignation. Lieutenant Colonel Uborevich still holds his post despite the Certification Commission of the Baltic Military District adopting a unanimous decision on his discharge from the ranks of the Armed Forces for discrediting the lofty title of Soviet officer in December 1989. Moreover, as we have learned, the same protectionist forces are getting ready to rescue him once again.

Therefore, we answer the question which was the title of your article in issue 1, 1990 as follows: Unfortunately, protectionism is a reality rather than "an apparition"; real actions on rooting out protectionism rather than articles may change our minds as to this.

[signed] Lieutenant Colonels Aksenchik, Ayzenshtadt; Majors Mezhanov, Myshko, Kovalev, Vika, Naberezhnev; Captains Litvinenko, Loktev, Kryachko; Senior Warrant Officers Pashuk, Pechiborshch; Reserve Lieutenant Colonels Afanasyev, Belousov

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#### **Chairman of Supreme Soviet Veterans' Committee Interviewed**

90UM0543A Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT  
in Russian No 14, 2-8 Apr 90 pp 8-9

[Interview with USSR Supreme Soviet Member N. Bosenko, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Veteran and Invalid Affairs, by parliamentary correspondent N. Belous: "Anxiety, Pain, Joy"]

[Text]

[Belous] Nikolay Vasilyevich! What can you say about the status of veterans in our country? Do you feel that all problems of the veterans' movement, or at least most of them, have been solved?

[Bosenko] I can't give a straight-forward answer to this question. It would seem that veterans are held in esteem in our country, and that many party and government decrees have been adopted attesting to attention to them and to the granting of large numbers of benefits and privileges. But this is from one side. On the other side, many good decisions still remain only on paper. The society still hasn't solved the problem of housing for war invalids, not to mention war veterans, laborers of the rear and the families of the fallen. Nor is the situation any better with health services, with installing telephones in apartments, and with providing transportation. Around a million of our veterans live alone, and they need constant care.

If we add to this the difficult material position of many of them, the picture becomes gloomy.

Although the veterans are a steadfast lot, they do have a limit to their patience.

Now the veteran organization has its own USSR people's deputies, and the USSR Supreme Soviet has its Committee for Veteran and Invalid Affairs. They in fact were the initiators of the adoption of the decree "On Emergency Measures to Improve Pension Support and Social Services to the Population" in the very first session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. This document will help us not only make the pension support provided to kolkhoz farmers equal to that of blue and white collar workers, but it will also significantly improve the lot of the indigent. Of course, this is only the beginning of a great effort to protect the rights and interests of the elderly. We need a concrete state program.

But here is what I would like to say. We can't reduce concern for veterans just to "punching out" benefits and other blessings. Life was never a bed of roses for people of the older generations; they are used to both difficulties and deprivations. But attention is something they need as much as they need air. We shouldn't be sparing of kind words and warm hearts. These things must be sensed both in the family and in the collective in which they worked or are still working. There is also another thought that I can't shake. Veterans are not always able to take advantage of the benefits offered to them. Consequently what I see as the objective of our committee in the Supreme Soviet is to make sure that the laws and decrees we adopt work!

[Belous] We sometimes encounter the assertion in the press and on radio and television that veterans are conservative people, that they all live in the past, almost going as far as idolizing the times of Stalin and Brezhnev. We have even come across the term "anti-perestroika forces," which supposedly long for the woeful memories of the "period of stagnation." How do you personally, Nikolay Vasilyevich, and your committee feel about such assertions?

[Bosenko] Let me say this precisely and categorically: The sort of person one is—an innovator or a conservative—has nothing to do with age. I am forever coming across 70-year-old "youngsters" burning with a thirst for activity, and 20-year-old "oldsters"—inert people infected with parasitism and consumerism. So what do you think, from whom is there greater benefit to society, who will give more to perestroika—the untiring, perpetually seeking veteran, or the young person who often looks at life from inside a car bought for him by his parents?

We could of course give a newspaper or a magazine a photograph of an officer in a tunic, a war veteran with all of his medals and attach the "Stalinist" label to it for the simple reason that he lived and fought against our enemies at a time when the country was ruled by Stalin. But is this fair? I would put the question even more roughly: Isn't this blasphemous in relation to distinguished people, to those who raised the country to the ranks of the great powers and deflected misfortune away from it, who dispersed the smoke of the ovens of

Oswiecim and the torches of the "Sonderkommanden" as they neared our cities and towns?

Of course, there are people among the millions of veterans who assess the past in a manner not to the liking of some of us today. But each has the right to his own point of view. It should be remembered that history is what was. To write it from scratch, and all the more so to rewrite it, is not allowed. But there are some who are trying to remake the past to their own liking, and create for themselves a business out of what is cheap and fashionable today. These are the sort who are running down their own people.

[Belous] What, then, is your assessment of negative articles in the press about our army, state security organs and internal troops?

[Bosenko] Criticism of negative phenomena in the army and other state institutions is necessary and useful. But in my opinion some of the articles that are published clearly go overboard. Men in uniform are sometimes derided with no concern for facts or evidence. They are looked at as "occupiers" and generally as narrow-minded people. This I feel to be slanderous to our defenders of the motherland. Many events, including of recent years, have confirmed their bravery, nobility and unselfishness.

Both in the war and in our days, the Soviet soldier—private, officer, general—was and remains an internationalist, a humanist, a person of good will. And it was never otherwise. He has always been a patriot, prepared to die in the name of the most sacred—the fatherland, in the name of the people.

[Belous] What can you say about the situation in the country, what ways do you see of stabilizing it?

[Bosenko] We are currently experiencing a complex and difficult period. Labor collectives, private citizens and organizations are expressing to the USSR Supreme Soviet their sense of anxiety over the country's destiny.

Workers, scientists, representatives of public organizations and especially the veterans write that recently certain political schemers, cloaking themselves with the status of informal organizations, working with various sorts of national chauvinists and leaders of the shadow economy, and speculating on the difficulties and the sentiments they engender in the people, are methodically pushing for immediate estrangement of the party from political life, and encouraging national enmity and social internecine warfare. Pluralism of opinions has been replaced by the dictatorship of rallies and strikes.

Organized by someone's experienced hand, a wave of rallies, demonstrations and strikes, and even pogroms in some places, has rolled over the entire country, and as with any other blind force of nature, it has left behind itself material losses, and in some places even blood as well. The Supreme Soviet, which is only taking its first, and not always successful steps, needs support not from

the shrill voices of self-appointed orators, and not from a frenzied mob, but from the honest, conscientious labor of each of us. And so it is that the veterans are appealing to the Soviet Union to stop this revelry of anarchy, which often supplants democracy!

Speculating on pluralism of opinions and glasnost, loud "gratifiers" of public interests are soiling the sacred name of Lenin, and concepts precious to every Soviet citizen such as motherland, October and patriotism. Disrespect for the law and a readiness to do violence are being persistently introduced into the consciousness of the people. Those mass media which have either become confused in the complexities of the current moment or which have consciously assumed the positions of service to the egoistic interests of individual groupings that have usurped the right to speak in behalf of all the people, do not play the last role in this. They declare any criticism directed at them to be attacks upon glasnost.

Enough time has passed to feel certain that it is their hands and their mouths that are conducting the purposeful and coordinated campaign to discredit the armed forces, KGB organs, MVD troops, and workers of the courts and the procuracy—that is, those institutions of executive power which are one of the most important and necessary guarantees of the security of the state and society.

War and labor veterans are taking everything happening in the country close to heart. There is nothing dearer, after all, to a real patriot, to one who defended our country without sparing his own life, who selflessly labored for its good, who gave it the best years of his life, than its destiny. The country has now found itself in a difficult and complex position, but we have only one motherland after all, there is no other, and there cannot be any other. The pain of the motherland is our pain, the joy of the motherland is our joy. It cannot be otherwise!

[Belous] Nikolay Vasilyevich, a special Congress of USSR People's Deputies was held, and the third session of the Supreme Soviet is continuing its work. Their decisions touched upon all peoples of the country, including veterans. What are the prospects for solving in the future the problems directly affecting the veteran public?

[Bosenko] The new Law on Pensions, which is presently being drafted, is to improve the material status of the elderly, invalids and the poorly provided-for strata of the population. Following nationwide discussion of the law, it is to be adopted at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The opinion of the veteran public is being taken into maximum account. Flaws in the existing pension law and the deleterious action of a number of departmental instructions are now becoming especially clear.

For example, our veterans have a great longing to go to work. Many of them still have enough strength, and most importantly, they possess the experience that the national economy needs so much today. But they cannot



work at full strength, because they are not permitted to receive wages through honest labor.

Each day we receive 500 or more letters. Many of them contain requests and demands: Fight to repeal the infamous "ceilings" on wages for working pensioners! Such a "ceiling" was repealed for workers and foremen by the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies. I think that the time has now come to do the same for all categories of working pensioners. They earned their pension through many years of labor, and they should receive it. And a person on a pension who earned money by his own labor should receive the full amount.

We are already getting used to the idea that certain cooperative workers are earning eight hundred to a thousand rubles a month. But why are we frightened by a pensioner who receives a total of 300 rubles from his pay and his pension? What is the result of such an attitude in real life? That, for example, after retiring, a highly experienced design engineer goes to work for a cooperative as a janitor. And all because he is not permitted to receive earned money. Who gains from this, the state? Hardly!

There is one other fact of social injustice in relation to veterans and invalids. While a war invalid—a person who had suffered, and who had lost his health in the war—was working in the national economy, he received wages and a disability pension. But then old age drew near, and the former soldier retired for reason of age. And on the spot, literally automatically, his disability pension was cancelled. Is it fair that these people are suddenly equated to those who had not been at the front, who had not been wounded?

[Belous] We often hear about continuity of generations, about the elderly muttering that young people are supposedly not like they used to be, and on the other hand about young people who are not always complimentary of the elderly.

[Bosenko] A demand to develop an integral state policy regarding the senior generation has been voiced on several occasions at congresses of people's deputies and at sessions of the Supreme Soviet. Laws on veterans and invalids as yet nonexistent in our country must become the legal basis of this policy. Proposals directed at resolving these issues were voiced in statements by deputies K. Mazurov, A. Golyakov, I. Klochkov and many other representatives of the veteran organization.

I remember the words of my associate—Deputy I. Klochkov, who, speaking from the podium of the Second Congress, said that secure old age is not a manifestation of charity, but a responsibility of society. This motive also resounds in thousands of letters to the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Veteran and Invalid Affairs. What makes me happy is that things like this are being written not only by the veterans themselves or their relatives. These thoughts are also being expressed by the young, by those who inherited the noble deeds of the senior generation. Concern for this generation, they

write, must become a high moral obligation of all Soviet people, and the most important responsibility of state organizations and every labor collective. I do not share the opinion that young people are "not like they used to be." This is stupid and absurd. What I would ask of those who think this way is this: Who is now working in the plants, factories and everywhere else? The lion's share of them are young people. Though this is less noticeable in the countryside (where veterans are the more frequent source of help). Of course, there is a sizable group of young people of the sort I described at the start as being indifferent, but on the whole they are smarter and more capable than us, the future belongs to the young, and it is they who will be entrusted with the helm of this great ship. But let them rest upon the shoulders of their senior comrades.

Soldier-internationalists who lost their health during the Afghanistan war require attention and protection today. Many of them have terrible housing conditions, they have no telephones, their pensions are very low, and there is a limit on their earnings. Such injustice should not be!

[Belous] The 45th anniversary of the Great Victory is drawing near. How do you think it should be celebrated? The conditions in the country are changing, after all.

[Bosenko] USSR people's deputies representing the All-Union Organization of Veterans of War and Labor and the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Veteran and Invalid Affairs proposed during the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies that we celebrate the victory's 45th anniversary as a jubilee and as a nationwide holiday. Drafting of a decree on this holiday is currently being completed in the USSR government. It foresees both solemn rituals and certain benefits to participants of the Great Patriotic War and to laborers of the rear.

[Belous] What would you wish for veteran and young readers of SOVETSKIY PATRIOT?

[Bosenko] First of all, of course, faith in the victory of perestroika, and successful activity in the name of our motherland. This is something worth working for. I would say to myself and to the readers, enough, we've talked ourselves out, let's get to work.

#### **Organization Established To Defend Rights of Georgian Soldiers**

90UM0570A Tbilisi MOLODEZH GRUZII in Russian  
13 Apr 90 p 2

[Gruzinform article: "Society for the Defense of Service Members"]

[Text] A philanthropic social organization to defend the interests and rights of Georgian servicemen provokes natural questions with its name. Defend against whom? By whose efforts? The society's constituent conference in Tbilisi answered these and other questions.

The number of boys from Georgia who have died in the last year in performance of military service beyond the



borders of the republic was announced. It has reached 80. And there are also many who have been disabled. So-called "dedovshchina," beatings by officers, and other criminal and shameful phenomena which today go with service in the Army, and difficulties with the language and acclimatization, make the already hard years, far from the motherland, unbearable for many. This was the testimony of letters to home, numerous complaints of parents to the republic commissariat, and raids by its representatives to various military units on the territory of the USSR.

Georgia has no superfluous sons—there cannot be two opinions on this matter. Nor about the need for their protection. Agreed on this were the archpriest of the Kashvet church, Father Elizbar, the chairman of the republic Association of Soldiers' Mothers, the writer Marika Baratashvili, and other parents and representatives of the society.

The writer Guram Pandzhikidze, representing here the All-Georgian Philanthropic society of David Armashenebeli, stated, to approval from the hall, that obviously the first step in assistance should be legal education of draftees. He called for preparation and reproduction of brochures which would contain a list of rights and explain the legal status of the draftee in the ranks of the armed forces, and in the name of his society he promised material support.

The speakers talked of the tasks of the new society, and suggested that areas of activity be determined that are feasible and realistic today: help to handicapped individuals and families of fallen service members, and preparation of conditions for the creation of national formations, and military service by persons from Georgia on its territory. As for the latter, those gathered received food for thought from an official of the republic commissariat, Zaur Gogrichiani. He noted that the recent attempt to create a national battalion failed because of the lack of Georgian officer personnel. This problem also entails another: the need to raise the prestige of military service through the revival of Georgian military traditions, and the re-creation of military training institutions on republic territory to train national cadres.

"Everyone who shares our tasks and work methods may join our society," said Malkhaz Badzagua, who was elected its president. "We plan to set up funds and conduct commercial activity, and establish businesslike ties with local and foreign philanthropic societies and organizations..."

#### **Kazakhstan's Nazarbayev Issues Decree on Veterans' Privileges**

90UM0563C Moscow VETERAN in Russian No 19,  
7-13 May 90 p 16

[Unattributed article: "For You, Veterans!"]

[Excerpt] The Kazakh president, N. Nazarbayev, has promulgated the Decree: "On Additional Benefits for Disabled and Participants in the Great Patriotic War, for

Internationalist Soldiers and Families of Killed Servicemen" and these benefits are above those established in line with the 45th Anniversary of the Victory by the Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of 14 April 1990. In this document the Republic President has instructed the Kazakh Council of Ministers, the ministries and departments, the oblsipolkoms, the Alma-Ata and Leninskiy Gorisipolkoms, the enterprises and organizations in 1990 to provide housing for the disabled, in 1991, for the participants in the war, persons equivalent to them and the families of deceased servicemen and waiting on housing lists as of 1 January 1990.

The participants of the Great Patriotic War, the internationalist soldiers and the families of deceased servicemen are to be released from rent.

The benefits provided for disabled of the Great Patriotic War in paying for utility services (heating, water, gas and electric power) are to be extended to the participants of the Great Patriotic War and the internationalist soldiers, while the participants of the Great Patriotic War are to be granted the right for the gratis receipt of state and departmental housing and apartments in which they reside as their own personal property.

In 1991, the Alma-Ata Gorisipolkom is to begin building a republic clinical hospital for the disabled of the Great Patriotic War and the internationalist soldiers. Until construction on it is completed, the building of the first municipal hospital with 760 beds is to be turned over for the quarters of the hospital.

The republic Council of Ministers is to extend to the participants of the Great Patriotic War and the internationalist soldiers the monetary rate of expenditures for food and purchasing medicines per patient per day in hospitals (departments and wards of hospital facilities and outpatient clinics) as established for the disabled of the Great Patriotic War.

In 1990, telephones are to be provided for the apartments of the disabled of the Great Patriotic War, the families of deceased servicemen and persons equal to them in the established procedure, and during 1991, in the apartments of participants of the Great Patriotic War and internationalist soldiers.

For the disabled and the participants of the Great Patriotic War and the internationalist soldiers some 1,500 cars are to be allocated from the market supplies for 1990 for sale for personal use while the necessary money is to be allocated for purchasing and presenting to the participants of the Great Patriotic War commemorative gifts with a value of up to 100 rubles as well as setting a procedure for the allocating of money for these purposes by the cost accounting enterprises and budget-supported organizations.

The Kazakh Council of Ministers, the ministries, departments, the oblispolkoms, the Alma-Ata and Leninskiy Gorispolkoms are to take supplementary measures to carry out the current Ukase.

#### **Kochetov Addresses Kiev Formation Party Conference**

90UM0846A Kiev LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA in Russian  
15 May 90 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel N. Gorenko LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA correspondent: "Not a Word Against Conscience and Truth"]

[Text] Today a Communist must not say a single word against conscience and truth if he is truly in favor of the consolidation of party ranks on a principled basis. Such was the resolution passed by the conference of the X formation, attended by the following: Army General K.A. Kochetov, USSR First Deputy Minister of Defense, and Hero of the Soviet Union Colonel General B.V. Gromov commander, district military forces.

Both during the conference and after it we kept thinking with pleasure that changes have taken place in army ranks and there is... perestroika! The report presented by the formation's political department chief and the speeches and discussions of the delegates during the intermissions, revealing a warm and sincere interest in improving the state of affairs in terms of the combat readiness, field training, and discipline, were all proofs, at the conference, that unlike frequent cases in the past, the conference was attended not by dispassionate "party extras," but precisely communists, people of honor and duty, who do not accept anyone's special authority, in the positive meaning of the term, if it is a question of the good of the service. Criticism was heard at the conference addressed at the USSR Ministry of Defense and the district and formation commands. Delegates Colonel K. Kozlov, Lieutenant Colonel V. Snezhkov, Major P. Belyak, Captain V. Bereza and others spoke on the basis of profound party, principle-minded and honest positions, not for the sake of saying nice things, as we say, but truly in the interests of the cause, of the perestroika which is today taking place in the district's armed forces. The conference had as its theme not to say a single word against conscience and truth but inflexibly to stand on the Marxist-Leninist positions of the CPSU Central Committee and not to retreat a single step from the party line but to defend the title of CPSU member, aggressively to promote ideological work and give decisive battle to the efforts of destructive forces to draw the masses over on their side; such were today the moods and views of 300 delegates—trusted and acknowledged leaders of the formation.

The high political spirit displayed at the conference and the profoundly party-oriented nature of the statements by the delegates, and the patriotism of the atmosphere in which the discussions were held were noted in an interview granted by Army General K.A. Kochetov, USSR

First Deputy Minister of Defense. Asked how he rated the work of the conference, Konstantin Alekseyevich answered:

"I cannot fail to note the constructive nature and relevance of the discussion on combat readiness and the search of ways to improve the quality of the work.... Both the report and the speeches were imbued by the common idea of joining forces in order to ensure further improvements in the quality of combat training and to unite the collective on a party basis. The latter is considered particularly important. Given the recent circumstances, when attacks on the party are intensifying, the armed forces of the USSR and our moral-political and organizational unity play a decisive role in the destinies of perestroika and the fate of the country. Today we must rally on the basis of the CPSU Central Committee Platform and the basic Leninist positions as presented in the party's Central Committee letter. This is our military duty. We have no right to stand aside when it becomes necessary to defend the party.

"The speeches made us realize that the people are concerned. They are concerned with the disparity between the organizational-personnel structures and the tasks as well as the fate of perestroika in the armed forces. On that level as well constructive statements are precisely what is needed. There was criticism addressed at the USSR Ministry of Defense, and let me say that we too are concerned with such problems and we think and seek ways of solving them, particularly problems related to the social protection of military servicemen. In this matter we are unanimous with the views expressed by the delegates. The conference is pursuing a sensible train of thought...."

"Comrade Army General, what are your wishes to the party members in the district's forces on the eve of the 28th Party Congress?"

"During these difficult times for the homeland, I wish to the party members of the Red Banner Kiev Military District, inflexibly to retain their loyalty to the ideas of Leninism. The CPSU Central Committee Platform and the Central Committee letter are to us a vital guideline, a program for action. Mobilize your forces. Act as a monolith with which one can firmly march in the interest of combat readiness...."

To act decisively and energetically to promote plans are the words which define the main idea in the report presented by Major General N. Volkov:

"The political departments and the party organizations were criticized both by their superiors and their subordinates and from the right and the left. However, they are implementing the party's plans. We have worked hard to understand the place of the CPSU in the new situation and we have understood it. The political department of the formation has studied the public opinion in the troops and I can confidently report that 80 percent of the military servicemen are firmly in support of a socialist future."

**Editorial remark.** During the period of preparation for the conference, the political department of the formation held a number of discussions and reviews of the party platform and statutes, which indicated the following: the party members in the forces have a variety of views on basic problems. We believe that a good feature of the work style of the political department is the fact that such contradictory views were not ignored by the political department or did not leave it unnoticed. Efforts were made, such as discussions, debates and clarifications of viewpoints. In the final account, everything was reduced to seeking the truth in understanding the party's place in the armed forces. Such an understanding was reached. This is an unquestionable achievement in the party work done by the communists in the political department. They were able to promote the activeness of CPSU members in the units, as is eloquently confirmed by the following fact: in the course of the discussions of the preconference documents, the formation's party members submitted 800 suggestions. The nature of the suggestions indicates that the party members in the formation heartily accept the position and the concepts formulated by of the CPSU Central Committee.

"The communists in the formation are today thinking about the functions of the party and the state authorities," Major General N. Volkov said. "It is not a matter of indifference to us the way the party will define its foreign and domestic functions under contemporary conditions. Our position is the following: let us not start political battles but build our common Union home together with the people. The CPSU Platform and Statutes provide the necessary tools to this effect."

The idea of the speaker to the effect that some party members today improperly understand the nature of the multiparty system carried some weight and was welcomed with approval.

A multiparty system does not mean any weakening of the positions of the CPSU. Conversely, it presumes, within the party, a stronger discipline and organization. "We, party members, must determine how to act with those party members who are persistently and purposefully promoting a division and creating within the CPSU organized factions, rejecting the socialist choice and, considering their views and behavior, have put themselves outside the party," the speaker stressed. "Today attempts are being made to strike at the political authorities. It is claimed that they are unnecessary. Such individual opinions are sometimes presented as being the opinion of the public. The truth, however, is as follows: 80 percent of anonymously surveyed officers and troops in the formation spoke out in favor of the need for political organs. Here as well we should pay attention to the following: the criticism of political authorities is accompanied by a destructive attitude toward the CPSU. On this matter the Communists-Leninists must assume a clear and strict position toward the 'voiders:' they should get no support. We shall not allow them to destroy the fundamental principle of our military building..."

In their discussion of this problem, the delegates unanimously expressed the opinion of the party members in the armed forces that attacks on the party have not weakened the morale of the personnel. The servicemen in companies and battalions do not doubt the need for political organs. The thought expressed by the speaker, that the uniform answer to the question is a perestroika of political organs in the army under contemporary conditions needed was yes, was supported.

Yes, as the conference indicated, today the party members in the formation are revising their views and determining their line of behavior. We can only be pleased by the fact that in the course of the developed discussion the following impartial fact was mentioned: some party members in the armed forces have acted as renegades, destroying the socialist ideals; others are withdrawing from the struggle by surrendering their party cards quietly and "discreetly"....

The conference clearly proved that the party members are working to master political methods of leadership and distinguishing between command-administrative and party-political functions. For example, both last and this year the political department held a number of meetings on such problems. The result was a real enhancement of the role of the party organizations and party members and of the entire ideological aktiv in shaping the social awareness of the military personnel, consistent with the political realities of the present and the current tasks and objectives of perestroika. For example, the range of problems being discussed has clearly widened. Today there is no topic which has not been discussed in the party organizations of the formation. What is particularly pleasing is that such problems include the future of the building of socialism, the history of the Soviet state, interethnic relations, and ensuring a sensible defense sufficiency for the country. Unquestionably, this cannot fail to have a positive effect on the communist convictions of the troops.

Furthermore, and this is yet another positive feature of the conference and, as a whole, of the climate in the party organizations of the formation, the delegates did not ignore existing difficulties related to this basic ideological problem. For example, they mentioned with concern and with the desire to find a solution of the problem, the fact that occasionally public opinion is shaped during smoke breaks, with the "help," a word which must be put in quotation marks, of the journal OGONEK, the "Outlook" television program, which of late has had a particularly anti-army slant, and individual articles in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. As the delegates pointed out, the Marxist-Leninist training of officers, the political training of ensigns, the political classes attended by soldiers and sergeants and the political education of workers and employees in the Soviet Armed Forces are a powerful instrument, the only proper means the use of which can truly lead to the unity of ideological and political views of the party members. "We note that individual heads of groups are insufficiently trained. There are objective reasons for this but there also is



slackness..." the report mentioned. We believe that it is also the imperative of the time that dictates the idea heard at the conference: it is time to abandon bookishness in political training and to seek new forms to provide it. For example, the delegates displayed profound understanding and support of the view of the political department of the unit, as expressed in the report: "The time has come when it is expedient to consider topics related to the relevant problems of our time, the political and governmental structure of the society, and the traditions of the state and the party. In other words, training must be such that the military personnel is familiar both with the basics and with the current situation. In the 1917-1920 period soldiers described the party program and assessed events in the world. Today some officers with higher training find this difficult. Unquestionably, the time has come to abandon stereotypes in political training and convert to round-table meetings, debates, discussions and talks based on the principle: you ask and we shall answer..."

In short, the conference determined what is important: today ideological work must be open, thoughtful and creatively aimed at the people. Commands must be replaced with social dialogue....

Army General K.A. Kochetov addressed the conference.

"Today the armed forces are one of the guarantors for the stabilization of the situation in the country," the USSR First Deputy Minister of Defense emphasized. "The entire world is looking at us with great hope, for which reason we, the party members in the army and navy, must be up to the tasks which face us.... We must clearly and unequivocally support the CPSU Central Committee Platform and the principled concepts of the CPSU Central Committee letter. I have seen that the party members in your formation are loyal to the ideals and political views of the party; they are united in the strong desire to intensify perestroika in the interests of the combat readiness and strengthening of military discipline."

"The reports submitted by the political department and the party commission have called for open discussion. Questions are constructively asked. There was a criticism of the Ministry of Defense. However, this was not a criticism for its own sake but an indication that we, the leadership, must more specifically deal with problems of perestroika in the armed forces...."

In speaking of the tasks of the party members in the military district and the formations, Army General K.A. Kochetov singled out the training of officers.

"Converting to quality parameters in combat training is, above all, an indication of the professionalism of the officers. In this area a number of unsolved problems remain. I wish success to the party members in the district in this noble effort!"

Army General K.A. Kochetov noted that 1990 will be a decisive year in solving the key problems of perestroika

in the USSR Armed Forces. He appealed to the party members of the formation to submit to the USSR Ministry of Defense and the General Staff specific suggestions and share their experience in perestroika in order to formulate the optimal organizational structures which would make it possible efficiently to solve problems of military service and combat training. The USSR First Deputy Minister of Defense recommended to the command of the formation, and to commanders and political organs to resolve more daringly, on the spot, problems of the daily life of officer families by making use of the buildings used for training facilities and, if necessary, the staff premises. Everything necessary must be done in the interest of the individual, at which point the combat readiness will increase....

The people say that if the mood is good there will be action. The mood of the party members in the formation is high, patriotic and profoundly party oriented. This will be embodied in its activities aimed at the further enhancement of combat readiness....

#### **Dep Chief GlavPUR Col Gen G. Stefanovskiy on Role of Ideology**

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*VOORUZHENNYKH SIL* in Russian No 12, Jun 90  
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[Article, published under the Heading "The Reader Interviews," by Col Gen Gennadiy Aleksandrovich Stefanovskiy, deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy: "From Lip Service to the Realities of Life"]

[Text] The process of restructuring all domains of the Army and Navy vital activity evokes the urgent need for renewal of the thinking and consciousness of military personnel. And this is closely bound with ideological work. Its mechanism, as in the past, is focused primarily toward forming socialist consciousness in army and navy personnel. This is also indicated by numerous letters from our readers. Today Col Gen Gennadiy Aleksandrovich Stefanovskiy, deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, will answer questions contained in these letters.

• • •

The term "ideological situation" [ideologicheskaya situatsiya] has recently come into use. Just what does it mean? What are the principal features of the ideological situation in the Armed Forces?

**Maj A. Kovrig, Belorussian Military District**

As I see it, the term "ideological situation" pertains to the aggregate of all those features which are characteristic of public consciousness in a given period, at a given stage in the development of the state, in a given region and collective. Ideological situation is an extremely flexible phenomenon. Its "coloration," its inner content and forms of manifestation, as is indicated both by the



experience of history and the time of perestroika, can change fairly rapidly, in relation to the realities of societal being. I shall cite the following example. At the initial stage of perestroika the most typical feature of the ideological situation in this country was a mood and tone favoring rapid renewal and purging our common home of stagnation layers and relapses. A highly critical attitude toward everything "from past time" which hindered movement forward predominated in the societal consciousness. The institutions of glasnost and democracy and a campaign for social justice showed powerful development.

The ideological situation began to change appreciably approximately a year or two after April 1985. A note of alarm sounded in the societal consciousness: concern with backslipping of perestroika. Practical realities dictated the need for a profound political and economic reform. The course of its implementation once again engendered new features of the ideological situation: ideological pluralism appeared, receiving organizational configuration through the activities of parties, politicized associations, and structures which were forming.

As regards the ideological situation in the Armed Forces, in my view it contains, with a certain relative autonomy, a great deal of that which was characteristic of the ideological situation as a whole: active politicization of the masses, profound concern by people for the fate of perestroika, highly critical rejection of social injustice, a strong desire for comprehensive development of democratic principles, and the wish to have living conditions, working conditions, conditions of rest and recreation, diet, etc which are worthy of the Soviet citizen.

At the same time certain specific features, inherent only in the ideological situation in the Armed Forces, are characteristic of it alone. They include the exacerbated issues of prestige of military service, poor social protection for military personnel, errors of omission in their military and ethical/moral [nравstvenny] indoctrination, and entirely unsatisfactory interethnic relations in many military units.

We should note that a substantial effect on the ideological situation in the Army and Navy was exerted by the decision of the special Congress of People's Deputies to revise Article 6 of the USSR Constitution. Public opinion in military units is presently experiencing a state of "heightened anticipation" in connection with the forthcoming 28th CPSU Congress. The attention of military personnel is also focused on military reform, Armed Forces reduction, withdrawal of forces from Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and a great many other things being engendered by the "multicolored" fields and zones in the societal consciousness.

I would assume that there is no need to expatiate on the point of how important it is for the commander and political worker clearly to gain his bearings in the ideological situation, to see the various trends in public opinion, and to respond to them in an appropriate way.

In spite of its great diversity and complexity, a focus on ensuring national security continues to be a dominating principle for Armed Forces personnel. It is important today not to be misled by the delusion which essentially consists in the shopworn thesis that imperialism has fundamentally changed and has become peace-loving in the military domain. One must be totally blind not to see that imperialism has become accustomed to making peace-seeking signs with one hand, while the other hand is signing contracts for new consignments of death-dealing weapons or military programs.

**The process of intensive politicization of the masses is today an objective reality. Nor has it bypassed Armed Forces personnel. What is the essence of this process, and what are its characteristic features? How is this reflected on the political and ethical/moral state of the army and navy? What new problems are facing ideological workers in the light of this process?**

**Maj Ye. Gavrilov, Air Defense Forces**

Intensive politicization of Armed Forces personnel is a reflection of a process which is common to our entire country. Today Soviet citizens are increasingly realizing that they in fact are becoming active participants in events which are defining the political affairs of the state and society. Evidence of this is the elections of USSR people's deputies, as well as elections to republic and local soviets, congresses of people's representatives, USSR Supreme Soviet sessions, and discussion of the CPSU Central Committee draft platform for the 28th CPSU Congress.

Among the most important features of politicization of personnel are affirmation of glasnost, freedom of opinion on any and all political problems, establishment of new and improvement of existing democratic institutions in military collectives, and enhancement of the role of party and Komsomol organizations, Officers' Assemblies, the military community, and women's councils in resolving matters pertaining to military duty and service, plus personnel and social matters, matters pertaining to living conditions and services, as well as many other problems.

How does politicization reflect on the political-moral state of the Army and Navy? To state it in a single word—positively, for people now have the opportunity to reason in a conscious manner about all issues. It is appropriate to emphasize, however, that the process of politicization does not universally and unequivocally influence their political-moral state. There are frequent instances where, encountering a lip-service attitude and bureaucracy, people simply give up in resignation, and sometimes become embittered as well. Of course these people need help and support.

Politicization has resulted in a number of totally new, previously unknown problems and issues. And this has caused a certain amount of ideological confusion on the part of some political workers, including ideological cadres, as well as a fear of entering into an open

discussion, dialogue, or debate with people. Some have even panicked. As a result I frequently hear nowadays: "How should one reply to this question?" and "What position should I take?" The answer here is both simple and complicated at the same time: no matter what, one must approach people, listen to what they have to say, and speak the truth, no matter how bitter it may be. The truth also educates. It instills the pain of patriotic awareness, consciousness of the need for vigorous actions in the campaign for perestroika and for a better future for our socialist homeland.

Demands on ideological workers, their professional competence, and personal qualities: knowledgeability, approachability, the ability to listen to and hear what people have to say, unity of word and deed, personal exemplariness in performance of duty, unpretentiousness, and modesty have increased in these conditions.

Today there is plenty of talk about how unity of word and deed, honest dialogue with others, and closeness to people are particularly important in ideological work. Practical experience indicates, however, that some places these demands continue to "live" in the form of slogans and are being transformed into daily reality very slowly and with great difficulty. What are the reasons for this? Has the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy devised specific ways to resolve these patently neglected problems?

**Capt V. Kudin, Central Group of Forces**

I entirely agree with you, comrade Kudin. Our present ideological work is correct in general, but it is frequently sprinkled with faded slogans and sometimes empty appeals as well. Some people lack respect for the individual and rigorous adherence to moral and ethical principles. It seems to me that another reason for this situation lies in the fact that our serviceman has changed: he has become more educated, more knowledgeable, freer and bolder in his opinions, while many ideological cadres continue to work according to the old scheme, as they say—with "averaged" personnel.

In the Main Political Directorate we can see prospects for improving the content and organization of ideological work in the Army and Navy. Genuine unity and a fusion of indoctrination and daily practical activities are becoming the central idea in upgrading ideological work and improving its results.

For a long time ideology lacked adequate content. It was assigned the role of commentator and publicizer of occurring events. The role in ideology of "architect," forming and shaping capability for transformation, initially in man's consciousness and subsequently in his actions, was patently inadequately appreciated. Emphasis on the active, revolutionary-transforming function of ideology was placed at the foundation of restructuring work with individuals.

The concept of renewal of ideological work is constructed on such principles as affirming democratic

spirit, humanism, focus on man, on the interests of each individual and, in the final analysis, on the interests of all personnel; unity of ideology and ethics/morality; profound consideration of the multiethnic composition of military units; flexibility, dynamic nature, and operational efficiency. In addition, the concept of its restructuring calls for a radical change in the style and method of its organization, securing of direct communication with individuals, and consideration of the actual situation and the tasks being performed by the collective and by each serviceman.

**The endeavor by certain elements to deideologize our spiritual/intellectual [dukhovnyy] affairs is becoming increasingly clearly evident in present-day conditions. At times one encounters practically overt propaganda of the bourgeois way of life and the values of capitalism. A question arises: how under these conditions can we preserve the preeminence of Marxist-Leninist ideology in the spiritual/intellectual affairs of our country and the Armed Forces? Can a forecast of tomorrow be made here?**

**Maj Yu. Pavlov, Western Group of Forces**

Of course one cannot help but notice such tendencies. It would seem, however, that one must clearly distinguish just what this process is. Liberation of a number of domains of societal activity (the domains of the economy and intergovernmental relations, for example) from under the total control of ideology, return to ideology of its traditional place and related functions which are very important for the viability of society—this is one thing. But when under the pretext of deideologization there occurs derogation of socialist ideology, the foisting of ideas alien to our society, and attempts to push Marxism-Leninism outside the domain of spiritual/intellectual affairs and societal consciousness—this, you will agree, is something else altogether. This is why a firm position and vigorous actions on the part of our propagandists in defending vitally important socialist ideals and values as well as a bold and resolute struggle for Marxism-Leninism and for the ideas of renewal of socialism are particularly important today.

Closely linked with these actions are efforts to reinstate the preeminence of Marxist-Leninist theory. Although I would somewhat refine the task in this area. It would seem that what is needed is restoration of the genuinely living soul of this theory, its method and critical essence, skilled and constructive unification of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism with the consciousness of the masses and their daily practical activities.

**Political instruction comprises the heart of ideological work in the Army and Navy. There has been a great deal of talk about its restructuring, particularly in recent months. And there have been constructive ideas and sensible suggestions. Unfortunately, however, only a little of this is being implemented in a practical manner, and even this is being done slowly and with difficulty, without affecting the "sore spots" of political instruction. The**

impression is formed that this is to the liking of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy.

**Lt Col S. Kondakov, Air Defense Forces**

The Main Political Directorate is of course aware of deficiencies in the domain of political instruction, and they certainly are a cause of concern. As we know, in the last two years a number of substantial changes have been made in the content, forms, and methods of political instruction. It has been decentralized, greater autonomy is being established (up to 30 percent of instruction time and topics), taking into account the features of a specific military unit and its assigned missions, and initiative and innovativeness in applying the most effective approaches to organization of things are being encouraged and rewarded; these things are being done on the basis of suggestions by commanders and political agencies.

Unquestionably, however, it will take considerable time to resolve urgent problems, and in the meantime life moves forward. It would be at the very least risky to take rash, hasty measures, without conducting experiments and studies, without synthesizing a vast quantity of observations. The Politpodgotovka-92 research project is currently under way under the guidance and with the participation of the Main Political Directorate, and a general plan is being drawn up for renewal of the organization, content and methodology of political instruction, taking into account the realities of the ideological situation in this country, in the Armed Forces, and the specific features of personnel.

**The constructive role of ideology, and political instruction in particular, loses all meaning without educating people on the positive. In connection with this both I and many of my colleagues are concerned by the following problem: how is one to go on when today practically the entire past of our socialist state, not to mention the present, is portrayed in such dark hues? From where can one draw faith and optimism?**

**Maj A. Stepanov, Moscow Military District**

I agree with the author of this question. Indeed, one notices in the domain of ideology a dangerous tilt in the direction of "across-the-board" casting of aspersions. There are those for whom negativism has become a kind of fad, and it frequently displaces the lofty, the noble, the traditionally sacred. Army and Navy ideological workers find themselves in a difficult situation. It is necessary to explain to people that critical analysis of the past and present is an extremely complex process. The mud of derogation and inflammatory garbage are being mixed in with the pure, heavy-running spring freshets of renewal.

But one must have faith that healthy forces in society will gain the upper hand, that no mud will cause the gold of our heroic history and our moral ideals to darken. Finally, one must draw faith in the fact that time subjects each new generation to a tough test of faithfulness to the ideals of the highest moral standard and the ability to

defend these ideals. One must be prepared for this. People must be taught this. One should draw one's faith and optimism from this.

**In my opinion the majority of our problems with political instruction classes, backward methods, and a lip-service approach lie in the fact that political instruction classes are not conducted by political workers. How do you feel about having this handled exclusively by political workers?**

**Lt Col Yu. Koltsov, Strategic Missile Forces**

This is not a new statement of the issue. There is a kernel of reason here. Nevertheless let us look at it in a sober and pragmatic fashion. The company or battery deputy commander for political affairs, for example, can gather together a hundred men in the barracks and conduct a lecture. But will he be able to reach each individual, as we put it, when it is necessary to determine the level of assimilation of the material by each man? I doubt it. It is better to do this in a group of 20 to 25 persons. Consequently, the political worker must then work with each platoon, which will involve complicated reorganization of the conduct of political instruction classes. Will the effectiveness of instruction be increased with such an approach? It is hard to say at this point. I feel that all commanders and superiors with subordinates should work with political indoctrination. Today it is clear that this requires a high degree of training and competence. At the same time I must agree that each political worker should lead a political training group. This also is a firm recommendation of the Main Political Directorate. In addition, political workers should do a better job of teaching all group instructors, of helping them be good indoctrinators of their men and of mastering the art of human psychology.

**For many years we have been saying that the topics of political instruction classes in the training schedules of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy are formulated in an extremely abstruse fashion. An example of this is the schedule for 1990. Is it really impossible to select topics which would arouse interest in people by their very titles? Can they not be made so that yesterday's high-school and vocational-school student can understand them?**

**Lt N. Danilyuk, Transbaykal Military District**

A valid comment. Political training should be organized taking into account the men's interests and needs. We have therefore already revised the political training schedule for primary-rank enlisted personnel and non-commissioned officers for the coming year, making it simpler in content and enriching it as regards forms of conduct of instruction classes. Practical realities, the development of events in this country, and changes in the qualitative composition of trainees urgently dictate that this work be continued. And I have a question in this regard. What do you personally, Comrade Danilyuk, and other staff and volunteer propagandists see as the



subject matter of political instruction classes? Communicate your responses to the Main Political Directorate and to the journal KOMMUNIST VOORUZHEN-NYKH SIL so that they can be taken into consideration in further improving political training both for the 1991 training year and beyond.

**I can state, based on my own service experience, that some of the directives issued by the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy are not grounded in full measure on the realities of Army and Navy life. Take, for example, the introduction of agitation and propaganda groups and agitation and propaganda units. Practical experience has shown that these are "stillborn babies." Nor are groups on interethnic relations operating. Question: how are suggestions and requests from the "grass-roots" level—from the immediate executors—studied and taken into consideration when drawing up directives and plans?**

**Maj V. Polezhayev, Air Defense Forces**

Experience has indeed shown that the effectiveness of all ideological work, as well as that of its organizers, including non-staff ideological establishments, depends in large measure on taking into consideration the actual situation and the suggestions of practical workers. Forgetting this fact leads to serious errors of omission, which are typical of the activities of many agitation and propaganda units and groups and commissions on interethnic relations.

What is the reason here, as I see it? It is that in many cases the persons selected for these groups and units either had no propensity for indoctrination work or were poorly prepared for such work. A kind of "tacit rule" appeared, according to which a group, for example, should contain from 13 to 15 persons. And yet in some units and naval ships there may be far fewer properly-trained activists who are able to and want to conduct verbal propaganda on a daily basis, to hold lectures, present reports, and to take part in debate and round-table discussions.

Practical experience dictates the necessity of revising the principles of obtaining and assigning manpower to our volunteer ideological establishments as well as their system of functioning. I believe that this revision will affect agitation and propaganda groups and units. We must put an end once and for all to the "method" of assigning people to the body of ideological activists on the basis of position held rather than according to objective data: those who are capable of conducting ideological work and who have the respect of the men.

As for interethnic relations groups and commissions, we must acknowledge that here as well we have not thought everything out thoroughly. Democratic principles of electing the members of these public organizations, for example. Some places they have been done in by haste and the endeavor to respond immediately to the situation, and there has also been excessive attention to form with consequent detriment to content. I believe that in

the future, in order to avoid various mistakes, it would be advisable not only more thoroughly to prepare directive documents and more thoroughly to study the opinion of ideological activists, but also to utilize, say, prior to their final adoption, provisional instructions and regulations, to conduct experiments in the line units and the fleets, and to consult with scholars and practical workers. Only after this should a final version be adopted.

I believe it is high time to consolidate the numerous groups, councils, units, and other non-T/O subdivisions tasked with personnel indoctrination into ideological commissions attached to political agencies, party and Komsomol committees, which would determine and organize comprehensive work with personnel, would consolidate the best-prepared personnel for this purpose, and would designate the most important problems in this area.

**Tens of thousands of books published by Voenizdat and which nobody is interested in reading are just so much deadwood in unit and officers' club libraries. And yet there is a shortage of books which are really in demand. What does the Main Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy see as the solution to this problem?**

**Capt Ya. Stokov, Siberian Military District**

Yes, the Main Political Directorate has received such reports. We feel that the solution lies in studying and taking into consideration reader demand more precisely, thoroughly, and scientifically, as well as the needs of the Army and Navy readership, which constitutes a most important duty of the section for study of public opinion. We have laid out and are implementing a program for putting things in proper order in this area, a program which provides both for culling libraries of obsolete materials and providing them with new materials. The Voenizdat list of titles is also undergoing a radical revision, and Voenizdat is increasingly working with the most interesting authors.

**The Lenin room should be a place for relaxation or a unique ideological center, with revision of requirements on its arrangement and layout proceeding from this assumption. What is your opinion on this score?**

**Maj S. Apalkov, Turkestan Military District**

The purpose of the Lenin room (cabin) was always, from the very first days of its existence, considered primarily from the political and indoctrinational point of view. Its content unquestionably should first and foremost help military personnel assimilate those points which are essential for conscious implementation of the Leninist legacy and performance of one's constitutional duty. At the same time we must free Lenin rooms from excessive cluttering with crude display stands, boards, and other, frequently depersonalized, crude artifacts. They are tasked with meeting the thirst for information, with



increasing knowledge, with providing intelligent relaxation and recreation, and with providing intercommunication at boring moments of personnel off-duty time.

**One observes a certain paradox: frequently political workers who have been guilty of some offense or who are deemed unpromising end up directing cultural and educational establishments. Will an end be put to this harmful practice?**

**Maj G. Shustov, Kiev Military District**

Yes, there have been cases where political workers guilty of an offense or without prospects for advancement are appointed to head cultural and educational establishments. I cannot deny it. It is also possible that in many cases their positions remain vacant due to a drop in the prestige of cultural and educational workers. But this of course under no circumstances can justify the decisions of those political and personnel agencies which assign a political worker who has been guilty of an offense to "serve out his days" at an enlisted personnel or officers' club, which only does harm. The Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy is taking measures to effect a decisive change in this bad personnel policy. Every such case should be reviewed by a political agency or party organization, and a firm decision should be taken.

**The present poor cultural level on the part of military personnel and their families gives rise to serious concern. And all this is occurring against the background of declining interest in activities conducted at cultural and educational establishments. Where can a solution to this situation be found?**

**Capt V. Pomorokov, Transbaikalian Military District**

The problem of culture is a national problem. Perestroika has clearly revealed that we, formerly "the most reading, the most viewing, the most listening, the most educated," have proven to be far from that. The younger generation frequently grows up without receiving a proper cultural upbringing and education in the family, at kindergarten, at elementary and secondary school, and at college. The majority of young men have this deficiency when they enter military service school. Our military service schools are lagging seriously behind in the domain of personnel cultural awareness, a high level of which had traditionally distinguished the Soviet officer corps. In short, we need fundamental adjustments, and this is being done.

...Why do military personnel and their families have diminished interest in cultural and educational establishments? On the one hand, it seems to me, a certain role has been played by the mass spread of "passive intellectual crass materialism." On the other hand, the officer and warrant officer, with the present poor organization of the workday, simply has no time for cultural and educational establishments. And finally, these establishments themselves do not always precisely take into

account the interests of their visitors and the new elements of the processes taking place in intellectual affairs and in the social consciousness of military personnel and their families. I see resolution of this problem as the primary solution to this situation.

**Today even military-political publications contain many appeals to discontinue forming an "image of the enemy" in military personnel. I would like to know how one can develop defenders of the homeland and conduct counter-propaganda work in these conditions?**

**Maj M. Polinyakin, Air Defense Forces**

As we know, the expression "image of the enemy" [obraz vraga] migrated to us from overseas. It is not in conformity with the essence of our policy and ideological principles. A forced emotional, hysterical spirit of focusing the public consciousness toward a specific "enemy" has never been characteristic of our propaganda. I would say that it is much more valid to state in this case that the level of military threat has diminished, but that it has not been totally eliminated and constitutes a reality, that even in conditions of warming of the international climate it is essential constantly to display political and military vigilance. The military man should have a genuine awareness of processes in the political and military domains. We have been entrusted by the Soviet people with the task of defending the security of the socialist homeland, and therefore we cannot, we do not have the right to slip into pacifism. There simply is no place in the military for pacifism.

**These days we political workers cannot help but be concerned by the following question: what is going to be the fate of political agencies and all Army and Navy political personnel after Article 6 of the USSR Constitution is amended and after the changeover to a multiparty system has been accomplished? What is your personal view on this problem?**

**Maj V. Lednev, Volga-Ural Military District**

This question is an invitation to engage in prediction. Well, I shall not avoid responding to it. The situation for the conduct of party-political work has changed sharply and requires that existing realities be taken into account. I am convinced that the prestige and authority of the Communist and the party worker has never been measured by directive; it has been grounded on practical results, on personal example in one's work and conduct. I think that even in conditions of a revised Article 6 of the Constitution and establishment of a multiparty system, both political agencies and political workers of units, naval ships, and subunits constitute an important component element of the military structure. We can assume that the structure and functions of political agencies will be refined and that political workers will engage in indoctrination of personnel. No army anywhere in the world can get along without professionally skilled and qualified educators and indoctrinators. Our military cannot constitute an exception.

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**Col Gen Makashov Comments on Military Reform**

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[Interview of Colonel General A. Makashov, Commander of the Volga-Ural Military District Forces, conducted by an unnamed correspondent, under the rubric "Express Questionnaire": "Three Questions for the Commander"]

[Text] Commander of the Volga-Ural Military District Forces Colonel General A. Makashov:

[Correspondent] 1. In view of military reform, what has already changed in the lives and activities of the troops entrusted to you?

[Makashov] It has become more difficult for everyone to do their job: from commanders of groups of forces to platoon commanders. The Army is becoming smaller. The discharge of a large quantity of officers (500 thousand in number) came like a bolt from the blue. The troops were neither materially nor spiritually prepared for the cutback. It was not necessary to unleash a campaign against the army in the mass media in order to reduce the Armed Forces.

The antimilitary attitudes, which have risen in the society, have struck at the patriotism and romanticism of military service more than anything else.

[Correspondent] In your opinion, what should be the ultimate goal of reform in the Armed Forces?

[Makashov] The ultimate goal of perestroika in the Armed Forces should be increasing their combat readiness, and consequently, strengthening the State as a whole.

[Correspondent] In your opinion, what are the main obstacles along the path to the profound changes, which are demanded by the times, in the Army and Navy?

[Makashov] A misunderstanding of the army's purpose by part of the society. Pacificism, which is unjustified and unsupported by reality, has never benefited the strengthening of the country's defense capability.

And, finally, the lack of materiel.

**Col Gen Pyankov Interviewed on Military Reform**

90UM0823A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
8 Aug 90 First Edition p 2

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA interview with Col Gen B. Pyankov, commanding officer, Siberian Military District: "Three Questions for the Commanding Officer"]

[Text]

[KZ] What has already changed in the lives and activity of the troops entrusted to you in the way of military reform?

[Pyankov] A reduction in troop strength is underway, as well as a refinement in troop organization and establishment. Approximately two years is required to complete all the organizational measures.

At the same time work is continuing on finding new jobs for officers and warrant officers who are subject to the reduction in force, but who do not want to leave the army. This also is not so simple, for we must not only find them suitable work, but we must also find them housing and work for their families. But neither are we willing to simply forget about those who were released from the armed forces.

[KZ] In your opinion, what should be the ultimate goal of reforming the armed forces?

[Pyankov] In our military district there are many small garrisons and military villages which are isolated from densely populated centers. It is not very expedient to maintain such complexes, especially since funds allocated for capital repairs and maintenance have been sharply reduced. I maintain that the housing funds for small military villages for which there is little future, should be turned over to the local soviets, while all the smaller garrisons should be liquidated. In this scenario the units from the military villages would be transferred to the larger military towns. There is already a precedent for such an action in our military district. For example, in the Tuvinskaya ASSR local authorities set up a health complex where not long before there had been a small garrison that was transferred to one of the oblast centers.

Optimum force structuring must result from the restructuring measures that are taking place within the framework of reform. After all, small troop organizations cannot totally commit themselves to combat training, carrying out their duties, and proper maintenance of their equipment, all at the same time. Large units must be created that have enough people to carry out these functions. These units should also have special groups which are solely responsible for dealing with matters pertaining to mobilization preparedness.

As the Commanding Officer of this military district, I would not object if there were units under my command made up totally of professional soldiers. But we must be realistic. At present neither the material nor the social conditions exist for creating such an army. Although it is appears that such will be the army of the future.

[KZ] What do you see as the main stumbling blocks which stand in the way of the in-depth reforms required by the changing times in the Army and the Navy?

[Pyankov] There are many obstacles which hinder carrying out reforms. The main one is the tremendous amount of construction required, particularly in

housing. Units are being sent to us which were previously stationed outside the USSR. And we have to quarter them. Barracks are not such a great problem, but where do we house the families of the officers and warrant officers? Many executive committees allocate us hardly any housing. For example, this year we received in all only one-and-a-half percent of the plan in Novosibirsk. And it is no better in other cities. It is true that examples can be given which show just the opposite. The authorities in Kemerovo are particularly sensitive to our needs. But that is only a drop in the bucket.

Our military district is trying to increase the rate of housing construction using what resources we have available. But all the same we will not be able to accommodate every family that needs housing. We don't have the means, and besides, our construction base is inadequate. This means that without the assistance of the government, particularly the local organs of authority, we will not be able to manage.

And one more thing. If you want to talk about housing, then this is what I have to say on that subject: We are in great need of construction units at present. And if we liquidate these units, then in general we will be left without housing. There is not a single civilian construction organization that will perform the amount of work that is necessary.

#### **Shlyaga Announces Increased Media Access to Troops**

90UM0840A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*  
in Russian 10 Aug 90 p 3

[Article by N. Panyukov: "Military Gives the Green Light"]

[Text] **Minister of Defense expands writers' access to military units and combat vessels.**

It would be difficult no doubt, to find a reporter whose creative pursuits were not shattered at least once by the restrictions levied by military authorities. And now it appears that the era of super secrecy is ending. Appearing at a press conference the Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, and other representatives of the USSR Ministry of Defense, gave their assurances that in an effort to insure the most objective reporting on military life, members of the mass media would be given expanded opportunities to visit military units and ships, as well as greater access to information in which they are interested.

In answering questions pertaining to military reform, the USSR Ministry of Defense officials emphasized in particular that at present there is lively discussion underway in the armed forces about the proposed laws affecting defense matters, the status of military personnel, and the law on universal military obligation and military service. Much attention is being given to the protection of military personnel under the rules of social justice. The USSR Ministry of Defense has turned to the USSR

Supreme Soviet, requesting that those functions be removed from their purview that do not befit the role of the military.

During the unusual discussion which took place at the press conference, a question was raised by P. Dunayev, a representative of the weekly publication, *VETERAN*, concerning the status of veterans and war invalids, who in the journalist's opinion, are being turned into an "army of aging ragamuffins".

The Chief of the Main Political Directorate and representatives of the Central Finance Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense and of the Main Military Procuracy, gave their assurances that much has been done of late for the social welfare of veterans that will yield positive results in the near future.

#### **Northern Group of Forces Commander On Military Reform**

90UM0836A Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* in Russian  
11 Aug 90 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Colonel-General V. Dubynin, commander of the Northern Group of Forces: "Express Interview: Three Questions for the Commander".]

[Text]

**[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] 1. As a result of military reform what has changed in the life and activity of the troops entrusted to you?**

[Dubynin] If one considers activities connected with unilateral reduction of Soviet troops in Central Europe to be a component of military reform, then the change is considerable. The number of units and subunits of the NGF [Northern Group of Forces] has been significantly reduced. We have already begun the organized and carefully planned second stage of troop withdrawals from Poland. What once was definitely an offensive grouping of our units is acquiring an ever more clearly demonstrated defensive nature today.

Of course that shifts a great deal more responsibility for maintaining military readiness on those still serving in the NGF. We have placed the emphasis in our work on the thorough strengthening of troop discipline.

**[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] 2. What, in your opinion, should be the final goal of reform in the armed forces?**

[Dubynin] Ideally what we should get out of it is an army that is well trained, armed with the latest word in science and technology, highly mobile, and, without a doubt, professional; an army of reasonable sufficiency that can defend its citizens against any attempted aggression.

The media often accuses the military high command of opposing the establishment of a "professional", or more accurately, a mercenary army. In so doing they unconsciously (or perhaps consciously?) accuse the wrong people. I don't know a single officer or general who



would agree that a professional army where a soldier receives a fitting wage for his difficult work instead of a symbolic seven to ten rubles would be worse than the army we have today. But is society prepared to support high-paid soldiers? Is it even capable of freeing units from building military bases by replacing them with civilian construction?

The country has the army it is able to support. That is why we speak so often of the shameful lack of civil rights of our soldiers when they should have a secure place in society. Only then will military service become prestigious. Only then will recruits be found for a professional army. In the meantime we will have to use cheap military labor to patch the gaps in our threadbare economic mechanism. Is building roads, digging ditches and paving Moscow streets really a soldier's job?

**[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] 3. What, in your opinion, are the main obstacles to making the changes in the Army and Navy that the times demand?**

[Dubynin] The main obstacle to reform is the instability of our society. It is difficult to predict how events will unfold in the country in the next six months or a year. And this when carrying out a radical reform of the military that is careful, thorough and gradual would require six to eight years. Only thus would it be painless for both the army and the government.

#### **'Generals' Revolt' at 28th Congress Assailed**

90SV0040A Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 33,  
14-20 Aug 90 pp 24-27

[Article by Aleksandr Pumpyanskiy under the rubric "Polemics": "Stellar Eclipse"—First paragraph introductory paragraph printed in bold print]

[Text] The USSR is the best place in the world to watch a solar eclipse from, a radio announcer declared proudly the other day. This is a most inspiring observation. He forgot to say, though, that the time for that was most opportune. We have had more than our share of catastrophes, unheard-of disturbances and protuberances. Therefore, the revolt of our Colonel-Generals we have witnessed should be regarded as a kind of stellar eclipse.

May I remind the reader that, to begin with, Colonel-General Rodionov, commander-in-chief of the troops of the Transcaucasian Military District, rebelled against the First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR in defence of his right (i.e. his duty as a soldier though a colonel-general) to give orders, that is to have a gathering of protesting men, women and children broken up, regardless of sacrifices.

#### **Colonel-Generals' Revolt**

From the platform of the Party Congress, Colonel-General Makashov, Commander-in-Chief of the Privolzhsko-Uralsky Military District, called for stoning the traitors (why not use standard weapons?). He made it perfectly clear to his applauding Partiegenossen that by

treason he meant not the giving out of military secrets to the enemy but a certain trend in politics and ideology which does not suit him.

Later, he explained his liking for stones by the profound influence on him of the Bible whence he borrowed the image. However, there transpired another source of inspiration—the letter of Colonel-General Rodionov's to his comrades in arms (and in reason).

This striking coincidence of one general's oral statements with the epistolary style of another (see NT No. 29 for quotations) has led certain observers to the conclusion that the two generals have drawn their inspiration from some other soldier of the ideological front. Judging by the purity of style, he is obviously a purist—the chief purist even, considering the rank of speakers. This hypothesis is waiting for its explorers, of course.

I should like to bring out a few positive factors which have come to the fore in this story.

Kindred spirits. At the higher levels of the military hierarchy it probably takes on absolute forms with the result that the thought and speeches of the "star-spangled" men become indistinguishable.

The triumph of democracy. General Makashov said in so many words later that he believed in pluralism, in the possibility of speaking up, and that he had suffered for that from a gang of pseudo-democrats who pounded on him. How can one fail to sympathise with the general whose best feelings have been insulted?

Rodionov's example is more impressive still. He celebrated the anniversary of the Tbilisi events at the 28th CPSU Congress hall, of all places. In that hall, he distributed leaflets—created by another purist, no doubt—meant to expose A.N. Yakovlev, a member of the Soviet leadership, as a liberal and free-thinker. The general himself confessed to having handed out some 30 illicit leaflets—an outstanding achievement, indeed. Some may call this a clandestine operation, but I regard this as an obvious demonstration. It's good that the general did not succumb to the natural urge to break up the congress, to suppress it by force, or just to expose it to the Cheremukha gas... Democracy!

That both generals quoted the Bible in search of an ideological weapon is, to my mind, an evidence of the triumph of all-human values. In that inexhaustible treasury of the spirit they have certainly found the stone to fit their palms. In this case, however, all-human and class values are at one. After all, a boulder is a weapon of the proletariat.

#### **I Attack the Army**

I think I must stop here and change tone. Not that in our society there is a whole class of men totally devoid of the sense of humour and regarding themselves as statesmen solely on this ground. And even not for the reason of

someone suspecting that what I am after is not criticizing the two generals, but disarming our whole army.

The theme of "Attacks on the army," mounted now by the ill-meaning press, is very popular in the higher Party and army circles now. Whatever one says in public about the military—the obsession with secrecy, bullying, neglect for the needs of officers and men—the only response is: "malicious slander," "attempts to drive a wedge...," "to undermine the prestige of the army..." It is no use arguing with that, any more than with stones. In all seriousness, no one has undermined the prestige of the army more than the two Colonel-Generals have. No yellow press, no penny-a-liners have outdone Rodionov and Makashov in creating the image of the army as a dull, aggressive and unscrupulous force. What democracy! What humanism and return to the whole family of mankind!

All these are fairy tales for the feeble minded. There are enemies all around. Developed socialism is the acme of civilization, and army life is an ideal of socialism. Now just try and prove that the army is actually different or that it is not all that way where colonel-generals are prepared to protect socialism in individual districts.

I do not know whether I should laugh or cry over this. But as I come to think about the gap between the might of modern weapons and the thinking of those who are to wield them, I do not feel like laughing. This is a precipice we might all fall into.

Some may object that far from all reacted to the statements by Rodionov and Makashov in that way, that to many they became all but an embodiment of the true spirit of the army. This is exactly why I am writing about them. Otherwise, it would have made no sense. They are of no interest to me as individuals.

The stellar eclipse is not merely a whim of two generals. It expresses the arrogance, discontent and fury of the military-industrial complex outraged by the changes in the country and the world.

#### Antipodes and Twins

Our communication with the West (convergence?) offers amusing surprises sometimes. For a long time now we have been using the word combination "military-industrial complex" exclusively with regard to the West and, naturally, in a sharply negative sense. Presumably, we had none. Then it suddenly appeared—even in the statements of the prime minister but in an entirely different sense—to designate to a certain sector of the economy (on an analogy with the agroindustrial complex, for instance).

However, the military-industrial complex is not merely a sum total of munitions industries. According to Dwight Eisenhower, who coined the term in his farewell speech in 1961, this is a formidable phenomenon ripened in the midst of the American society in the Cold War years and threatening its normal development. This is a holy

alliance of the army, the munitions industry, the policy catering to them (militarized science is added to this of late) which has become a kind of state within a state. It has a sharply pronounced hypertrophied corporative interest of its own, its own notions of good and evil, and has a powerful influence on the making of political decisions and on public opinion. The arms race is to it a normal and natural state, and the relaxation of international tension—a suspicious and dangerous thing because it worsens the military conjuncture. The ideology of the military-industrial complex is simple: what is good for it, is good for society and patriotic; what isn't amounts to treachery.

It is time we have admitted that we have the military-industrial complex, too. We also have a corporative military industrial interest which is at variance—even poles apart with—the interests of civil society.

When in the privacy of an unanimous office a decision is taken (secretly) to build the Krasnoyarsk radar station equal to a few Cheops pyramids contrary to the treaty signed by the USSR, and when this fact (obvious to any satellite flying over Siberia) is denied for years, this is the military-industrial complex in action. When our politicians and diplomats were so hard at it trying to prove that our missiles and our tanks in Europe were non-existent, that what we had in Afghanistan was not an army but a "limited contingent," and that parity meant the USSR having a nuclear might equal to the aggregate might of the other members of the nuclear club—that was an influence of, or direct instructions from, the military-industrial complex. When the munitions industry resists perestroika, and demands new fabulous military spending, this comes from the military-industrial complex.

It would seem that the American and Soviet military-industrial complexes are bitterly hostile to one another but, strangely, they are extremely similar and parallel one another. I mean not only the contacts between the military departments of late—this is all in the day's work.

Both complexes need the "enemy image," and both are afraid of losing the enemy; both are seeking, and finding (boosting, if necessary) the traits of aggressiveness on the other side, and the military threat emanating from the other side. While one side uses the "Communist plot" scare, the other side resorts to the "capitalist conspiracy" scare. Some show "cavemen's anti-Communism" to use our term of a few years ago, and others (the Colonel-Generals included) displayed a "caveman's Communism." In the competition for satanizing the enemy, both military-industrial complexes took part, but the queer impression is that they need one another.

Enemies-allies, antipodes-twins... This knot is not easy to untangle but it is necessary to distinguish each time between the interests of society and the egoistic interests of the military-industrial complexes covering themselves up by public need and patriotic rhetorics.

### Two Deadly Figures

Eisenhower had warned that the American military industrial complex was getting out of the democratic society's control. (He was saved from stoning by his five-star generalship and two-term presidency). Our own military industrial complex has never been under control. In our case, the scale of its influence on the character and fate of society are different.

At the 28th CPSU Congress two figures were made public for the first time: it turned out, that only a seventh of our industry produced consumer goods, and six sevenths—producer goods (Gorbachev). A fourth of the state budget is assigned to military spending (Shevardnadze). I do not know of a more striking expose of the freakishness of the system. This a system which gives one just a tithe. This is the economy which works for its own sake and is devouring itself. To make the picture complete, I would like to have another figure: the proportion of the economy working not merely for the heavy industry, but for the munitions industry and catering for the military-industrial complex. Presumably, this is a lion's share. In any case, it is higher than any other country's.

This explains why our store shelves are empty of goods. This is not due to perestroika. Our military socialism has never filled them up. perestroika has just given our people a bit more money with the result that what had seemed to be a buyers' market disappeared.

For decades, our society was told that the level of the country's economic development was determined exclusively by a few heavy industry indices, and that the place and weight of the state in the world community was determined by its military might.

This philosophy ensured the privileged position of the military-industrial complex which, in a poverty-stricken country, was not denied anything but which could spell the ruination of the country. This is what has actually happened. And now that perestroika is gingerly trying to change the situation and make it more sensible and humane, the military-industrial complex feels impinged and cries for help through the lips of the colonel-generals.

In their polemics with the press, the army ideologists have come up with a new argument of late. Negative phenomena in the army, they say. How can we do without them? After all, the army is part of society and shares its ills. This argument could be accepted but for the obvious desire to shun any responsibility and to shift it to much-suffering and meek society.

Our society is in a crisis, indeed. This is a crisis of means and ends. This is a crisis of the entire ideological world outlook based on a bipolar world and on the irreconcilable struggle between two social systems. The fundamental postulate have proved wrong or mendacious. Could the army stand idly by under the circumstances? In a certain sense, it has taken the brunt of the blow.

During the Great Patriotic War, the army was a savior and a hero and, quite deservedly, a universal favourite. The slogan of "All for the Front" was the solely possible formula for the survival of the nation.

During the Cold War, the army seemed to protect the country from numerous threats. True, none of these materialized—but was it because we spared nothing for the army?

What role does the army have to play after the Cold War has come to an end? When it is clear to most people that no one in the West is going to attack us?

The army is now having the crisis of its role. Obviously, it is to change, to become much more modest, economical, professional and civilized. It is not society that works for the army, but the other way round. The army, as an institution of civil democratic society, has its clear-cut functions and sphere of influence... An end is coming to the omnipotence and arbitrary rule of the military-industrial complex.

### Concerning Methodology

How can one keep his temper? How can one help being discontented with glasnost which calls things by their proper names and with new thinking which is new in its realism, in its ridding itself of myths and fears, with a foreign policy which solves problems instead of pursuing ideological objectives, which breeds friends instead of enemies? I wrote recently (in Issue No. 26 of the NEW TIMES) about one of such discontented persons—O.D. Baklanov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. At the CPSU Congress, he confirmed his loyalty to views, which gives credit to his consistence, but calls his position in question. May I quote him: "Contrary to some people's opinion, national security cannot be defended by political and diplomatic methods alone. Remember the pre-war years when our diplomacy triumphed in connection with the signing of the non-aggression pact, with the most horrible war in history to break out shortly."

The secretary of the Central Committee has a bone to pick with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This is quite natural in itself. What merits attention here, however, is the very methodology of the dispute, and the character of the arguments offered. In our Foreign Ministry, they actually think that the country's security can be protected by political and diplomatic methods, and that the choice of these methods is ample. However, no one says this can be achieved only through these means. No one doubts the need for the military component. The true argument consists in what this component should be like, where the limit of reasonable sufficiency of military efforts lies. In quests for the answer to this question the contribution of the Central Committee secretary concerned with military problems, could be extremely valuable except that he retires into the wobbly reminiscences of another epoch.



I feel I must put a few more rhetorical questions to the CC secretary. Did the war really happen to us because Stalin had tried to guarantee the country's security by political and diplomatic means only? The tragedy of 22 June was caused not by the naivete of our diplomatic service but by the overall viciousness of the Stalin regime, by imperial ambitions.

This is a subject in its own right which should hardly be dealt with just in passing. But still, what does Oleg Dmitriyevich mean by recalling this tragedy? Is he trying to say that our current diplomacy is an unrealistic as it was in 1939? In that case, which treaties does he identify with the disgraceful Molotov-Ribbentrop pact—the IMF one, perhaps? Or the coming agreements on deep cuts in strategic and conventional arms in Europe?

Does he think that Moscow is now pacifying the West like Stalin did Hitler? That the West is now threatening us with a perfidious attack which our politicians turn a blind eye to? Who, specifically, threatens us with a crusade: Bush, Thatcher, Kohl, Mitterrand, Andreotti? Or, say Colonel Woerner (Reserve), NATO secretary general, who has visited Moscow recently? It was for nothing that he lulled us into complacency by reasoning that 16 democratic states are physically incapable of agreeing on attacking anyone?

The military complex needs the atmosphere of irrational fear: it enables it to exist carefree, without control and competition. If war breaks out tomorrow, what kind of sensible sufficiency can we talk about?

Gherman Kiriyeenko, major general and doctor of military sciences, protected the Central Committee Secretary from me in the *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* column. I do not feel at all like carrying on the discussion, but the very admission of the military scientist is interesting in itself. He writes:

"In the opinion of A. Pumpiansky, the threat to the country has reduced sharply over the past years and months." I admit that a few years and even months ago the journalist sensed heightened danger. But I must disappoint him by the fact that the threat to the country over the past few years and months has neither increased, nor diminished. It simply has not existed. As for the war danger, it has been and remains. And the likelihood of power politics towards us increases as the USSR's military and military-economic potential dwindles."

I am a peaceful man, and I do not even contemplate taking up arms against the existing order of things. And I really find it hard to understand the difference between a "threat" and a "danger." Thanks to the military scientist, however, I understood the fundamental fact: another 22 June is not imminent. There is no threat to the nation. And there hasn't been any—even when the Cold War was at its worst. It turns out that even before I could not succumb to the feeling of the threat which, using my gullibility, official statements by the military or

such publications of the Ministry of Defence as "Who Threatens World Peace" caused in me.

It follows from this that our active participation in the arms race was at least arbitrary and not justified. And that the military effort should and must be curbed. But departmental military science does not want to recognize that. Hence the danger which, though not a threat, is also a formidable scarecrow. As incidentally another nightmare—the "probability of power pressure" which allegedly threatens us to an ever greater extent.

In 1946, when the Americans had the atomic bomb and the USSR didn't, we, war-ravaged, were not suppressed. On the days of the Caribbean crisis when the Americans had an overwhelming superiority in missiles, they did not suppress us, either. Tiny Albania was not suppressed by anyone, even by us. Tiny Cuba, which is letting itself go right under America's nose, has not been suppressed. And we shall be suppressed by all means if we succumb to the arms cuts temptations.

Come off it! No one has ever tried to impose anything on us—the GULAGS, human rights, genetics, cybernetics, pluralism, the market economy, nothing, until we arrived at the universal human values ourselves and at the realization that we are not the God-accursed lot.

Now we are scared by the horrors involved in reaching an agreement with the West and by disarmament. What is the light at the end of the tunnel for civil society is the end of the world to the military-industrial complex.

### Meeting in a Submarine

Another scarecrow is that of depolitization or, as they say, departization of the army. What is there to be afraid of? The entire civilized world has long arrived at the naturalness of this idea: where there are weapons, there should be no ideological struggle, the army should be outside politics.

Army is counterindicated to politics because political problems cannot be solved by means of tanks, submarine guns or even by entrenching shovels. But politics, in its turn, is counterindicated to the army. Just imagine inter-party struggle aboard an atomic submarine, and you will see the truth of this. And when the top brass stubbornly reiterate that the "Army is the vanguard of the Party," they have a tongue in their cheeks. They are trying to keep the type of the party leadership under which the military-industrial complex is boss.

They are working in amazing accord. Generals swear allegiance to the party and thus strike at revisionists and carpers whom they don't like. The party conservatives profess their selfless love for the army and beat those who do not suit them—who have forgotten the lessons of history and are prepared to betray their Motherland. It's a good trick ruining your opponent by passing him for a renegade or an enemy of the nation.

The army cannot serve the party or ideology. It can serve only the people and the Motherland.

#### **The Science of Winning in Peacetime**

Colonel-General Rodionov was transferred from the Transcaucasus to Moscow to head the Academy of the General Staff.

Colonel-General Makashov was rumoured to have been assigned the military representative to Iraq, but there are enough hotheads in that country already. But no, he carries on commanding his military district, although he deserves the title of the Academy chief. He is the author of a book on how to win, another one of the kind after Suvorov's. True, his book is called "How to Win in Peacetime During Military Exercises."

The claims of the two colonel-generals are quite justified: Just two stars distinguish Rodionov and Makashov from Suvorov and Kutuzov—and that in peacetime, mind you!

I find it puzzling, though, how can one work his way up to the title of a colonel-general in peacetime. This is a military secret not only to me alone: how many colonel-generals have we got? And why so many? Incidentally, this is a real secret. Thanks to the Party and television, the murder was a bit out on the days of the CPSU Congress. When a TV camera panned on the endless rows of uniformed men, one could ask oneself many questions, Stellar eclipse was beginning....

We have just learned about the decision to cut the number of generals in the Soviet armed forces and on replacing them by officers of lower ranks. The Americans have taken an analogous decision. As usual, they give the precise figure: 78 generals and admirals. We, as usual, think and act in broad categories: a third of the generals is to be reduced. Now we are to wait for indignant voices: we are at the imperialists' beck and call again. After all, we shall reduce more generals than there were in the American army even before reduction. And what about parity?

It seems to be that this is, so far, the most serious step towards civil society and normal life.

**Maj Gen Medvedev: Role of Military Science in Reform***90UM0761A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
21 Jul 90 p 2*

[Article by Maj Gen V. Medvedev, professor and doctor of technical sciences, deputy chief of the Center for Operational and Strategic Studies of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, under the rubric "Military Reform: Problems, Proposals": "How to Assist Science?"]

[Text] The improvement of military science invariably comes up in discussions on various aspects of the military reform, including those in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. Various proposals are put forth, up to the point of establishing an academy of military sciences (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 27 May). Statements are also made which totally reject the participation of military scientists in the development of the concept for the reform. What can one say to this?

Major reforms in the army and navy are impossible without the active participation of military science, of course. The organization of the scientific work itself is in need of fundamental changes, however. This involves primarily the accelerated development of its priority directions, the development of new concepts of military art in accordance with the defensive nature of our military doctrine, and scientific validation of minimal levels of defense sufficiency and ways to ensure a state of constant combat readiness. The system for training scientific cadres and the organizational structure of scientific institutions of the Armed Forces are also in urgent need of improvement.

An increased return from military science is directly dependent upon enhancing the democratization of the entire scientific research process: raising the competitiveness of concepts and decisions, establishing close interaction between the Ministry of Defense's scientific research organizations and military educational institutions and industry's scientific organizations and the USSR Academy of Sciences. But what do we have at the present time?

The General Staff is the client for and the organizer of theoretical military research. It is performed by the military academies, scientific bodies of the main staffs, the Staff of the Rear Services of the Armed Forces of the USSR and certain scientific research institutes of the Ministry of Defense, however. The research on problems at the operational-strategic level is performed by the Center for Operational and Strategic Studies of the General Staff, which simultaneously organizes and coordinates scientific work at the level of the Ministry of Defense as a whole. Around 2,500 scientists in all are engaged in theoretical military research. When we compare our work to that performed abroad, we see that in the USA around 60 various "think tanks" are engaged in

research in military theory, with a staff of around 5,000, plus several thousand people in civilian organizations involved in this work.

Now let us look at technical military research. Ours is organized by the directorate of the deputy minister of defense for weapons and corresponding organizations of the main military commissariats of the branches of the Armed Forces and chiefs of the troop arms. But the direct feasibility studies for future development of weapons and military equipment are performed by scientific research institutes, military engineering academies and test ranges of the Ministry of Defense together with scientific research institutes and design institutes in industry, the Academy of Sciences and the higher school.

These areas of research are being developed jointly and influence one another. They have been actively brought together in recent years. This has been manifested primarily in the provision of unified management by the General Staff resulting from the introduction of long-range research planning and coordination. A new statute on scientific research was introduced in 1989, for example, which combined the two areas of scientific work in the USSR Ministry of Defense.

Around 400 doctors of sciences and more than 6,500 candidates of sciences work in the scientific organizations, and around 900 doctors of sciences and 14,000 candidates of sciences are employed at military educational institutions. In addition, there are small military science agencies in the forces. Clearly, all of these forces can perform effectively if they have a developed materials and equipment base at their disposal. With this in mind, a comprehensive program was worked out and measures are being implemented to improve the provision of scientific research organizations with computers and duplicating equipment, measuring instruments, modeling units and expendable materials. Scientific organizations of the Ministry of Defense are still not adequately supplied, however. Obsolete equipment is still in use throughout. There is an acute shortage of personal computers. Military scientists are frequently unable to set up modern-level models or full-scale mock-ups to test their ideas for new types of weapons and equipment.

There is an urgent need to improve the materials and equipment base. It is perfectly obvious, however, that this alone will accomplish little, if precision is lacking in the organization and management of the scientific work. Work is being performed also in this area. The structural system of the scientific research organizations has been optimized in the past 2-3 years, the focus of the scientific work has been precisely defined, and approximately 30% of their total activities have been halted. The test ranges and centers have been removed from the system of scientific research organizations. At the same time, the scientific subdivisions working on priority problems have been reinforced. Since January of 1989 scientific



research organizations, primarily those engaged in technical military research, have been converted to economic accountability and autonomous financing.

With respect to the training quality and the use of scientific cadres, certain regulatory documents have already been revised: The statute on the training of scientific teaching and scientific cadres has been thoroughly rewritten, and a statute has been introduced on the competitive filling of positions for scientific cadres at scientific research institutes. Doctoral programs were established at a number of leading military academies and scientific research institutes in 1989, the post-graduate training capacity has been increased and the admission of school graduates to military engineering academies has been renewed.

It should be borne in mind, however, that the natural process of training and renewing the cadres has slowed in recent years. Today the average age of doctors of technical sciences in the scientific research organizations and at military VUZs is 55-60 years, depending upon the specialization. The situation is equally bad with respect to doctors of military sciences. Only four of 54 doctors of military sciences (servicemen) working at military academies are below the age of 50 years, for example, 25 are between 51 and 55, and 25 are over the age of 55. The number of doctors of sciences in scientific research institutes and at VUZs of the Ministry of Defense could be cut in half within the next 2-3 years as a result of the impending discharge for reasons of age, and the number of candidates of sciences could be reduced by 30%. It is essential immediately to resolve the problem of rejuvenating the corps of military scientists.

In our opinion, the structure of allocations from the Ministry of Defense also needs to be adjusted. A comparison of the funds allocated for research in the USA and the USSR shows that there is greater funding (approximately 1.2-1.5-fold more) for the stage of scientific research and development in the production of weapons and military equipment in the USA. The U.S. Defense Department funds approximately 95% of the research and development. Moreover, the main effort focuses on improving the quality and reliability of the

weapons and military equipment and on the development of new technologies and future research.

Scientific validation of the most expedient directions of defense development and technical military policy and conformity of the weapons to the modern technical level are out of the question without considering economic, production, technological and other capabilities. Precise interaction plays an important role. Up to now there has been a lack of effective means of influencing the quality of the developmental projects on the part of the Ministry of Defense. This was caused primarily by the funding system. The monopoly enjoyed by the large developing enterprises gave them no incentive to ensure good quality for the new weapons and military equipment.

It is planned fundamentally to alter this situation during the reform. It is intended to allocate the bulk (up to 90-95%) of the funds for research and development in the development and production of weapons and military equipment directly to the Ministry of Defense. Work in the most important areas is to be conducted on a competitive basis, under agreements between the Ministry of Defense and the industrial organizations.

In conclusion I shall return to what I began with. As a specific area of human knowledge pertaining to warfare, military science also studies objective processes which no other branch of knowledge but ours can comprehend. Military science is represented extremely poorly in the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, however (this subject was brought up in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA by instructors at the General Staff Military Academy). At the present time there are only one academician and four corresponding members among the military scientists. I therefore fully support the proposal that military science be made an official part of the Academy of Sciences on a limited basis. In the future it might be possible to establish a special military department. In the first stage, however, a certain number of slots could be specially designated for military scientists in existing departments of the USSR Academy of Sciences: general physics, control mechanics and processes, information science, computers and automation, for example. I believe that this would stimulate the development of military science.

**Letter, Response on Aircraft Spare Parts Shortage****Aircraft Cannibalization Permitted**

90UM0510A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
6 Mar 90 First Edition p 2

[Letter to the Editor by Guards Captain O. Zuyev, flight technician, Northern Group of Forces: "Aircraft on the Flight Ramp".]

[Text] A precondition of a flight accident occurred during the last training year while carrying out a flight. A damaged aircraft was rapidly restored but was not tasked to fly. The pretext for this was the lack of waveguides on it.

The cause of the downtime appears to be serious—one of the systems does not have a component. It would seem that we need to look for one without delay. But Major M. Agafonov, deputy squadron commander for engineer aviation service, decided to use the situation that had developed to make his job easier. Without equivocating, he ordered this aircraft to be transferred to the category of those in mothballs and to use serviceable components and aircraft system assemblies from it to restore other aircraft.

The specialists who due to lack of care or lack of knowledge had made aircraft unserviceable liked this order. Thus one of the aircraft was practically doomed to a slow dismantling and began to be used as a spare parts depot. A leapfrog began with the reinstallation of assemblies from aircraft to aircraft in violation of the requirements of appropriate documents that permit such actions in extreme situations and only with the authorization of the deputy regimental commander for engineer aviation service (IAS) and with a mandatory entry into the aircraft's maintenance log.

In short, more than two dozen assemblies and components were removed from this aircraft. At times this was done even without the knowledge of the aircraft's senior technician. The probability of hidden defects has risen dramatically.

When one aircraft's speed brake hydraulic control assembly failed, Major Agafonov ordered the assembly removed for replacement with one from the aircraft that was in mothballs. Guards Senior Lieutenant V. Barsukov carried out this order. But in this case, he should have installed the although defective unit in the mothballed aircraft in order to prevent the hydraulic system from filling with air. He did not do this. The assembly was sent to the plant manufacturer and they did not even remove the brackets from it. Other parts were also lost. As a result of these "experiments," as could be anticipated, air got into the aircraft hydraulic system which later when the aircraft was entered into the number of combat ready, brought in its wake one more precondition of a flying accident.

They blamed this precondition on a section technician. They also punished him. I think that the real guilty party

was the one who ordered the assembly removed and the one who did not install the unserviceable part in its place in a timely manner.

Incidentally, the lack of waveguides due to which the aircraft was mothballed has still not been taken into account. The combat aircraft will fly without them. And today the next aircraft is being disassembled to such a state that precludes it from flying into the air even a month from now if that was required. If you take into account inspection and maintenance work, modifications, overhaul periods, etc., and the other aircraft in the squadron that we "knock out" of commission everyday, you can imagine the serviceability of our aircraft fleet. That is the value of an aircraft used as a spare parts depot. And, it seems that the officers—the IAS regimental supervisors have reconciled themselves to this practice.

By the way, should you be surprised by what has happened in our regiment? This is not my first year in the Army which is why I can say, based on personal experience, that similar practices are also not a rarity at other units. The commanders know about this and prefer to close their eyes to violations of instructions because there is a chronic shortage of spare parts in subunits. And if we follow the letter of the instructions, there will be even fewer aircraft in the air on a flying day than today due to various types of defects.

But nevertheless, I am firmly convinced: What is occurring at our airfield is criminal. Judge for yourselves. Assembly and disassembly operations triple under this system and losses of work time increase. In turn the quality of technical operations is reduced and along with it the respect of personnel for the results of their labor. Senior technicians' faith in the reliability of subsequent operation of aircraft systems is destroyed. Furthermore, transferring equipment from one aircraft to another using the "scientific" method at times results in assemblies being installed becoming unserviceable. As a result, the number of unserviceable components doubles and even triples.

And here alignment and adjustment operations, etc., are still required. Due to the shortage of work time, sometimes these operations are ignored which has a negative impact on the operation of aircraft systems. As a result, flying missions are not accomplished and there are dry runs which cost the state a pretty kopeck. The shortage of serviceable aircraft constrains the squadron commander's maneuvering room during personnel training. An element of nervousness will appear in combat training.

An enormous workload falls on serviceable aircraft. The intervals between sorties are reduced to the limit. That is why the shortage of one or two mechanics at an airfield on a flying day causes a storm of indignation. Furthermore, that is why maintenance is rapidly conducted on serviceable aircraft. But this situation probably does not

worry anyone besides the senior technicians who must increasingly perform inspections and checks.

There is only one alternative to this practice—supply aircraft with spare parts based on real requirements. But on whom does this depend?

#### **Aircraft Cannibalization Prohibited**

90UM0510B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 22 Apr 90 First Edition p 2

[Response to Captain O. Zuyev's Letter to the Editor by Colonel P. Kazazayev: "'Aircraft on the Flight Ramp:'"]

[Text] That was the headline of Guards Captain O. Zuyev's critical correspondence that was published on March 6, 1990. In it, he talked about aircraft spare parts supply problems for aviation units.

As Colonel P. Kazazayev reported to the editor, the deputy chief engineer of the Air Force has sent a directive to the troops which contains instructions to once again explain to personnel the requirement to prohibit removal of assemblies from some aircraft to make other aircraft serviceable. The attention of the all engineer-technician supervisory personnel has been directed to the severity of the consequences of the violations indicated and that guilty individuals will be held accountable.

Moreover, Colonel Kazazayev admitted that supplying line units with spare parts from Air Force rear services units and the Ministry of the Aviation Industry does not meet vital requirements and this results in that engineer-technician personnel, while attempting to maintain a level of combat readiness, resort to restoration of unserviceable aircraft by removing individual assemblies from other aircraft.



## More than 100 Soldiers Poisoned in Krasnoyarsk Kray

90UM0533A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
26 Apr 90 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Medical Corps Lt Col N. Kopovoy, a toxicology specialist and department head at the Ministry of Defense Central Military Medical Directorate by Captain 2nd Rank A. Tkachev: "Ignorance and Carelessness—The Primary Assistants of 'Chemical Murder'"]

[Text] Medical Corps Lieutenant-Colonel N. Kopovoy, a toxicology specialist and department head at the Ministry of Defense Central Military Medical Directorate, says:

[Kopovoy] There is sad news from Krasnoyarsk Kray: More than 100 railroad troops were poisoned. Private A. Druzholyuk died and the remainder were incapacitated for various periods due to toxicosis. Many were saved thanks only to timely hospitalization.

[Tkachev] How could such [a thing] happen?

[Kopovoy] It is all very ordinary. There was not enough water for the kitchen detail to prepare the stewed fruit since the water-pipe was temporarily out of order. Someone found a 300 liter bottle with a little salt water in it in the boiler room. They decided to add sugar to kill the taste and... they served the stewed fruit cooked in a solution of sodium nitrite. This, in fact, is a deadly poison. The military medics carried out the whole life saving operation [or] the outcome could have been more grievous.

[Tkachev] How did sodium nitrite show up in that ill-fated bottle?

[Kopovoy] Nitrite of sodium is widely used in the economy and in the Armed Forces to support construction work and to service armored vehicles. It is needed by builders as an anti-freeze additive for cement mortar and is widely used to flush vehicle engine cooling systems. The bottle from which they took the "water" for the stewed fruit was once used as a container to store liquid antifreeze.

[Tkachev] Is this incident unique?

[Kopovoy] Unfortunately, only in the number of victims. Poisonings with sodium nitrite occur year in and year out; only the circumstances are different. Most often, the poisoning takes place [when] the attempt [is made] to use sodium nitrite instead of cooking salt. There are cases when sodium nitrite was poured into salt cellars and placed on tables.

[Tkachev] They are not deliberate criminals?

[Kopovoy] No, each time the investigation showed that carelessness, bungling, and scandalous ignorance of officials led to the tragedy.

Safety manuals define the procedures for storing sodium nitrite and there are also rules for storing products of the chemical industry. Inscribed on the packaging is, "Toxic. It is forbidden to store [this] near foodstuffs." While the toxic chemicals are handled rather carefully while they are in the manufacturer's container. But as soon as they are poured into a small container without a warning label, that is it, it ends up in food. Enlisted personnel take it for ordinary salt and the majority of officers and warrant officers are also unable to differentiate between salt and sodium nitrite.

[Tkachev] What do you advise?

[Kopovoy] Pay attention to the humidity. The fact is that sodium nitrite and salt are practically indistinguishable "in appearance." It is a fine white or light yellow crystal powder without any odor. But it is hygroscopic [moisture absorbing] and therefore it often resembles slightly damp table salt. But naturally the main thing is to follow safety regulations and storage rules. Then a dangerous substance will not be in uncontrolled circulation.

[Tkachev] Agreed, it is necessary to follow the instructions everywhere and in every way. But experience shows that in the foreseeable future it is not likely that everyone everywhere will observe them. Is there no possibility of doing something more than campaigning to strengthen the written instructions? For example, to add something to sodium nitrite to change its color or odor?

[Kopovoy] You have struck a sore point. For several years, the Central Military Medical Directorate has been proposing this to the Ministry of the Chemical Industry. We consider it necessary to introduce coloring additives so that sodium nitrite will differ sharply from table salt. The ministry objected: The addition of coloring increases the product's cost. But the victims continue to multiply and recently the Ministry of the Chemical Industry sort of agreed to introduce coloring additives.

[Tkachev] Does this eliminate the problem?

[Kopovoy] First of all, only time will tell. Everyone knows how hard and long it is to implement any [kind of] decision in our country. Secondly, we nevertheless need to take effective precautionary measures with the existing reserves of sodium nitrite. We discussed this above.

[Tkachev] But what if the misfortune continues?

[Kopovoy] Emergency first aid for sodium nitrite poisoning consists of immediately and abundantly flushing out the stomach with a three percent solution of potassium permanganate with the addition of activated charcoal.

As a rule, for massive poisonings, they carry out three multiple non-probing stomach flushes and for this the victims need to drink two to three liters of water and to cause vomiting by pressing on the back of the tongue with two fingers. At the unit's medical aid post oxygen and an intravenous solution of ten percent glucose must

be administered (during collapse, a five percent solution of glucose with ascorbic acid [is administered by] intravenous drip). Polyglucin, aminokrovin, and other plasma substitutes can be used; adrenalin in a sodium chloride solution must be administered with a hypodermic and in time of shallow breathing a one percent solution of lobeline.

After rendering emergency first aid to the victims they should be evacuated to the nearest medical institution for further treatment.

### **Col Gen Stefanovskiy of GlavPUR on Legal Training**

90UM0574A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
11 May 90 First Edition p 2

[Col Gen G. Stefanovskiy interviewed by Col. L. Nechayuk: "Toward Legal Knowledge"]

[Text] [Introduction] The All-Union Science Practice Conference on Questions of Universal Legal Training was held in Tashkent at the start of the year, and discussed with interest and surprise the fact that the Army and Navy have already accumulated experience in organizing comprehensive systematic legal training and education of personnel.

How can we explain the fact that we have set about resolving the problem of inculcating legal knowledge and culture in service members earlier and more actively than other ministries and departments?

This was the question that led off the discussion between Deputy Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, Col Gen G. Stefanovskiy, and the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent.

[Stefanovskiy] Yes, the study of legislation is in its fifth month now in the Army and Navy, and follows a uniform plan. Universal legal training has acquired the status of a component part of combat and political training and educational work with personnel.

To some extent this is related to the fact that, according to the specifics of organization and activity, the Armed Forces objectively require especially precise legal regulation. Work to strengthen conscientious discipline and order has been and remains the object of concern of all cadres and activist ranks. It is another matter that this work has contained many errors, and from time to time has lacked purposefulness and a businesslike attitude, sometimes even elementary literacy. Here the idea of universal legal training has been most welcome. "Sent down from above," as it were, it has found fertile soil and received the approval and support of various categories of personnel.

After all, what is the goal of universal legal training? First of all, to give the men the foundations of legal knowledge, to raise their legal culture. Second, to develop their desire to live and work in strict accord with the letter and spirit of the law, to raise their personal responsibility for

quality accomplishment of service and social obligations. Third, to enrich educational work with respect to one of its most important components, legal education.

[Nechayuk] But how can these goals be achieved if it is necessary to work with people whose level of education, life experience, and jobs vary so greatly?

[Stefanovskiy] Of course this is not an easy task. We have taken the so-called legal minimums as our foundation, that is, lists of the most important questions and legal documents as applied to their jobs. Such minimums have been developed for each category of service member and blue and white collar worker of the Army and Navy. For example, compulsory service members are obliged to know the provisions of the Law of Compulsory Military Service and the requirements of the Combined-Arms Regulations, procedures of service, various kinds of legal proceedings, safety regulations, and other documents governing military service.

As you understand, we need trained organizers, the corresponding programs, and time to accomplish this. We spent all of last year preparing. Thus the time spent on the study of legal disciplines was more than doubled at military schools and academies. They are taught by legal specialists. The new textbook "Foundations of Soviet Law" was prepared for the printer and submitted to Voenizdat.

The corresponding courses were introduced for future Army and Navy warrant officers, sergeants, and petty officers. Special classes are held right in the units, and discussions and reports are conducted periodically. For instance, each officer must submit reports on the legal minimum at least once every two years, and also when assigned to a new job. We have decided on the organizers and executive entities for specific measures to raise the effectiveness of universal legal training, the personnel of the legal activist ranks, and procedures for the conduct of assemblies and methods classes with them and for independent assimilation of the normative documents. To assist the organizers of universal legal training, this year we are issuing a number of brochures from the serious "Library of Universal Legal Training," and the central military journals are publishing methodological materials.

[Nechayuk] So what have the first months of the universal legal training demonstrated? Is everything going as planned?

[Stefanovskiy] I must say that in many tactical formations and units the training has been started in an organized manner and without holdups. However, especially now in the starting phase of organization of legal training, new work always means delays and problems, of course. For both objective and subjective reasons. You know, in general I have not been surprised when officers, even ones with solid service experience, and graduates of military schools, voiced dissatisfaction with their legal training and expressed the desire to raise their

legal knowledge. The times urgently demand of the officer not just a knowledge of legal questions, but also a high level of legal culture.

However, in my work in the Army and Navy I have grown convinced that many officers, including command personnel, have a weak knowledge of the laws, regulations, orders, and directives governing many aspects of their daily service activity. Such cases have been noted in the tactical formations and units where the commanders and political officers are comrades Z. Abdurakhmanov, A. Mamayev, V. Zavgorodniy, D. Reznichenko, Yu. Krivenko, K. Zhampisov, and certain others.

There are many officers who do not know the regulation-governed duties of their jobs. A significant portion of officers of the subunits have clearly weak legal training, i.e. precisely those who are directly called on to teach and educate Army and Navy youth.

Unfortunately, the level of legal knowledge of compulsory service members is often limited to a only a few provisions of the combined-arms regulations. Many do not even know the requirements of the Law of Compulsory Military Service and the benefits granted them and their families. Individual talks and polls of service members lead one to conclude that they have a poor notion of their responsibility for commission of offenses during service.

In short, the level of legal knowledge remains low in some areas. So it is especially important that those who are entrusted with leadership and immediate organization of universal legal training at the local level, those who personally head this work, do not allow it to proceed haphazardly. I would like to believe that the majority of officer leaders have realized that this is not a campaign, that in organizing legal training we are laying the foundation for a government of laws and are forming the basis of a law-governed Army.

Unfortunately, universal legal training is not everywhere duly supported organizationally. What has been the result of this in the very first months of training? Formalism, at times simply a negligent attitude of certain commanders, political officers, and staffs toward accomplishment of specific requirements and recommendations regarding the training of leaders to conduct classes. In a number of tactical formations and units there still exists the urge to hold mass lectures and talks on legal subjects, to the detriment of hard work with categories of service members, and with each individual, in the interests of raising his legal literacy and service competence and responsibility for his assigned task.

I repeat, to organize legal training we must start energetically with the primary individuals: commanders and chiefs of political organs and staffs. This is all the more important under today's complex conditions of the sociopolitical, governmental, and legal situation in a number of regions of the country and in military garrisons.

Experience of the first months of universal legal training in the Army and Navy demonstrates that we must step up efforts at legal training and education of the troops. In this work we must resolutely abandon sermonizing and strengthen the vital connection of legal training to specific problems of improving troop training and tightening military discipline, legality, and order. To do this we must more actively develop businesslike, training-methods contacts with military jurists, local legal organs, and legal institutions, and more fully utilize their experience and potential to raise the legal culture of our personnel and members of service families.

We would be correct to synthesize experience from the results of the winter training period, to summarize the first results of universal legal training and note its best organizers, to meet with the leaders of legal training classes and their assistants, to listen, to help them, especially in terms of methodological and material support of training, and to allow for all the minuses and pluses in planning work for the summer period.

[Nechayuk] Universal legal training is, after all, only part of what has to be done in order to renew the Army. What changes are proposed in military legislation so that it remains relevant to our lives?

[Stefanovskiy] First of all I must say that a legal base is now being formed, and a plan of legal drafts is being implemented. By this I mean the preparation of draft laws on the defense of the USSR, the status of service members, compulsory military service, and new combined-arms regulations. This should legally reinforce the present state of Soviet military doctrine and the new approaches to the manning of the Armed Forces, to their structure, and to organization of their work and interactions with the organs of authority and other ministries and departments, and should become a component part of military reform.

A great deal of work must be done to bring all legal documents regulating Army and Navy service in accord with the new laws. Without a doubt adjustments will be made to all programs and thematic plans of legal training. All this work should be closely linked to radical improvement of universal legal training and education of personnel, and training of the Armed Forces on a qualitatively new basis, safeguarding the guaranteed security of our socialist Fatherland.

#### USSR Law 'On Pension Support to Servicemen'

90UM0629A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Jun 90  
Morning Edition pp 2-3

[USSR Law signed by M. Gorbachev, President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Moscow, the Kremlin, April 28, 1990: "Law of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: On Pension Support to Servicemen"]

[Text] In accordance with the Constitution of the USSR and the Law of the USSR "On Pension Support to



Citizens in the USSR," this Law defines the conditions, standards, and pension support procedures for USSR Armed Forces servicemen, USSR Committee for State Security troops and organs, internal troops, railroad troops, and other military formations, and internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel and their families.

## **1. General Provisions**

### **Article 1. Types of Pension Support**

Officers, warrant officers, extended service military personnel, and internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel who have internal affairs organ service or military duty service under this Law have the right to a life-long service pension.

Servicemen and internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel who have become disabled under conditions provided for by this Law acquire the right to a disability pension.

In the event of the death of servicemen or internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel, their families have the right to a pension due to loss of the breadwinner.

### **Article 2. Pension Support Conditions**

Servicemen and internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel who have the right to pension support and pensions in accordance with this Law are granted and paid pensions after release from service.

Disabled servicemen, internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel, and their families are granted pensions in the event of loss of the breadwinner regardless of length of service.

### **Article 3. Individuals Who have the Right to Pensions on a par with Extended Service Military Personnel and Their Families**

The pension support conditions, standards, and procedures prescribed by this Law for extended service military personnel and their families also apply as appropriate (unless otherwise stipulated):

- a. To partisans and their families (other than those listed in Article 4 of this Law);
- b. To workers and employees of appropriate categories defined by the USSR Council of Ministers who worked in zones of military operations during the Great Patriotic War (on frontal railroad lines, at fortified defensive lines, naval bases, airfields, and others) and to their families;
- c. To citizens who were in hunter battalions, platoons, or squads defending the people, and their families;
- d. To servicemen drafted into training, special, and muster assemblies, and their families; and,

e. To paramilitary security force workers and USSR Ministry of Communications special communications services junior command and rank and file personnel and their families who are not subject to State social security.

### **Article 4. Individuals Who Have the Right to a Pension on a Par with Officers, Extended Service Military Personnel, and Their Families**

Pensions are also being implemented for personnel who held command positions and corresponding officer positions in partisan detachments and formations and for their families on the bases prescribed by this Law for officers and their families.

Pension support for women who were accepted onto active duty military service into positions as soldiers, seamen, or noncommissioned officers and their families is also being implemented on the bases prescribed by this Law for extended service military personnel and their families.

### **Article 5. Granting a Pension to Servicemen, Internal Affairs Organ Command and Rank and File Personnel, and Their Families on the Bases Prescribed by the Law of the USSR "On Pension Support to Citizens in the USSR."**

Officers, warrant officers, extended service military personnel, internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel, and their families can (according to their desire) be granted a pension under conditions and in accordance with standards prescribed by the Law of the USSR "On Pension Support to Citizens in the USSR." Furthermore, all types of monetary allowances received by these servicemen, command and rank and file personnel, and their families prior to their release from the service along with wages are taken into account while calculating their pensions. Preferential terms are used to grant old age pensions that are prescribed by legislation for individuals working in Extreme Northern areas and locations and with regard to servicemen and command and rank and file personnel performing duty in the Extreme North or at locations equivalent to areas of the Extreme North.

Pensions are also granted to servicemen and to internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel who have been stripped of military or special rank and to their families on the bases prescribed by the Law of the USSR "On Pension Support to Citizens in the USSR."

### **Article 6. Pensions for Families of Deceased Pensioners**

Families of deceased pensioners who were servicemen and command and internal affairs organ rank and file personnel have the right to a pension in the event of the loss of the bread winner on the same basis with families of servicemen and internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel.

**Article 7. The Right of Pension Selection**

Servicemen, internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel, and their families who simultaneously have the right to various State pensions are granted one pension of their choice.

**Article 8. Resources to Pay for Pensions. Tax Exemptions for Pensions**

The State provides pension payments to servicemen, internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel, and to their families using USSR State Budget resources.

Pensions are not subject to taxation.

**Article 9. Payment of Benefits**

Servicemen and internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel who are released from service and the families of the corresponding categories of servicemen and internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel and pensioners who were servicemen or internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel who have lost their breadwinner are paid benefits in the procedure and in the amounts determined by the USSR Council of Ministers.

**Article 10. Organs Providing Pension Support**

Social security organs provide pension support to compulsory service military personnel and their families in accordance with this Law. Pension support to officers, warrant officers, internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel, and their families is carried out in the same manner when they are granted pensions under conditions and in accordance with standards prescribed by the Law of the USSR "On Pension Support to Citizens of the USSR" (Article 5 and the first portion of Article 26 of this Law).

The USSR Ministry of Defense, USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the USSR Committee for State Security provide pension support to officers, warrant officers, extended service military personnel, internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel, and their families in accordance with this Law and in the procedure determined by the USSR Council of Ministers.

**Article 11. Social Assistance to Pensioners**

Union and autonomous republic legislation, local Soviets of people's deputies, administrative and enterprise, institution, and organization workers collective decisions may establish supplemental types of material support and benefits for pensioners who were servicemen or internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel and for members of their families within the limits of the rights afforded to them by the Law of the USSR "On Pension Support to Citizens of the USSR" using republic and local budgets and wage fund additions to pensions granted in accordance with this Law.

**Article 12. Special Service Pensions**

Servicemen and internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel who have been awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union or Hero of Socialist Labor or have been decorated with the Order of Glory, three classes, the Order of Workers Glory, three classes, or the Order "For Service to the Homeland in the Armed Forces of the USSR," three classes, or who have honorary titles of the USSR and also in the event of other service to the Soviet State can be granted a special service to the Union of SSR pension in the manner prescribed by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

**2. Service Pensions****Article 13. Pension Granting Conditions**

The following personnel have the right to a service pension:

a. Officers, warrant officers, extended service military personnel, and internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel who have 20 or more years of service on the date of release from duty in the military service or internal affairs organ service; and,

b. Officers and middle, field-grade, and senior level command personnel released from service due to age, illness, reduction of staff, or restricted health condition and who have reached 50 years of age on the date of release and have a total service period of 25 or more calendar years of which military or internal affairs organ service totals not less than 12 years 6 months.

**Article 14. Pension Amounts**

Service pensions are granted in the following amounts:

a. Officers, warrant officers, extended service military personnel, and internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel who have 20 years or more of service (Article 13, paragraph a.): For 20 years service—40 percent, and those retired for age or illness—45 percent of the corresponding monetary allowance amount (Article 46); for each year of service over 20 years—3 percent of the corresponding sum of monetary allowances but not more than a total of 75 percent of this sum; and,

b. Officers, and internal affairs organ middle, field-grade, or senior level command personnel who have a total of 25 or more calendar years length of service of which military or internal affairs organ service totals not less than 12 years 6 months (Article 13, Paragraph b.); for a total of 25 years of service—40 percent and for each year over 25 years—1 percent of the corresponding amount of monetary allowances (Article 46).

**Article 15. Minimum Pension Amount**

Service pensions granted in accordance with this Law cannot be lower than the minimum old age pension amount.

**Article 16. Increasing Pensions of Certain Categories of Pensioners**

Service pensions calculated in accordance with Articles 14 and 15 of this Law for officers, warrant officers, extended service military personnel, and internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel in the amount of less than 200 rubles per month are increased by 20 rubles per month. Furthermore, the pension should not exceed 200 rubles per month with the increase.

**Article 17. Increased Pensions for Disabled Persons and War Veterans**

Service pensions are increased for officers, warrant officers, extended service military personnel, and internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel who are disabled veterans (Article 22, Paragraph a.) to the sum of the minimum pension amount stipulated by Article 24 of this Law for disabled veterans who were compulsory service soldiers and seamen in accordance with the corresponding disability group.

Minimum old age pension amounts will be increased by 25 percent for officers, warrant officers, extended service military personnel, and internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel who have performed service in an army in the field, in partisan detachments or formations, or who participated in combat operations while fulfilling their international duty if they are not disabled veterans of war.

**Article 18. Service Pension Increases**

Service pension increases are calculated for officers, warrant officers, extended service military personnel, and internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel who have 20 or more years of service (including to those calculated in the minimum amount):

a. Non-working pensioners who have disabled dependent family members who belong to the circle of people provided a pension in the event of the loss of the breadwinner—for each disabled family member in the amount of a social pension prescribed by the Law of the USSR "On Pension Support to Citizens in the USSR" for the corresponding category of disabled persons. Furthermore, the increase is calculated only for those members of the family who do not receive a labor or social pension. When a disabled family member simultaneously has the right to a social pension and an increase to a service pension, a social pension can be granted to the family member or an increase can be calculated just for this family member in accordance with the pensioner's choice;

b. Pensioners who are Group I disabled veterans (besides those who have the right to a pension increase provided for by Article 17, part one), and also single pensioners who have reached 80 years of age—will have 50 percent of a minimum old age pension allocated for their care.

Increases stipulated by paragraphs a. and b. of this article can be calculated simultaneously.

**Article 19. Calculation of Years of Service**

The USSR Council of Ministers determines the years of service calculation procedure for granting pensions in accordance with this Law to officers, warrant officers, extended service military personnel, and internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel.

**3. Disability Pensions**

**Article 20. Pension Granting Conditions**

Disability pensions are granted to military personnel and internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel who have become disabled if the disability occurred during the period they were performing service or no later than three months after release from service or if the disability occurred after this time period but as a result of a wound, contusion, serious injury, or illness that occurred during the duty performance period.

**Article 21. Determination of a Disability**

Disability groups and causes and also the times of their occurrence are determined by a Medical Disability Determination Commission (VTEK) that functions based on the Provisions about them that have been approved by the USSR Council of Ministers.

Disabled persons are divided into three groups depending on the degree of loss of their ability to work.

**Article 22. Causes of Disabilities**

Disabled persons who were military personnel or internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel are divided into the following categories depending on the causes of disabilities:

a. Disabled war veterans—when a disability occurs as a result of a wound, contusion, or serious injury received while defending the USSR or while executing other military service duties (job responsibilities) or an illness associated with a stay at the front or fulfillment of international duty in countries conducting combat operations;

b. Other disabled veterans who were military personnel or internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel—when a disability occurs as a result of a serious injury received as a result of an accident not associated with accomplishment of military service duties (job responsibilities) or an illness not associated with a stay at the front or fulfillment of international duty in countries conducting combat operations.

**Article 23. Pension Amounts**

Disability pensions are granted to servicemen and internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel in the following amounts:



a. Group 1 and 2 disabled war veterans—75 percent and Group 3—50 percent of salary (total monetary compensation, hereinafter referred to as salary); and,

b. Other Group 1 and 2 disabled personnel—55 percent and Group 3—30 percent of salary.

#### **Article 24. Minimum Pension Amounts**

Minimum disability pension amounts have been established:

Group 1 and 2 disabled war veterans who were compulsory service soldiers and seamen—in the amount of 150 percent and Group 3—75 percent of the minimum old age pension amount and, for other disabled servicemen who were Group 1 and 2 compulsory service soldiers and seamen—in the amount of 100 percent and Group 3—50 percent of the minimum old age pension amount; —disabled servicemen who were compulsory service sergeants, ranking NCO's, privates, and senior seamen—in the amount of 110 percent, those who were warrant officers, extended service military personnel, and internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel—120 percent, and those who were officers and internal affairs organ command (besides junior) and rank and file personnel—130 percent of the appropriate minimum pension size stipulated by this Article for disabled servicemen who were compulsory service soldiers and seamen.

#### **Article 25. Pension Increases for Certain Categories of Disabled Servicemen**

Disability pensions calculated in accordance with Articles 23 and 24 of this Law for officers, warrant officers, extended service military personnel, and internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel in the amount of less than 150 rubles per month are increased by 20 rubles. Furthermore, the pension with the increase should not exceed 150 rubles per month.

Minimum old age pension amounts are increased by 25 percent of the minimum old age pension for group 2 disabled war veterans who do not have the right to other types of pensions and increases for care stipulated by Article 27 Paragraph b. of this Law.

#### **Article 26. Granting Disability Pensions in the Amount of Old Age or Service Pensions**

Disability pensions may be granted in amounts of old age pensions stipulated by this Law with the appropriate length of service for group 1 and 2 disabled servicemen who were servicemen or internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel who have the length of service necessary for granting old age pensions prescribed by the Law of the USSR "On Pension Support to Citizens in the USSR" (including under preferential conditions).

When a Group 1 or 2 disabled serviceman who was an officer, warrant officer, extended service military personnel, or internal affairs organ command and rank and

file personnel has the length of service needed to grant a service pension (Article 13, Paragraph a.), a disability pension can be granted to him in the service pension amount with the appropriate length of service.

#### **Article 27. Increases to Disability Pensions**

Increases are added to disability pensions granted to servicemen and to internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel (including to those calculated in the appropriate minimum amount):

a. Non-working Group 1 and 2 disabled servicemen who have dependent disabled family members who belong to the circle of people provided a pension in the event of loss of the breadwinner—for each disabled family member in the amount of a social pension prescribed by the Law of the USSR "On Pension Support to Citizens in the USSR" for the corresponding category of disabled persons. Furthermore, the increase is calculated only for those members of the family who do not receive a labor or social pension. When a disabled family member simultaneously has the right to a social pension and an increase to a service pension, a social pension can be granted to the family member or an increase can be calculated just for this family member in accordance with the disabled serviceman's choice;

b. Pensioners who are Group 1 blind disabled veterans and Group 2 single disabled war veterans who need constant assistance—[a pension] in the amount of 100 percent [is provided] for their care and other Group 1 disabled veterans and Group 2 single disabled veterans who need constant care—50 percent of the minimum old age pension amount.

The increase stipulated by Paragraphs a. and b. of this Article can be added at the same time.

#### **Article 28. Increases to Disabled War Veteran Pensions**

Disability pensions are increased by 25 percent of the minimum old age pension for military personnel and internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel who performed service as part of an army in the field, partisan detachments or formations, or who participated in combat operations while fulfilling their international duty and who became disabled as a result of causes indicated in Article 22, Paragraph b. of this Law (including those calculated in the appropriate minimum amount).

#### **Article 29. Time Periods for Granting and Payment of Disability Pensions**

Disability pensions for military personnel and internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel are granted for the entire disability period established by VTEK and for disabled men who are over 60 years old and women over 55 years old for life with recertification of these disabled persons only according to their applications.

In the event a pensioner who has not reached pension age is declared to be able-bodied, he is paid the pension until the end of the month in which he is declared to be able-bodied but no further back than from the date on which the disability is established.

**Article 30. Pension Recalculation when Changing Disability Groups**

When a change of disability group occurs after a pension has been granted, the pension amount is changed accordingly. Furthermore, if a disabled war veteran's disability becomes more severe as a result of illness, a serious work injury, or professional illness, the pension is recalculated according to the new disability group with preservation of its cause.

**Article 31. Resumption of Pension Payments for an Intermittent Disability**

When a disabled serviceman who was a servicemen or internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel passes a VTEK reexamination, pension payments cease and, in the event that he is again declared to be disabled, it is resumed from the date it was stopped but no more than one month from the date of reexamination.

In the event that the disabled serviceman has passed the reexamination for a valid reason, pension payments are resumed to him from the date they were stopped but no more than three years from the date of reexamination if the VTEK declares him to be disabled for that period. Furthermore, if another disability group is established during the reexamination, the pension is paid in accordance with the previous disability group for the indicated period.

**4. Pension in the Event of the Loss of the Breadwinner**

**Article 32. Pension Granting Conditions**

Pensions in the event of the loss of the breadwinner are granted to families of military personnel and internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel if the breadwinner died while performing service or no later than three months after release from service or later than this period but as the result of a wound, contusion, serious injury, or illness that occurred while performing service and for families of pensioners who were military personnel or internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel—if the breadwinner died while receiving a pension or no later than five years after pension payments stopped. Furthermore, families of military personnel who are missing in action during a period of combat operations are on a par with families of those who perished at the front.

**Article 33. Family Members Who Have the Right to a Pension**

Disabled family members who were dependents of those deceased (perished) military personnel or internal affairs

organ command and rank and file personnel have the right to a pension in the event of the loss of the breadwinner.

Regardless of the nature of the dependents' relationship with the breadwinner, a pension is granted to: Disabled children; disabled parents or wife if they lost their source of livelihood after the breadwinner's death; or disabled parents and wives of military personnel who died at the front or while fulfilling their international duty in countries conducting combat operations.

The following are considered to be disabled family members when determining the right to a pension in the event of the loss of the breadwinner:

a. Children, brothers, sisters, and grandchildren who have not reached 18 years of age or older if they became disabled prior to reaching 18 years of age and who are students at professional technical schools, middle special or higher educational institutions—until graduation from these education institutions but no later than when they reach 23 years of age. Furthermore, brothers, sisters, and grandchildren have the right to a pension if they do not have able-bodied parents:

b. The father, mother, or wife if they have reached pension age: Men—60 years, women—55 years or if they are disabled;

c. The wife, one of the parents or grandfather, grandmother, brother or sister, regardless of age or ability to work if he (she) is engaged in caring for children, brothers, sisters, or grandchildren of the deceased breadwinner who have not reached eight years of age and who does not work; and,

d. The grandfather and grandmother—in the absence of individuals who are obliged to support them by law.

The USSR Council of Ministers can establish other conditions for granting pensions in the event of the loss of the breadwinner for parents and wives of individual categories of deceased military personnel and internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel.

**Article 34. Family Members Who are Considered to be Dependents**

Family members of the deceased are considered to be his dependents if they were completely dependent on him or received assistance from him that was their permanent and primary livelihood.

Family members of the deceased for whom his assistance was their permanent and primary livelihood but who they themselves received some kind of pension have the right to transfer to a new pension.

**Article 35. Pension Payments to Children Who Are Totally State Supported**

Children who have lost both parents (orphans) are paid the total [pension] amount during the period of total State pension support.

Other children who are on total State support are paid 25 percent of the pension granted.

**Article 36. Adopters and Adopted Persons Right to a Pension**

Adopters have the right to a pension on an equal basis with parents and adopted persons—on an equal basis with natural children.

Adolescents who have the right to a pension in the event of the loss of the breadwinner also preserve this right in the event of their adoption.

**Article 37. Stepfather's and Stepmother's and Stepson's and Stepdaughter's Right to a Pension**

A stepfather and stepmother have the right on an equal basis with a father and mother under conditions if they have raised and supported the stepson or stepdaughter of the deceased for no less than five years.

A stepson or stepdaughter have the right to a pension on an equal basis with natural children if they have not received child support from their parents.

**Article 38. Retention of a Pension Upon Remarriage**

A pension granted in the event of the death of a husband is also maintained if the pensioner remarries.

**Article 39. Pension Amounts**

Pensions in the event of the loss of the breadwinner are granted in the following amounts:

a. To families of military personnel or internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel who died as a result of a wound, contusion, or serious injury received while defending the USSR or while executing other military service duties (job-related responsibilities) or as a result of an illness associated with a stay at the front or fulfillment of international duty in countries conducting combat operations—40 percent of the breadwinner's salary for each disabled family member. The same pension amounts are calculated for families of deceased pensioners who were disabled war veterans and for families that consist of children who have lost both parents (orphans) regardless of the breadwinner's cause of death; and,

b. To families of military personnel and internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel who died as a result of serious injury received as a result of an accident not associated with fulfilling military service duties (job-related responsibilities) or an illness not associated with being present at the front or with fulfillment of international duty in countries conducting combat operations—30 percent of the breadwinner's salary for each disabled family member.

**Article 40. Minimum Pension Sizes**

Pensions in the event of the loss of the breadwinner that are granted to families of military personnel and internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel cannot be lower than the following for each disabled family member:

a. While calculating pensions in accordance with Article 39, Paragraph a. of this Law: For families of compulsory service soldiers and seamen—100 percent; for families of compulsory service sergeants, noncommissioned officers, privates, and senior seamen—110 percent; for families of warrant officers, extended service military personnel, and internal affairs organ junior command and rank and file personnel—120 percent; and, for families of officers and internal affairs organ (other than junior) command personnel—130 percent of the minimum old age pension amount; and,

b. While calculating pensions in accordance with Article 39, Paragraph b. of this Law—75 percent of the amount stipulated by Paragraph a. of this Article for families of corresponding categories of military personnel and internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel.

**Article 41. Calculation of Pensions for Orphans**

A pension in the event of the loss of the breadwinner can be calculated for families of compulsory service military personnel that have children who have lost both parents (orphans) based on the total salaries of both parents in accordance with the standards prescribed by the Law of the USSR "On Pension Support to Citizens of the USSR."

**Article 42. The Period for Which a Pension is Granted**

A pension in the event of the loss of the breadwinner is established for the entire period during which the family members of the deceased are considered to be unable to work (Article 33) and for family members who have reached: Men—60 years of age and, women—55 years of age—for life.

**Article 43. Granting One Pension for all Family Members. Allocating a Portion of a Pension**

One overall pension is granted to all family members who have the right to a pension.

At the request of a family member, that person's share of the pension can be allocated and paid to that person separately.

Allocation of a portion of a pension is conducted from the first of the month following the month in which the application for division of the pension arrived.

**Article 44. Changing the Pension Amount and Ceasing Payment of it**

If a change occurs in a family that has been granted a pension in the event of the loss of the breadwinner as a



result of which individual family members or the family as a whole loses the right to a pension, pension recalculation or cessation of its payment occurs from the first of the month following the month in which the change occurred.

**Article 45. Procedures and Time Periods for Establishing Disability of Family Members**

Regulations about procedures and time periods for establishment of a disability set forth in Articles 21, 29, and 31 of this Law appropriately apply to family members who are disabled.

**5. Calculation of Pensions**

**Article 46. Salary (Monetary Allowance) for Calculation of Pensions**

Pensions granted to compulsory service military personnel and their families in accordance with this Law are calculated according to prescribed standards in percentages of average monthly salary that military personnel received prior to being conscripted into military service or after release from military service until application for pensions or in percentages of average monthly monetary allowances received by military personnel during the period they performed military duties under contract. Furthermore, average monthly salary (monetary allowances) for calculating their pensions is determined in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Law of the USSR "On Pension Support to Citizens in the USSR."

Pensions are established for compulsory service military personnel, who did not work prior to being conscripted into military service or after release from military service and who are not on military service on contract, and for their families in the minimum amounts prescribed according to Articles 24 and 40 of this Law.

Pensions for officers, warrant officers, extended service military personnel, internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel, and their families are calculated from monetary allowances of these military personnel and command and rank and file personnel. Furthermore, the appropriate salaries, military or special rank, and percentage increase for length of service (continuous work) are taken into account in the procedure and amounts determined by the USSR Council of Ministers for calculating their pensions.

**Article 47. Recalculation of Pensions from Higher Salaries**

After being granted disability pensions, pensioners among compulsory service military personnel who have worked no less than two years at a higher salary than that upon which the pension was calculated establish a new pension amount based on their application and proceeding from the salary determined according to the procedure prescribed by the Law of the USSR "On

Pension Support to Citizens of the USSR." Recalculation of pensions granted in a minimum amount as a result of the absence of a salary are conducted under these same conditions.

A new recalculation of a pension is conducted at a pensioner's request in the event of a further increase in his salary. Each subsequent pension recalculation is conducted no earlier than two years after the previous recalculation.

**Article 48. Calculation of Pensions for Pensioners' Families**

Pensions in the event of the loss of the breadwinner are calculated for families of pensioners who were military personnel or internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel based on the same salary (monetary compensation) from which the breadwinner's pension was calculated.

Families of pensioners who were compulsory service military personnel who had the right to recalculation of a pension according to the procedure stipulated by Article 47 of this Law and pensions in the event of the loss of the breadwinner are calculated from the salary from which the indicated pension recalculation was conducted or could have been conducted.

**Article 49. Increase of Minimum Pension Amounts and Maximum Salary Amounts**

Minimum pension amounts granted to military personnel, internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel, and their families and increases to these pensions determined based on the minimum wage and also maximum salary size taken into account to calculate pensions for compulsory service military personnel and their families are increased with minimum wage increases. Furthermore, their increase is carried out from July 1st if the minimum wage increase has been conducted prior to July 1st or from January 1st of the next year if the minimum wage increase occurred on July 1st or later.

**Article 50. Application of Rayon Coefficients to Pension Amounts**

Pensions are granted to pensioners who were officers, warrant officers, extended service military personnel, internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel, and members of their families who reside in rayons where rayon coefficients have been prescribed for workers and employees salaries for the time periods during which they reside in these rayons in accordance with this Law (including minimum amounts) are calculated with the application of the appropriate rayon coefficient prescribed in this rayon for workers and employees of non-production sectors but no greater than a coefficient of 1.5.

Pensions are calculated for pensioners who were compulsory service military personnel and for members of their families for the period of residence in rayons where

rayon coefficients are added to workers and employees salaries according to the procedure prescribed by the Law of the USSR "On Pension Support for Citizens in the USSR."

## 6. Granting Pensions

### Article 51. Pension Grant Applications

Pension grant applications for compulsory service military personnel and members of their families are submitted to the rayon (city) department of social security or to another social security organ (Hereinafter referred to as rayon (city) social security department) that corresponds to it at the location of their residence and for officers, warrant officers, extended service military personnel, internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel, and members of their families—to USSR Ministry of Defense, USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, or USSR Committee for State Security pension organs.

### Article 52. Organs that Grant Pensions and Time Periods for Examination of Documents on Granting Pensions

Pension granting commissions grant pensions to compulsory service military personnel and to their families (Article 100 of the Law of the USSR "On Pension Support to Citizens of the USSR") and USSR Ministry of Defense, USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, or USSR Committee for State Security pension organs grant pensions to officers, warrant officers, extended service military, internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel, and their families (taking into account Article 10, part one).

Pension granting organs review pension granting documents no later than 10 days after their arrival.

### Article 53. Pension Granting Time Periods

In accordance with this Law, pensions are granted:

a. To compulsory service military personnel—from the date of discharge from the hospital but no earlier than from the date of release from military service if VTEK establishment of disability and application for pensions occurred no later than three months respectively from the date of discharge from the hospital or from the date of release from military service and for families of compulsory service military personnel and pensioners who were military personnel—from the date of the death of the breadwinner or the origin of the right to a pension but no more than 12 months before application for a pension. A pension is awarded to parents or the wife of military personnel and pensioners who have obtained the right to a pension as a result of loss of livelihood from the date of application for a pension; and,

b. To officers, warrant officers, extended service military personnel, and internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel—from the date of release from service but no earlier than the date prior to which they were approved monetary allowances and for families of these military personnel and command and rank and file

personnel and pensioners among them—from the date of the breadwinner's death but no earlier than the date prior to which monetary allowances or a pension were paid to him except for the following cases of granting them pensions from later time periods:

The indicated military personnel and command and rank and file personnel who have been recognized as disabled at the expiration of three months from the date of release from service or as a result of an accident or illness that occurred after release—from the date the disability is established and those condemned to imprisonment—from the date of application for pensions after release from the site of imprisonment;

Family members of the indicated military personnel, command and rank and file personnel, and pensioners among them who have acquired the right to a pension after the death of the breadwinner—from the date of origin of the right to a pension and, parents or wife who have acquired the right to a pension as a result of the loss of the source of livelihood—from the date of the application for a pension.

A pension for past time when an application is submitted late is granted from the date of origin of the right to a pension but no more than 12 months prior to the application for a pension.

### Article 54. Time Periods for Recalculation of Granted Pensions

When circumstances arise that entail a change in pension amounts granted to compulsory service military personnel and their families, recalculation of these pensions occurs in accordance with the time periods prescribed by the Law of the USSR "On Pension Support to Citizens of the USSR."

Recalculation of pensions granted to officers, warrant officers, extended service military personnel, internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel, and their families is conducted from the first day of the month that follows the month in which the circumstances occurred that entail a change in pension amount. Furthermore, if the pensioner acquired the right to a pension increase, the difference in the pension for the past time can be paid to him for no more than 12 months.

## 7. Pension Disbursements

### Article 55. Pension Disbursement Organs

Social security organs at the pensioner's actual place of residence disburse pensions to pensioners who were compulsory service military personnel and members of their families regardless of official residence.

USSR State Workers' Savings and Credit Bank institutions disburse pensions to pensioners who were officers, warrant officers, extended service military personnel, internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel, and members of their families at the location of

the pensioner's actual residence regardless of official residence based on the appropriate documents processed by USSR Ministry of Defense, USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, and USSR Committee for State Security pension organs.

**Article 56. Disbursement of Pensions to Pensioners when There is Salary or Other Income**

Pensions granted in accordance with this Law are completely disbursed regardless of whether or not the pensioner has a salary or other income.

**Article 57. Pension Disbursements for Past Time**

Pension amounts calculated for pensioners who were servicemen, internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel, and their families and not claimed by them in a timely manner are disbursed for no more than three years prior to the application for receipt of a pension.

Pension amounts not received by pensioners in a timely manner due to an error by an organ that grants or disburses pensions are disbursed for the past time period without any limitations whatsoever.

**Article 58. Pension Disbursements to Pensioners Who Reside in Boarding Homes**

The difference between a pension and the cost of maintenance in a boarding house (hotel) is paid to single pensioners who were servicemen or internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel and who reside in boarding homes (hotels) for the elderly or disabled but no less than 25 percent of the pension granted and no less than 20 percent of the minimum monthly old age pension amount. If a pensioner who resides in a boarding house (hotel) for the elderly or disabled has disabled family members who are his dependents and who belong to the circle of people provided pensions in the event of the loss of the breadwinner, the pension is subject to payment in the following order: 25 percent of the pension but no less than 20 percent of the minimum old age pension amount is paid to the pensioner himself and the remaining portion of the pension but no more than 50 percent of the amount granted is paid to a designated family member.

Pensioners who are family members of military personnel or internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel are paid 10 percent of the pension granted but no less than 20 percent of the minimum monthly old age pension amount during the period of residence in boarding houses (hotels) for the elderly or disabled. In those cases when the amount of the pension exceeds maintenance costs at the boarding house (hotel), they are paid the difference between the pension and the maintenance costs but no less than 10 percent of the pension granted and no less than 20 percent of the minimum old age pension per month.

**Article 59. Pension Disbursement During a Stay at an Inpatient Treatment Facility**

A pension is completely paid during a pensioner's stay at an inpatient treatment facility (at a military hospital, clinic, hospital or other treatment institutions) and also at a hospital for lepers.

**Article 60. Halting Pension Disbursement During Imprisonment**

Payment of a pension is halted during the period of confinement in the event a pensioner is imprisoned.

**Article 61. Pension Deductions**

Deductions from pensions granted to servicemen, internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel, and their families are conducted in the manner prescribed by the Law of the USSR "On Pension Support to Citizens of the USSR." Furthermore, pension sums paid in excess to pensioners who were officers, warrant officers, extended service military personnel, internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel, and their families as a result of abuse on their part are withheld based on USSR Ministry of Defense, USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, and USSR Committee for State Security pension organ decisions.

**Article 62. Pension and Allowance Disbursements in the Event of a Pensioner's Death**

Pension sums owed to pensioners, who were servicemen, internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel, or members of their families and left under-received as a result of his death, are not included as part of the inheritance and are paid to those members of his family who belong to that circle of people provided pensions in the event of the loss of the breadwinner.

However, the parents, wife, and also family members who resided with the pensioner on the day of his death have the right to obtain this sum in the event that they are not in the circle of people who are provided pensions in the event of the loss of the breadwinner.

When several family members apply for the sum owed, the pension is equally divided among them.

The sums mentioned above are paid if application for them has occurred no later than six months after the pensioner's death.

In the event of a pensioner's death, his family is paid a burial allowance amounting to two months pension.

If the pensioner's burial is conducted by persons other than his family, they are paid an allowance in a sum that does not exceed the actual interment expenses borne within the limits of the allowance amount indicated above.

**Article 63. Pension Payments when Emigrating Abroad**

Military personnel, internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel, and their families who have emigrated for permanent residence abroad are not granted a pension in the USSR.



Pensions granted are paid to the above named persons in the USSR until emigration for permanent residence abroad in the manner stipulated by the Law of the USSR "On Pension Support to Citizens in the USSR."

### 8. Pension Recalculation Procedure

#### Article 64. Recalculation of Previously Granted Pensions

Recalculation of previously granted pensions for military personnel, internal affairs organ command and rank and file personnel, and their families as a result of this Law taking force is conducted according to the documents that are in pension files at the time of recalculation. If pensioners subsequently submit additional documents that give them the right to further pension increases, recalculation is conducted at a later time but no more than 12 months from the date that the additional materials are submitted and no earlier than the date that this Law enters into force.

#### Article 65. Salary Taken into Account During Pension Recalculations

Recalculation of pensions granted to compulsory service military personnel and their families prior to this Law entering into force can be conducted from the average monthly salary for the five years prior to the Law entering into force or prior to granting the pension, or based on the salary from which the pension was previously calculated, in accordance with the pensioner's choice.

#### Article 66. Pension Increase as a Result of Changes of the Cost of Living Index and Wage Increases

Pensions calculated from wages (monetary compensation) in accordance with Articles 14, 15, 23-26, 39, and 40 of this Law are increased annually taking into account changes in the cost of living index and wage increases in the manner determined by the USSR Supreme Soviet but no less than two percent of the salary (monetary compensation) from which the pension is calculated.

### New Appointment: Major General V. I. Sein

90UM0804A Moscow KOMMUNIST  
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 13, Jul 90  
(Signed to press 25 Jun 90) p 60

[Unattributed article: "Major General Vladimir Ivanovich Sein Named Member of the Military Council and Chief of the Political Directorate of the Red Banner North Caucasus Military District"]

[Text] Major General Vladimir Ivanovich Sein was born on March 24, 1941, to a worker's family in the Kuban (the village of Novo-Rozhdestvenskaya, Tikhoretskiy Rayon, Krasnodar Kray). He went to work as an electrician in the Tikhoretsk city office of Vodosvet immediately upon finishing secondary school.

In 1960 he was enrolled in Orenburg's G. K. Ordzhonikidze Air Defense Artillery School. On graduating from it, he was assigned to the Belorussian Military District as senior technician of a radio technical battery. There he played an active role in the unit and combined unit Communist Youth League and two years later chose Communist Youth League work as his profession: He was appointed deputy chief of a regiment political department for Communist Youth League work, and later worked in that capacity for the units of a garrison and for a combined-arms army.

In 1975 he graduated from the V. I. Lenin Military-Political Academy and continued his service in the Central Asian Military District, serving as deputy commander of a motorized rifle regiment for political affairs and as inspector of the district political directorate's party organizational work department. He went on to serve in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (today the Western Group of Forces) as chief of the political department of a tank division and as chief of the group political directorate's propaganda and agitation department. He was later assigned to an internal district as a member of the military council and chief of the political department of a tank army. He subsequently became First Deputy Chief of the Baltic Military District Political Directorate.

He is a Russian. He joined the CPSU in December 1962. He was elected a member of the bureau of a an oblast CPSU committee and was a delegate to the 28th CPSU Congress.

He was awarded the order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" Third Class (1989).

He was promoted to the rank of colonel ahead of schedule in February 1982, and to the rank of Major General in October 1986.

He married in 1966. His wife, Aleksandra Aleksandrovna, was born in 1945. She is a Russian and an economist by profession. He has two daughters—the older one graduated from the Kiev National Economic Institute, and the younger one is in ninth grade. His younger brother, Anatoliy Ivanovich, is also a major general and serves in the Kiev Military District staff.

### From Answers To Questions In A KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL Questionnaire.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] What goal have you set yourself in taking up your new place of service?

[Sein] First of all, to develop all the good that has been done before me. To take new steps in the perestroika of army life—especially the perestroika of political influence on inter-ethnic relations and of internationalist education in view of the bitter experience of the Baltic region. The North Caucasus, where I will be serving, is a serious subject for this.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] What thoughts does your assuming this post at such a difficult time for the political agencies inspire in you?

[Sein] I think that the most important thing is not to make mistakes and to choose out of all ideas the essential ones. And this can be done only by looking all around you, and not in haste. For example, how can we restore the value of party ideals, which have significantly lost their luster in the army, especially among young communists? I see considerable work for myself in this area.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] How do you explain the declining prestige of army service?

[Sein] On one hand, by the fact that the reexamination of the army's role and place in our society is not always objective and is sometimes even distorted, and on the other hand, by the fact that certain negative aspects of army life really do exist, and the army has yet to find a way to overcome them as quickly as possible.

At the same time, in order to enhance the prestige of the army and navy, in my view, we must not cut them off from society, we must enforce the country's laws concerning society's obligations to the army, and, of course, we need irreproachable deeds on the part of our people in shoulder boards—they must set an example in service to the motherland and in questions of morality.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] What category of servicemen worries you most of all, in your opinion?

[Sein] Officers. At the current stage of reforms in the Armed Forces, each of them wants to know exactly what his fate will be. But there are quite a few questions here, and unless they are resolved, success in things military and in perestroika is unthinkable.

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#### **Army Gen Shkadov Comments on General Inspectorate**

90UM0806A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
2 Aug 90 First Edition p 4

[Article by Army Gen I. Shkadov, party bureau secretary, Inspector General Group, USSR Ministry of Defense: "Inspector General Group"]

[Text] "Reports of a 'paradisical group' of the USSR Ministry of Defense have recently appeared in youth publications. What is behind this?" N. Sviridov

When it comes to such publications, an ignorance of the facts and groundless arrogance are behind them. But what are the facts?

The Inspector General Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense was created in January 1958 by a decree of the USSR Council of Ministers in order to ensure that the armed forces make effective use of the accumulated knowledge and combat experience of military chiefs who

had attained an age at which they could no longer continue working at full load.

It was established as an organization fulfilling assignments of the USSR Ministry of Defense pertaining to certain important issues of troop combat and operational training and development of the armed forces.

It would be sufficient to say that our comrades, working on orders from the minister of defense, have already provided assistance to leaders and intermediaries in troop, naval and command-and-staff exercises this year.

Marshals, army generals and fleet admirals periodically make local visits to transmit their combat experience and the experience of postwar development of the armed forces to newly appointed district, fleet, army and flotilla commanders, chiefs of staff and political directorate chiefs.

The Inspector General Group takes a most direct part in studying and solving the most important problems of army and navy development and the theory of the art of war, it provides practical assistance in designing and approving military equipment and armament, and it prepares conclusions on works of military theory, military technology and military history.

For example 30 inspector generals and military inspector-advisors were included in the main editorial commission to create the 10-volume scientific work "The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet People 1941-1945" as its members and military consultants. The group actively participates in solving the problems of military reform, in drafting laws on defense matters and on military service by officers, creating new combined-arms and combat manuals and various regulations for the troops, and it provides constant assistance to military educational institutions in improving cadet and student training plans and programs and the entire process of training and indoctrination in them. Each year many of us are appointed chairmen of state examination commissions.

The Inspector General Group contains marshals of the Soviet Union, chief marshals of the armed services, army generals and marshals of branches of troops, and fleet admirals. Most were participants of the Great Patriotic War, and of combat at Khasan and Halhin-Gol. There are veterans of the Soviet-Finnish war, and those who fought in republican Spain.

It contains a three-time Hero of the Soviet Union (Marshal of Aviation I. N. Kozhedub)—1, two-time heroes—4, heroes of the Soviet Union—23, two-time heroes of socialist labor—2, and heroes of socialist labor—3.

This is why there is no need for me to persuade the reader that these are people who earned the respect of the people, and who are giving their all to serving the motherland with a clear conscience even today.

**Weapons Stolen from Unit in Armenia**

90UM0818A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
4 Aug 90 First Edition p 5

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent reports: "From Armenia: Flamethrowers in Hands of Terrorists"]

[Text] On 2 August at 0400 hours local time in one of the rayons of Yerevan a group of about 50 armed terrorists attacked an army subunit. Having stopped their vehicles about 400 meters from the military garrison, under the cover of darkness the terrorists penetrated the garrison and attacked and injured the orderly on duty, Junior Sergeant A. Simonyan. The other personnel, who were on duty for that 24-hour period and who were not armed, were blocked and held at gunpoint.

After receiving word of the attack, soldiers on patrol from a nearby subunit opened fire on the criminals. But by that time the raiders had broken into the storehouse and carried off 165 infantry flamethrowers, 102 charges for them and 675 signal flares. After the patrols opened fire, the terrorists disappeared.

USSR Peoples' Deputy General Major M. Surkov reported on this most recent criminal act of terrorists at a session of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet.

Steps are being taken to search for the criminals. Those people who are responsible for negligence in storing the arms will be made to answer.

In view of the critical situation that has come about within the republic, it has been decided to issue personal weapons to military servicemen. Officers and warrant officers have been switched to residing in the barracks.

This most recent attack by bandits upon a military subunit for the purpose of seizing weapons is a sobering lesson for those who are suggesting that we suspend the effective functioning of the USSR Presidential Decree "on forbidding the creation of armed formations not authorized by the USSR judiciary and for the removal of arms when they are held illegally" within the Armenian Republic and the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast.



### Commentary on Kiev MD Operational-Tactical Exercise

90UM0512A Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT  
in Russian No 13, 26 Mar-1 Apr 90 p 13

[Article by N. Zhichkin, G. Chernomorskiy: "'The Front' and 'The Rear' near Chernigov".]

[Text] A Kiev Military District troop operational-tactical exercise took place during the second half of March. Our special correspondents were there.

#### The Exercise Was Difficult

The "reds" and "blues" "fought" in all two-sided training exercises during the 1930's. After the Great Patriotic War, it was the "west" and the "east." Varying numbers of troops participated in the maneuvers, various tasks were worked out at them, and the equipment was different. Nevertheless, those exercises were always alike in one way. In the beginning, as a rule, victory was achieved by the "reds" and decades later by the "east." It was not hard to guess who were "reds" and "east" or who were "blues" and "west."

The "south" and "north" participated in this exercise which took place on the territory of Dnepropetrovsk, Cherkassy, Kiev and Chernigov Oblasts. But the matter is not just that the names of the sides have been changed. The "patriotic" assignment, "if you are 'blue' you cannot defeat 'red,'" did not weigh heavily on commanders. Here victory depended on the troops' level of training and commanders and staffs degree of operational training.

And one more thing. In contrast with exercises on this scale that were conducted, say five years ago, it stipulated only employment of conventional weapons. This detail, in our view, splendidly characterizes the change in the Armed Forces' leadership strategic thinking that realize in practice the possibilities that have opened up in the matter of training troops using the USSR's peace-loving foreign policy.

Primary "combat" operations took place between the Dnepr and Desna Rivers southwest of Chernigov. We do not seem to be giving away military secrets (military observers from over 20 countries were informed about it) if we tell readers that besides three tank divisions that participated in the exercise, there were reinforcing units: Aviators, floating bridge construction personnel, PVO missileers, etc.

A significant percentage of the personnel of many subunits were military reservists, another feature of the current exercise. Sr Lt A. Myakinin's motorized rifle company held firmly on the defense and acted swiftly in the attack. Of the company's 55 privates, sergeants and officers (all of them were called up from the reserves) only one man was younger than his "commander-father." To gain authority in such a contingent requires outstanding educational skill.

Tactical helicopter assault landings occurred twice during the course of the exercise. The reservists used to man the assault companies performed well. Nevertheless, helicopter pilots were the main players here. They skillfully suppressed the simulated enemy's opposing fire and made a precise assault landing. And this was not by chance. Almost all of the helicopter regiment's pilots served in Afghanistan. And the majority of them have been in another hell—they participated in eliminating the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES [Nuclear Power Plant].

Floating bridge construction personnel displayed their mastery during the final stage of the exercise. Personnel commanded by Lt Col N. Malkov's regiment laid a bridge across the Desna so the troops on the defensive could transition to a counterattack.

Major B. Shulgin, commander of the pontoon-bridge battalion, gave us the explanation. These bridges are the entire existence of this officer and his colleagues in the unit.

"We also had the opportunity to be in Afghanistan," the major said. "We built and maintained a bridge across the Pripyat. We arrived there 48 hours after the explosion at the AES."

Tank crewmen and rear services subunit personnel worked well. We heard these assessments from military specialists who naturally frequently return to analyze experience acquired [by the troops]. Not being concerned with operational-tactical subtleties, we simply turned our attention to certain aspects of the exercise. We discuss them in the following.

#### A Lot of Dust for Nothing

More than 12,000 men, hundreds of tanks and thousands of other pieces of equipment participated in the "combat" operations. The dust was especially annoying on the march and during the execution of various maneuvers. Visibility was reduced and that also meant speed was reduced. Preconditions were created for all sorts of troubles which might arise even without the "enemy's" opposition.

Dust on the roads of the firing range, what troubles did it not cause, nothing but the rain could "beat down" the dust. You can withstand it with skill, patience, and physical endurance.

It is bad to fight in such dust! But, really and truly, being near this "dust" seemed harmless to us until the exercise; some specialists made much ado about nothing and raised the issue of the dust prior to the exercise. It turns out that we have such people in our times. The engines were still silent, not one soldier's boot had struck the ground on the firing range and there was already a resounding salvo of rumors, conjecture and "scientifically based" predictions.

One of the first was voiced by the newspaper *VECHERNIY KIEV*. One of its articles was about an unfavorable radiation situation in the training area and how the dust being raised certainly was having a negative impact there and in other areas. This "precise" prediction which had sown some doubt in people's minds did not live long at least among those who participated in the exercise.

Radiation levels were measured here daily—both on the soil and the vehicles. For example, tests were conducted in our presence by specialists from the medical subunit. Journalists frequently underwent this monitoring. The instrument readings did not differ substantially from the readings taken in the streets of Kiev or those at times in Moscow. We note that this data was not just acquired by "our" specialists but by some foreign observers who did not fail to use instruments they had brought with them.

A "dust cloud" also arose around the exercise in connection with the time that it was being conducted. For example, one of our colleagues who represents a very respected central newspaper specifically asked who had ordered the exercise to be conducted in the republic just as spring planting is beginning, when bi-elections to Councils are planned, and when the day of remembrance of the dead is approaching? The question implied one thing, "Oh, these military [men] once again did not take the public interest into consideration." But, was it that way? No, it was not!

Let us begin with the elections. Who could predict a year ago when and on what day bi-elections would be conducted? Or that they would have been necessary at all? Yes, and everything was done so that the soldiers called up from the reserves could exercise their right [to vote]. Furthermore, the version of interfering with the spring planting has not "turned out" to be anything of the kind. First of all, it begins on different dates in the various Ukrainian oblasts. Secondly, almost none of the people concerned with agriculture were called up. And thirdly, the "battle" unfolded on land they do not till.

Let us talk about the religious "point" separately. Is it possible that the exercise offended thousands of believers? We addressed this question to the Metropolitan of the Kiev and Galatian Philarete and the Patriarch Exarchos of the Ukraine. "It is not a sin to participate in the exercise," answered the Philarete. "The Day of Remembrance is observed every Saturday in Lent. At that time for example, they could conduct exercises in the Russian Army. And regimental priests participated in them."

More and more glasnost is entering our lives. Scores of journalists were invited to the exercise. A press center was organized. It was headed by Maj Gen A. Kuznetsov. Very favorable conditions were created for the press. Journalists received answers to all questions and they saw everything they wanted to see.

But why was part of this energy which was directed at informing the people not expended prior to the exercise?

Indeed, right away it could have decreased the cloud of "dust" which was literally raised from nothing. What kept this from happening? Concern about secrecy or preserving military secrets? Most likely, it was the stereotypical thinking which we can in no way part with.

#### "You Are Not Greens?"

Major V. Kovalchuk who commanded the battalion deployed on the bank of the Desna greeted us with that question.

"What, are they worried?" we asked in our turn.

"It happens..."

More and more often the military collides with the current truly nationwide concern about the ecology. It must be confessed that it was not always so. Although orders from the very highest levels were sufficient on that count, it proved to be something else in practice. Sometimes after the exercise when they gathered the various materials that were obviously disturbed and were called upon "to lift," "to raise," or "to fix" after they had packed everything up, the area was left as if "Mamay" [Tatar who pillaged Ryazan in 1373] had passed by.

This time everything was different. The Military Council appealed to the soldiers, "Be zealous masters of the peoples property. Preserve the roads, bridges, forests and meadows... Take care of fauna and flora in the exercise area." And these words found a response. We had occasion to talk to many private citizens. There were no serious rebukes directed at the military.

As we have already said, the exercise took place on the territory of four oblasts, however the main events occurred on the firing range.

This territory, almost 54,000 square hectares, was allotted to the military by a Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers resolution. Naturally, it is not a small piece [of land]. But in carving it out, they took into account that the land here is nothing to rave about, it is sand, swamp, salt marshes and forested in places. You will not get much from it in the agricultural industry.

"But for all that, it is land!" said one of the people we were talking to. "Something could have been grown on it. The villages of Bondara, Sukacha and Chabana were there. People lived [there]. And they are planting and plowing around [there]."

"Yes, they are planting and plowing and cattle are grazing. Clearly, everything is useful for the State, especially in our time of universal poverty."

"Well, a firing range is a place where military people train to fight, is it not necessary?"

We all recognize that for the present it is impossible to live without an Army. However, we do not need just any kind of Army, but a good, well trained Army that is

capable of protecting the Fatherland from danger wherever it arises. It is impossible to train it sitting at a school desk. You need a field. There is a reason that the armies of a number of European governments have leased firing ranges where there is more room due to crowded conditions on their own territory. We do not need such a lease and it would not matter if we did; we cannot afford it. That means we need to train on our own land.

But are there not a lot of firing ranges? Have they not sprawled out and taken up too much room? We had the opportunity to hear such questions.

It is no secret where the firing ranges are located and it is no secret what they are engaged in there. But why not tell the residents about it through the mass media from time to time? And not just recount, let us say, that Lieutenant or Sergeant so-and-so distinguished himself, but that without this land and without this firing range we could find ourselves at a loss and we could lose much more compared with the possibility of the poor harvest on this land. We leafed through the republic newspapers and almost never saw such articles. Nor did the many people we talked to recall television or radio programs about this. Are the journalists guilty? We think the chiefs of the Kiev Military District firing ranges deserve a greater share of the blame for not having been able to attract representatives of the press with these themes.

#### **Airborne Troops' Commander on Professionalization**

90UM0769A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Jul 90  
Morning Edition p 6

[Interview of the Airborne Troops' Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Ye. Podkolzin by IZVESTIYA Correspondent, N. Burbyga: "Entering the Airborne Troops Under a Contract?"]

[Text]

[Burbyga] How do you feel about the idea of a professional army?

[Podkolzin] Positively. I believe that those who serve in the Airborne Troops are professionals. The only difference is that they do not receive very much pay. We have prepared several proposals for the General Staff. We will be requesting that starting next year they permit us to conduct an experiment in which we propose that we take people under contract to fill the most complicated jobs. But this is to be under the condition that the Armed Forces will be staffed on the basis of the law regarding universal military service. If the principal for staffing changes, then there will be no need to conduct the experiment. But before the choice can be made, the people must know the cost of this or that alternative. For example, we have estimated that the maintenance of several of our divisions is cheaper than one American division.

[Burbyga] Yevgeniy Nikolayevich, just what are the Airborne Troops today?

[Podkolzin] I would put it this way: it is fire power, mobility and a great deal of authority among the young people. It is sufficient to recall that this is not the first year that there have been 17 to 18 men competing for a spot in the Ryazan Airborne Troops Academy.

[Burbyga] Subunits of the Airborne Troops are most well known to the public for their role in international conflicts.

[Podkolzin] This is a painful issue for all of us. I have many telegrams and letters from military servicemen, their families and wives. The basic message comes down to this: we want to engage in combat training, not how to maintain order throughout the nation by the use of force. Here is one of the recent telegrams: "We urgently request that you look into returning us to our permanent garrisons and giving us the opportunity to engage in combat training." The telegram was signed by Senior Lieutenant Koshinov, who is the secretary of the unit's Komsomol committee. How am I to answer him?

I understand, on the one hand, that we prevented bloodshed, but on the other hand ... Why should we be obliged to use troops in such a thing. It has come to a point where internal troops are engaged in planned combat training and the airborne troops are patrolling the streets.

[Burbyga] Yes, and people are dying in a time of peace. Are the airborne troops servicemen insured and has provision been made for such a concept in the event of their death?

[Podkolzin] Something different is taking place. But there is no compensation at all. And after a tragedy can a commander be dismissed or punished? Who has the easiest path?

[Burbyga] How are your subordinates paid for their service? Are there any benefits for those who must work in extreme conditions?

[Podkolzin] None whatsoever. And we have no plans along these lines. As regards pay, so as not to give you wrong information, and we added a ruble here and there, let me check with the chief of finance. (Makes a telephone call.) Here we are, a conscript receives ten rubles today, and a sergeant gets 17 rubles.

[Burbyga] And a final question. By tradition the Airborne Troops will celebrate their 60th anniversary on 2 August. Former members of the Airborne Troops will get together in Moscow. And, as has happened in past years, there may be some excesses.

[Podkolzin] The leadership of the Airborne Troops is worried about this. They are all young men, not deprived romantics. They do not forget their past service in the Airborne Troops and they are seeking to get together and return once more to their youth. But, officially, no one has set a holiday. And the boys are coming here from the



elite forces, each of them deserving honor, and no one is waiting for them. This is the source of the insults.

### Division Rearmed Prior to Dissolution

90UM0821A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
8 Aug 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Captain A. Yegorov, entitled: "Commentaries on the Facts: Rearmed and... Dissolved".]

[Text] This military garrison is a kind of complex. A half dozen well built five-story buildings for offices of officers and warrant officers, stores, a middle school, kindergarten, preschool... Three hundred meters away are well built barracks, a club that seats a thousand with its own television center, arsenal, technical service centers, gas stations. Beyond this lies the training center with its artillery training center, moving target tank gunnery ranges, tank maneuvering ranges... Twenty training areas in all, along with another barracks, a club, a training equipment storage area, workshops for the support personnel.

In a word, everything needed for a tanker's normal service, training and life is here. That is until the division was dissolved and the base turned over to another organization free of charge.

This is nothing unusual of itself in these days when there is an ongoing reduction of the army. And perhaps it would not even be worthy of comment. But the heart of the matter is that many of the changes made at the garrison by its new owners, the Internal Security Troops, are simply useless.

"Of course they don't need as much storage space for materiel," says Lieutenant-General I. Strogov, first deputy commander, North Caucasus Military District, "they don't need the tank maneuvering ranges or the tactical ranges. After all, the tactics used by internal security sub-units is different from those of tanks and motorized-rifle units".

Colonel A. Timashkov, deputy commander of the dissolved division, put a lot of energy into construction of the training garrison, and recounts with pain audible in his voice how the new owners use the firing range with its special "rocking horse" (vehicle movement simulators) for tank fire as an automatic weapons training area, like a regular infantry gunnery range. All the buildings are empty. There really isn't anyone left for the training commander to work with...

And how is one to explain the economic, tactical or strategic purpose of this fact: practically on the eve of fully dissolving the division, its old equipment was entirely replaced with new. It's as if a house ready for demolition was filled with new furniture. Colonel Timashkov remembers:

"The refit was carried out quickly, in the course of the first half of the year. This was in order to start training

on the T-72 and SAU [Self-Propelled Artillery] by summer. Officers and warrant officers were sent on two temporary assignments, once to the tank factory and once to the Belorussian Military District. Their first trip was to learn the new equipment, the second to receive it. We had switched the entire training garrison to the T-72 and SAU. By August we were already firing out of the auxiliary barrels; which means that we were ahead of plan! Two weeks after the first firing we were forced to give the order to close down...

It should be noted that the North Caucasus Military District is 'unlucky' this way. In the past few years the North Caucasus Military District has lost nearly the entire technical training garrison for its assigned troops, even though the number of troops available was quite good. A number of garrisons have been given over to road construction, several more to other organizations. It is clear that we cannot depend on improved training for the mixed army reserves called for by the XXVIIIth CPSU Congress in the resolution "On the Basic Direction of Current Party Military Policy".

Reducing the army is one of the stages of implementing the ideas of the new defensive doctrine, a policy intended to stay in place for years. We hope to provide a high degree of effectiveness in defense organizational-development with a minimum of financial and material expenditures throughout the military reform. But will we be able to take the measured, balanced approach required by such a mission if we continue cutting back the army in this manner?

It is said that intelligent people learn from other peoples mistakes; but it seems like we haven't even been able to learn from our own. It is sufficient to recall the combination of two military districts into one—the Volga-Ural. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA already wrote of how staffing insufficiencies and the casting together of personnel, budgeting, and ordinary problems led to confusion. And not just confusion anywhere, but in the district headquarters. To put it mildly, commanding the troops became more involved.

It is completely obvious that what sometimes passes for military reform with us is simply unacceptable. What is going on often appears like a building being reconstructed without a plan. First we knock down a wall, then we decide whether this will make the roof fall in. It is difficult to disagree with the opinions expressed by many commanders of military districts and groups in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA express interviews regarding obstacles to military reform. Some of the main obstacles to reform they see are the lack of a legal basis for change in the army and navy, a defense law, a special government program for providing social protection for servicemen and the families, etc. As Colonel-General V. Gromov, commander of the Kiev Military District puts it: "The higher legislative body must examine and thoroughly weigh the options proposed for change in the armed forces and tell the people what army we need and what must be done to attain it."

The reform needs a legal and scientific foundation.

### **Armor Directorate's Plan To Reduce Losses From Tank Reserve**

90UM0863A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
10 Aug 90 First Edition p 2

[Article and commentary by Colonel A. Ladin and Major General B. Zhuralev, first deputy chief of the Main Armor Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, under the rubric "Military Preparedness: An Alarming Situation": "And the Tanks Are Standing in Lines"]

[Text] We call such formations reserve tank depots. But it would be difficult to give that name to what I had the opportunity to see.

One of the depots I am familiar with has existed in the Turkestan Military District for several years, although it only began to accept the majority of the machines a year ago. The chief of the depot, Colonel A. Boshenkov, showed me everything that his subordinates had managed to do in that time. The engines of half of the machines are mothballed. About the same number had been lifted off the ground onto concrete beams consisting of worn railroad ties. A number of the engines had been inspected for defects. But no one had gotten to many of them yet. There is no hope of speeding up the work. There is a shortage of specialists, cranes, monitoring and inspection equipment, and other machinery. And there is not even enough common grease for the machinery that is there...

There are even more problems on the depot, activated recently, headed by Colonel G. Loboda. Because of the lack of normal work conditions here, they have not been able to put the equipment into storage at all. It is all they can do to accept the arriving shipments. The question of guarding the machines at the arrival site still has not been resolved. They stand in half-kilometer rows in a literally empty field without a fence.

Of course such riches in the middle of the steppe immediately began to attract shady operators. They unceremoniously unseal the hatches and calmly slip inside the machines. A fair portion of the instruments and equipment have already been barbarically destroyed.

Unfortunately, this does not greatly trouble the bosses of the depot, who are awaiting some sort of special instructions from higher up. They should know from practice that no special effort is needed—facilities taking up a large area without fences may still be effectively guarded by walking sentries with guard dogs. What keeps them from making use of that contingency?

There are also many problems with stationing and settling people. Colonel Loboda and his subordinates, for instance, inherited from the last chief a compound that has broken windows in the barracks and no heating. The dining hall looks beyond repair. And of course people's

moods do not improve as a result of all this disorder. I did not note in any of the people I talked with any confidence that these two reserve tank depots, which were created in unwarranted haste, will begin to function as intended, at least in the short term.

One asks whether we are not like the hunter who hunts two rabbits at the same time. We wish to maintain the equipment, and we want to reduce the Army... But if servicing and mothballing the tanks is going to last many years, soon there may simply not be anything to put into storage. Would it not be better, calculating the number of specialists and on-hand personnel and equipment, to put into the depots exactly as much equipment as we can maintain? And the rest can be transferred or sold to the national economy. Certainly someone needs tractors, tank engines, instruments, and radio equipment... Especially because the specialists insist that even a smaller quantity of tanks would be difficult to handle in such a short time, and the important thing is to do a good job of preserving them.

### **Commentary of a Specialist**

**Major General B. Zhuralev, first deputy chief of the Main Armor Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, comments on this article at the request of the editor:**

There is one reason for the complicated situation, to speak frankly, that has arisen at the reserve tank depots—The limited time for displacing the tanks. One and a half months were designated from the birth of a reserve tank depot, so to speak, to the arrival of the first trainload. This is all we arranged for the preparation of military compounds and the training of qualified specialists. You will agree that this is not enough time for such a serious matter. So it was foreordained that we would still be engaged in construction in the course of the work we are now doing.

In order to stabilize the situation and create conditions for normal life and service by the personnel as quickly as possible, the Main Armor Directorate has developed a special program of activities on the basis of an order of the minister of defense. One of the main portions of this program is a plan for equipping the military compounds. It has been calculated for five years (1991-1995), and it will be implemented under the direct supervision of the deputy minister for construction and quartering of troops.

As of 1 October 1990 several depots are being transferred over to a new TOE [Table of Organization and Equipment]. The number of personnel is practically doubling. Thirty-three graduates of service schools and 22 graduates of the Armored Troops Academy have already been sent to the Turkestan Military District.

As of 1 November the reserve tank depots will be centralized. They will leave the jurisdiction of the districts and come directly under our directorate. This will enable us to increase financing of construction. Right now there is no such opportunity. The only thing we can

do is to allot a certain sum for equipping the military compounds in addition to the basic total. The Turkestan Military District requested 250,000 rubles. They received them. Automotive equipment, excavators, tractors, and specialized equipment are being specially earmarked for reserve tank depots.

In July we sent the forces a directive recommending which of the existing methods for protecting the equipment is better to use under conditions of a shortage of preserving materials. There is nothing we can do: Industry only filled 80 percent of our demands.

Currently teams of manufacturers are working at the depots of the Turkestan Military District. They are helping to repair the arriving machines, and we are providing spare parts. In addition, this year all the depots of the Turkestan Military District will each receive one specialized machine rigged with equipment considered necessary for the mechanized preservation of engines. The machine was designed by our scholars, it

has already passed tests by the state, and it will go into production on 1 September. During the first six months of next year the reserve depots will each receive a kit of stationary vehicle pool and garage equipment. I believe that these measures will help us to put all the modern machinery into long-term storage.

In conclusion I would like to say several words about the correspondent's proposal to transfer the "extra" equipment to the national economy. A great number of requests have accumulated in the Main Armor Directorate from the most diverse ministries and departments concerning the sale of the machines at an armor depot. In the opinion of the customers, the range of probable uses for such machines is extremely great: From systems for eliminating disasters at nuclear power plants to self-propelled "safes"... Recently that question was put directly to the board of the USSR Ministry of Defense. There is good reason to suppose that the refitting of armored equipment for "peaceful purposes" will be put on an industrial basis in the upcoming five-year plan.



## KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Takes First Look at Su-24 Bomber

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[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Col A. Krichevstov under rubric "Our Defense Arsenal": "There Also Are Aircraft With a Happy Destiny"]

[Text] *We are telling about the Su-24 front bomber for the first time.*

*One characteristic detail was noticeable at the air exhibition held on the Moscow Central Airfield imeni M. V. Frunze flying field. Visitors lingered the most by a combat aircraft with a shape near that of an arrow at the flight line of aircraft created in the Experimental Design Bureau imeni P. O. Sukhoy. This was the Su-24, with wings pressed to the fuselage and the sharp nose ready to pierce the air at any moment. Regular lines, streamlined body, and high-flung tail gave even the uninitiated person to understand the high speeds which this aircraft conquers.*

### Times Change...

Now and then the people through whose talent the aircraft was born and to whom it is obliged for its successful biography would approach it. Vladimir Sergeyevich Konokhov was engaged in an animated conversation about something with a group of specialists there. He stroked the metal giant like a living being and remembered and remembered... Many years ago he conducted tests of this aircraft as the leading engineer. Together with Su-24 Chief Designer Yevgeniy Sergeyevich Felsner and Mikhail Petrovich Simonov, then the deputy chief designer, he had faith in the aircraft's great future, took it to perfection, and painstakingly raised a new relief of bombers. And the people themselves grew. Today Simonov is Experimental Design Bureau general designer and a Lenin Prize laureate and Konokhov is his deputy. Only Felsner is not among them; he died last year. Yevgeniy Sergeyevich's assistants and followers continue the work under the direction of Deputy Chief Designer Leonid Andreyevich Logvinov.

In telling about the Su-24, Experimental Design Bureau associates often referred to authoritative comments about the aircraft by HSU and Honored Test Pilot of the USSR Yevgeniy Stepanovich Solovyev. He came to understand the unique capabilities of this bomber during plant and state tests. He was entrusted with demonstrating the Su-24 (short takeoff) at the air holiday in Domodedovo. He also brilliantly performed demonstration flights employing weapons. Having given this aircraft a ticket to life, Yevgeniy Stepanovich himself departed life during a test flight of one of the latest developmental aircraft of the Experimental Design Bureau imeni P. O. Sukhoy.

Then Major General of Aviation V. Ilyushin approached. The Hero Star and "Honored Test Pilot USSR" and "Lenin Prize Laureate" emblems gleamed.

After exchanging handshakes with friends and old acquaintances, he too went up to the Su-24. A picture was taken as a memento. Although this is only one of 143 types of aircraft and helicopters he has mastered, it is in his memory for life. Vladimir Sergeyevich, at that time still a colonel, was the first to take it up and teach the bomber to fly. He completed the basic tests and began test flying using various systems, and there was not one forced ejection, not one serious breakdown, so Vladimir Sergeyevich has all grounds to regard this aircraft in a special way.

And why were visitors to the exhibition looking at the Su-24 as if bewitched, especially as another aircraft of the Sukhoy firm, the Su-27, whose merits already were known to the entire world, was standing not far away?

Konokhov explained the situation:

"To date the Su-24 has been known only to specialists and the military. A broad circle of people have not even seen a photograph of it. But times are changing. At this exhibition any person can not only examine the combat aircraft from all sides, but also touch it and be photographed with it in the background."

The years really are flying by, especially in aviation. Entire generations of aircraft are swiftly replacing each other. Even the 1970's already have become distant history. It was then that the country's Air Force received an aircraft in the inventory that was a milestone for the period in domestic aircraft construction. It was a two-seater, twin-engine front bomber with variable-geometry wing intended for day or night combat operations under VFR and IFR conditions. Our aviators had not yet seen such a fantastic cluster of scientific-technical thought. It was even difficult to compare with the closest predecessor, the Yak-28B, and the Il-28 seemed simply a grandfather in comparison with the newcomer.

But much time has passed since then. A continuous search is going on for new materials and technologies, and aircraft equipment is being upgraded. Has the Su-24 fallen behind scientific-technical progress?

"Of course, we also have more advanced aircraft, but a long life has been prepared for this little bird," said Major General of Aviation V. Ilyushin firmly. Later, after falling silent for a bit, he remarked: "There also are aircraft with a happy destiny."

But still, I thought, who is interested in enlarging on shortcomings of native creation? So I should have a talk with the pilots, engineers and technicians; in short, with the operators.

Soon such an opportunity presented itself when I spent time in an air regiment stationed near our country's western borders.

### From the Standpoint of the Proprietors

The first person with whom I spoke was Squadron Chief of Staff Major A. Senotrusov, who retrained in the Su-24

while already in a duty status. It was easy: four dual-instruction flights, two check rides, and then solo flights.

"I experienced a feeling as if I had shifted from an old Moskvich to a Zhiguli," remarked the pilot, shifting to the language of automobile drivers.

Then, turning down the fingers first of one, then the other hand, Aleksandr spent a long time enumerating the bomber's merits. The first-class pilot spoke of this without boasting, from the standpoint of the aircraft's proprietor:

"The navigator and I together can ready the aircraft for the next sortie at an intermediate airfield. We are prepared to operate both from concrete runways as well as dirt strips. Thanks to an on-board digital computer and modern landing systems, the bomber is capable of automatically flying a cross-country route, making the approach to its own airfield, and making a landing approach under IFR conditions to a height of 50 m. The variable-geometry wing supports a large range of altitudes and flight speeds. The aircraft has a set of the most modern missile, bomb and gun armament in accordance with its purpose."

But realizing that a simple enumeration of the aircraft's pluses was tiring, Major Senotrusov began to recall various nonstandard situations from his own service and from the service of unit colleagues.

"With rigid landing and takeoff minimums, one of the engines of Captain A. Stepanov's aircraft malfunctioned while he was flying to maximum range and it was too late to return to his own airfield. The crew continued the flight and landed at an alternate airfield calmly and coolly, based on commands from the ground. This is what two engines (which, moreover, are powerful) mean," summed up the combat pilot.

To what has been said can be added that the turbojet engine installed in the Sukhoi was developed by the design bureau directed by A. M. Lyulka. It is easy for two such turbojet engines to lift into the air a combat aircraft which has a maximum takeoff weight approximating that of a medium tank.

Pilots are an interesting and romantic people, but they tell about their service and profession unwillingly. It is another matter if they are egged on. It seemed to me that Military Navigator 1st Class Lieutenant Colonel M. Almazov perceived just such an attempt in a conversation about the "age" of the Su-24. He immediately became animated and was ready to argue as much as necessary.

"Everything here is approximately as it is in athletics," he said, citing an analogy. "The more an athlete trains, the more confident he feels and the higher the results. And so it is with our bomber: the longer it flies, the more virtues it acquires. That was the idea from the very beginning. All systems were made redundant back in the development stage. And over the years the aircraft has

been upgraded more and more and has acquired ever newer qualities. A person who has not flown this aircraft since the late 1970's would be pleasantly surprised today. Outwardly the aircraft seemingly is the same, but essentially it is already quite different. The electronics have been upgraded and the bomber's combat capabilities have broadened through use of guided types of aircraft weapons.

"Or take the following interesting detail. An on-board defense system appeared which gives the crew information in processed form in cases where the aircraft is painted by a radar or missiles are employed against it. The system instantaneously produces jamming for protecting the combat aircraft and chooses the form of maneuver—missile-evasion or aircraft-evasion. All this noticeably reduces the probability of destruction by an enemy aircraft.

"There is your age," remarked Lieutenant Colonel Almazov significantly.

Major A. Kalemenev, a calm, soberminded, experienced officer of the regimental aviation engineering service, told about the combat aircraft unhurriedly, with a kind of satisfaction: about how this aircraft "forgives" some crews their blunders and even saves the lives of pilots and navigators because of its electronic intellect. He spoke about certain problems with concern. For example, the weapons aiming and navigation system was left without reliable attendants after the shift to a new T/O&E structure. It was unbelievably difficult for one engineer of the aviation-technical detachment and his only warrant officer assistant to keep an eye on all systems in the regiment.

The narrator began to hasten only once, when I recalled the story of the accidental ejection of a navigator on the flight line, linking this with problems of reliability of crew survival aids. He hastened to dispel my doubts.

"There was such a thing. True, not in our regiment, but also on an Su-24. The navigator almost paid for his negligence with his life, but such is our aircraft that it forgave him this sin. The navigator landed safely after inadvertently leaving the cockpit."

So reliability of equipment has nothing to do with it; it is rather the other way around. Some foreign firms only dream about a seat such as in this bomber, and this ejection can serve only as advertising.

The end of our conversation coincided with the beginning of flights. Now to the flight line.

#### So Just Who is the Night Pirate?

With a wave of his hand, one of the pilots invited me to become familiar with the aircraft from inside.

You can't call the aircraft cockpit cramped. The pilot and navigator are easily accommodated here, sitting side by side, and have an opportunity to converse and observe each other.

And here is one more convenience: a redundant control panel. This means a special dual-trainer aircraft is not required for training purposes.

But still this is not the important thing. Along with the second panel, at one time the designers placed a serious trump card in the Su-24 to increase flight safety. If the navigator has even minimal flying skills, he could take control of the aircraft in emergency situations. The aircraft's high survivability provided by a special set of design measures was combined very opportunely with a supplementary crew survivability factor.

But this idea was not taken to completion. To this day combat training plans do not envisage teaching navigators to fly.

In examining the Su-24 close up and listening to explanations of military pilots, one does not cease to be surprised. So many great minds and lucid intellects placed their ideas, their inspiration, and their labor into it so compactly! They say that the USSR's defense arsenal was appreciably enriched when this aircraft began to be delivered to air units. The Air Force command authority breathed a sigh of relief. On the other hand, our probable enemy of that time lost sleep. Not only the military, but also diplomats built their plans with consideration of the new Soviet front bomber. The foreign press immediately dubbed it the "night pirate" for its capability to deliver effective strikes at any time of day.

True, this nickname did not strike root, because there was nothing in common with piracy in the life of the Su-24 either then or years later. The unenviable lot of night pirates befell the U.S. F-111 bombers. Craftily

stealing up on Libya's sleeping capital, they dumped their deadly load on the city. The blood of innocent victims is a black page in the biography of this aircraft.

A different fate fell to the Su-24. It is common knowledge that today the Soviet Union's leadership is acting vigorously to lower the level of military confrontation, to expand zones of confidence, and to build a common European house. Therefore removal of the Su-24 from the Western Group of Forces was one of the first steps toward the planned objective. After this unilateral act came another, this time bilateral: destruction of U.S. and Soviet mobile intermediate-range and lesser-range missiles. Even larger-scale plans for disarmament and elimination of the threat of a new world war are on tap...

But the fact is that the first step was taken not long ago, and the main character of our story took it. A unique mission, a match for a diplomat.

The final minutes of our stay at the airfield had come to an end. Meanwhile the flying day was gathering force. Some bombers soared up in pairs after a swift takeoff run while others were coming in for a landing. It was a customary and at the same time gripping spectacle. Looking at these elegant, dull-blue aircraft, it seemed to me that they were not only surprisingly advanced, but also beautiful in an aircraft way. And an aircraft's beauty, as the popular belief of aircraft designers and pilots goes, is a guarantee of its happy destiny.

It is really happy for the Su-24. We wish it high skies and soft landings for the future as well!



**Adm Chernov on Prolonging Komsomolets Investigation**

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[Interview with Hero of the Soviet Union Vice Admiral Yevgeniy Dmitriyevich Chernov, deputy commander of the Naval Academy and candidate of Naval Sciences, by Aleksandr Yemelyanenko, Leningrad-Moscow: "Admiral Chernov's Arguments: Why the Investigation into the Circumstances [Surrounding the] Loss of the Submarine Komsomolets Has Been Prolonged"]

[Text] In 60 years, 37 of which he has devoted to the submarine fleet, he has retained that quality that is rare for our times: The optimism of a man who is convinced of his own righteousness. We met several times during the course of the last eight months and talked for hours about the tragedy that befell the Komsomolets and about the work of the governmental commission and the position of the Main Naval Staff, but he only recently agreed to the publication of an interview. We talked with Hero of the Soviet Union Vice Admiral Yevgeniy Dmitriyevich Chernov, deputy commander of the Naval Academy and candidate of Naval Sciences.

[Yemelyanenko] When and in what capacity were you enlisted [to participate] in the work of the governmental commission?

[Chernov] I learned about what had occurred on the morning of April 8th and I was ready on that same day to fly to the north. But the command authorities did not consider it necessary for me to become involved in the initial, and possibly most important, stage when the commission was working in the Northern Fleet.

When the primary investigation was transferred to Leningrad, the Commander in Chief of the Navy, at my request, authorized me to participate in one of the sections that was involved in ascertaining the technical causes of the outbreak and development of the accident. The section consisted of both military and civilian experts.

The fire's possible causes were established with a high degree of certainty and its dynamics were reproduced as a result of painstaking work. The objectivity of these conclusions do not cause any doubt and much has already been reported to the press. There is no particular need to repeat what has been said right now.

[Yemelyanenko] And just what did not suit you at that time? Why did the need arise for an additional "Analysis of Personnel Actions During the Submarine Komsomolets' Struggle for Survival on April 7 [1989] in the Norwegian Sea" which you completed and submitted to Naval command authorities and to the governmental commission?

[Chernov] The fact is that the version of the accident events that occurred on the boat were primarily reduced to a description of interrelated, interdependent physical

processes—as if they had occurred in a pure form without the crew's interference and active opposition. But really when the submariners combated the accident and used technical equipment—were their reactions always timely and adequate? What impact did the crew's actions have on the development of the accident situation? However, our section did not go into such details—there was another section that investigated the issues of operations and the struggle for survival. It was the holder of this information and should have conducted an assessment of the crew's actions. It should have but, as we later learned, it did not. Therefore, I had to fill the gap.

[Yemelyanenko] As far as I understand, you did not make the goal of your investigation an analysis of the entire sum total of problems that arose—from the design stage and construction until the moment the boat was lost—but did you concentrate your attention in only one direction? But really the commission that was established attempted to overcome precisely this bias of views and assessments on what occurred on April 7th in the Norwegian Sea....

[Chernov] This is so and this is valid. While I had the possibility—I participated in the Naval section's work on a broad scale. But as for what directly concerns the "Analysis...", its introductory paragraph unambiguously states that the author also did not set the goal for himself to replace the sections' work or moreover the entire commission's work.

I did not concern myself with issues associated with design deficiencies—this is the subject of a separate investigation. It has been conducted within the required scope.

Furthermore, I did not task myself with investigating or assessing Navy search and rescue service operations. I stress: I took one actually not investigated direction—and precisely the organization of the struggle for survival, in which I consider myself to be a professional, and thoroughly studied it. I can only guess why this detailed investigation was not organized within the framework of the appropriate section of the Navy....

[Yemelyanenko] Probably because a simple rule had existed for many years prior to this: No matter what happens—the crew is to blame. To this day, many people remember the pithy saying of the previous Commander in Chief of the Navy Admiral S.G. Gorshkov: "There is no accident rate that is justifiable or unavoidable. People create an accident rate and the conditions for it arise through their irresponsibility and ignorance..."

[Chernov] There was such a rule. However, even right now there is no basis to exclude irresponsibility or ignorance from the causes of many accidents, including in the Navy. It is impossible to avoid those factors which are concerned with a professional assessment of the crew's actions both from a legal point of view and from the positions of systems analysis. A submarine is really a complex man-machine system and we cannot permit

ourselves to examine only the technical or equipment aspects without considering the actions of the people who make up its crew.

[Yemelyanenko] Could you briefly state how your conclusions differ from the commission's official conclusion?

[Chernov] As far as I know, an official version still does not exist. But the May 14th issue of IZVESTIYA contained an interview with USSR Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry and Government Commission Member I.V. Koksanov in which certain generalized assessments are provided. I do not have any substantial differences with the data that is provided in this article. However, a fundamental divergence exists with Commander in Chief of the Navy Admiral V.N. Chernavin's position that states that the boat was doomed to destruction from the moment the fire broke out in the seventh compartment. I am convinced of just the opposite. If all of the boat's capabilities had been utilized during the struggle for survival, including the technical equipment and organic ship systems that were specially designated for this, and if they had been utilized as the logic of the struggle for survival and the fleet regulations to conduct this struggle required—both the submarine and its crew could have been saved.

First of all, extraordinary efforts were not demanded from the crew in the situation that had developed, professionalism alone was needed. Then, of course, complications arose but the very possibility to save the boat was preserved, in my opinion, right up until 16:30 hours. There was adequate time to assess the situation and to make the appropriate decisions.

[Yemelyanenko] Maybe there was time but there is information without which it is as if a commander is helpless—was there adequate information to correctly assess the situation?

[Chernov] This question was researched separately. There is no basis to assert that information was inadequate, not just according to the instruments but also visually, according to reports of the phenomena and processes noted and even recorded in the watch log according to which we can understand what was occurring on the boat at a given moment. In short, they observed and recorded and what remained was to make and carry out decisions.

This is proven in specific cases with the application of calculations and grounds in the first part of the "Analysis..." that I submitted. Lessons, conclusions, and suggestions are also there. I think that submariners' thorough acquaintance with them will arm crews in the event that their boats have to struggle for survival—even in the presence of individual technical imperfections on them.

The second part of the "Analysis..." discusses the causes of the unsuccessful struggle for survival that lie in the area of combat training. There are also lessons and suggestions there.

[Yemelyanenko] No matter who is concerned with the Komsomolets tragedy, he cannot avoid one circumstance: People died. Forty two crew members. Twenty seven who passed through the fiery hell survived. Only one who has himself experienced what a fire in a submarine hull is like is justified to assess the submariners' actions.... Yevgeniy Dmitriyevich, how did your naval service develop? Why did you receive the title of Hero of the Soviet Union?

[Chernov] I arrived in the Northern Fleet as a lieutenant in 1953. I began serving on 613 design diesel submarines and on nuclear submarines from 1959-1986. I commanded a multi-mission submarine for nine years and served five more years altogether as a task force deputy commander and commander.

I was already commanding a submarine flotilla when the only deepwater submarine of its type arrived in the Northern Fleet. You know that this was a difficult time. The international tension that was maintained had left its stamp on Army and Navy life. We had to become involved with testing fundamentally new combat equipment and mastery of new sailing areas, including in the Arctic basin. They awarded me the title of Hero of the Soviet Union as recognition for the services of the boat crews whose cruises I commanded.... One of the episodes of my service was to execute the duties as nuclear submarine Komsomolets deepwater operations commission chairman.

I had already encountered my first serious accident on submarine S-80 in 1954 when at that time water began to enter into the first compartment. Decisive actions by the accident team of which I was a part succeeded in overcoming the situation and preventing flooding of the compartment. Various types of ignition occurred repeatedly but each time we did not allow the fire to gain strength. I remember an incident when an intercompartmental automatic control unit burned. The crew of the ship commanded by Captain 1st Rank Mosalov and BCh-5 [Engineering Department] Commander Captain 2nd Rank Anokhin localized and extinguished the fire. Electrical mechanisms organic power that had been lost were connected by combat attachments and they set the main energy source into operation.

I was senior on board on that cruise but I did not become involved in command and control—there was no need. However, as a rule, I assumed command when the situation became complicated on the boat. I neither understand nor approve of the conduct of Captain 1st Rank Kolyada who was senior on board Komsomolets. If there is a flag officer on a boat cruise and if the boat is lost due to actions of irreversible forces of nature or as a result of irreparable damage, then it must be lost under the command of the flag officer. It is not only the right of

the senior in position and more experienced, it is also a matter of naval officer honor [for a flag officer] to assume command in the event danger arises.

[Yemelyanenko] Is it correct to say that the "Analysis..." submitted by you is one man's point of view? Or is it nevertheless the result of a collective investigation?

[Chernov] Some of our academy's shipbuilding department teachers and students who have adequate knowledge and service experience on submarines were enlisted to do this work. I also used some material and a Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry specialized design organization's calculated data. The many submariners to whom I essentially dedicated my work are in solidarity with the point of view set forth in the "Analysis..."

It is also important to stress something else. I have material at my disposal of the section that was engaged in the study of the accident itself, the causes of its outbreak and development, and also watch logs, tape recordings (including recordings of crew member debriefings), their explanatory notes, and photographs of the disaster the boat was suffering taken from on board an aircraft by a Petrograd pilot as starting points.... So I cannot say that this is my individual work. And as for the conclusions—here I actually took personal responsibility to make them and submit them to the command authorities.

[Yemelyanenko] As far as I know, your report along with the Main Headquarters experts conclusion on it and the Navy Commander in Chief's letter that accompanied it was distributed throughout the fleets and flotillas. For what purpose? Did you insist on this?

[Chernov] No. When I learned that they had decided to send both parts of my "Analysis..." throughout the fleets, I expressed my satisfaction with this decision.

[Yemelyanenko] Incidentally, from whom did you learn this?

[Chernov] From a conversation with the Commander in Chief. And after a certain amount of time when the set of documents arrived at my office at the academy, I understood that I had been strongly deceived in my hopes. The Commander in Chief's accompanying letter and the two Main Headquarters reviews-conclusions present my work in such an obviously negative light that it would be naive to suggest its detailed review in a circle of professional submariners. Essentially, these documents a priori attempt to force the opinion on everyone who receives them that Vice Admiral Chernov is "inadequately competent," "biased and prejudiced," "personally self-interested in order to exclude any possible complaints toward the equipment and to transfer all [blame] to the personnel..."

I have endured the shameful labels and undeserved accusations directed at me—let this remain on the consciences of their authors. But how can I remain silent when they reject, graphically and without calculations or

proof, the conclusions and lessons I submitted which must be extracted from the Komsomolets tragedy?

[Yemelyanenko] There is the point of view with a particular opinion that is primarily advocated by those who were involved in the design, construction, and testing of the experimental boat and who maybe bear personally responsibility for this. Incidentally, you are also considered to be a self-interested individual....

[Chernov] I have only one self-interest—to establish an objective picture of what occurred, all of this truth—in its naked form!—and to disseminate it to the professionals. No passing over in silence or apologetic provisos are required here. Moreover, any distortion or mitigation of information—even for the most noble, humane considerations—is immoral and amoral with regard to those who hourly are alongside a similar danger.

[Yemelyanenko] Today what occurred on April 7, 1989 in the Norwegian Sea is more or less clear. You thoroughly analyzed the crew's actions, can certainly provide an assessment, and can describe how the submariners conducted themselves during that difficult hour....

[Chernov] I think that a professional investigation should remain within the circle of professionals. But I will confirm what has already been reported in the open press: All crew members displayed personal courage, fortitude, and mutual assistance during the emergency situation. There were not even any individual manifestations of cowardice or refusals to carry out orders on the boat. They maintained until the last man and died when they already no longer had the strength with the dignity of men who carried out their duties until the end.

Therefore, I think that State awards to the Komsomolets crew—are recognition of its courage and at the same time a symbol of respect for the parents, wives, and children of the submariners—whose memory I hope will be preserved in the families of the deceased.

I did not want to return [to it] but since you have touched upon the subject, I will also say this about the very principle of an award: All 67 crew members who either died or survived were awarded the Order of the Red Banner. It seems to me that the Navy manifested a certain haste and a sort of protective reaction from possible rebukes and charges in this approach.

And furthermore, the work of the governmental commission and my own "Analysis..." convincingly demonstrate that circumstances developed in the common background of the crew's courageous resistance and that the names of the submariners who received the first blow—as it occurred in the 7th compartment with Seaman Nodari Bukhnikashvili—stand out. Precisely those who fearlessly fought to save people and the boat in subsequent hours, who repeatedly approached the heart of the fire, and who sacrificed themselves but did not leave their combat posts. As 5th and 6th Compartment Watch Officer Warrant Officer Vladimir Kolotilin did who placed himself in the path of the advancing fire, and



Electrical Compartment Commander Captain 3rd Rank Anatoliy Ispenkov who took the place of an engine operator who was suffering from [carbon monoxide] poisoning near the operating diesel engine. Ispenkov remained at this post until the boat sank.... In accordance with the commander's order, Captain 3rd Rank Vyacheslav Yudin, who knew the submarine's layout well, led accident teams into the heart of the fire eight times.

In my opinion, the selfless, bordering on self-sacrifice, actions of the four submariners I have named deserve the highest assessment, right up to awarding them the Hero of the Soviet Union posthumously.

[Yemelyanenko] The very first reports about the lost super-secret boat have recently been replaced by assertions of some highly placed military personnel that nothing of particular importance was assigned to this boat. But essentially what hopes did you connect with the Komsomolets?

[Chernov] I assumed that it would be used as an experimental and scientific-research boat—after test operations had been completely conducted, of course. Its primary purpose was improvement of deepwater engagement tactics but Komsomolets could have worked in science and in the broadest context—for oceanography and hydrology.... Our existing underwater vehicles can descend to greater depths than the Komsomolets could have. But they do not have the same displacement or autonomous operations capability as a submarine.

Therefore, the loss of the unique boat—is not only the death of people and the irretrievable loss of assets for its construction. This catastrophe deprived us of a one of a kind oceanic deepwater vehicle—as an analogy with space. The comprehensive study of hydrology and ocean acoustics at the maximum depths and beyond the maximum [depths] of existing submarines begun with its assistance essentially ended just at the very beginning.

I repeat there was an extensive 12-point program. But unfortunately, other intentions prevailed with regard to the experimental submarine. The already agreed upon directive about the continuation of testing was delayed somewhere up above. And the unique boat was used as a series production submarine beginning in December 1986.

[Yemelyanenko] Yevgeniy Dmitriyevich, I managed to become intimately familiar with a memorable event in the Komsomolets' biography. I am not sure but do you know that a tape recording has been preserved of an improvised rally that occurred under water at a depth of 1,000 meters on the day when a Soviet combat vessel conquered [the 1,000 meter mark] for the first time in the history of the submarine fleet. You opened the rally and right after the command "Inspect the compartments!" you said something not quite in accordance with regulations: "Stop for an instant, you are beautiful!..."

[Chernov] As you could already have noted, I do not have any artistic inclinations. But that was a truly exciting day and it is worth living for the sake of such an event. And all of the words that were spoken at that time were from the heart and they expressed our internal state. We were very proud of our boat.

[Yemelyanenko] While continuing to insist on your conclusions, are you not afraid that you will also not end up among those "resentful" people who are settling accounts? Really as far as I know, the Commander in Chief of the Navy has actually predetermined the question of your release into the reserve....

[Chernov] No matter how my service and the entire rest of my life turns out, I will never become a man who bears malice or who speaks at cross purposes with the interests of the Navy. I served it with loyalty and the truth and I stand on that now. I have many, not only coworkers—many friends and comrades in the Navy and they will never believe the slander directed at me. I highly value their support. I am also conducting this difficult work essentially for their sake.

This is the main thing. But I must also state the following: I myself also do not intend to serve under such leadership and under such, if I may say so, "tutelage." I myself also do not intend to. I am not holding on to my position but I do not intend to retreat from that which I began and for what I am striving.

We must ultimately carry out the Council of Ministers' decision. In accordance with a special order that arrived at the beginning of June, the design bureau jointly, I stress, jointly, with the Navy's NII [Scientific Research Institute] have been tasked to once again review in detail the "Analysis...." that I submitted.

[Yemelyanenko] Tasked already after the verdict has been rendered by the Commander in Chief?

[Chernov] Precisely so. And the time period has been announced—report final conclusions and proposals by August 1st. The manner in which the question was raised suited me but the Naval Institute also demonstrated its disinterest this time.

How is it turning out? The USSR Council of Ministers and the military industrial commission assign and issue instructions and Naval Command Authorities ignore [them].... I personally ask about the committee of experts and about being involved in the work of the professional submariners and I am refused. The time period to conduct the scientific technical conference on struggle for survival issues in the Northern Fleet has been postponed twice. Right now it has been once again postponed for an indefinite time. In April, the Commander in Chief had already planned to conduct a Komsomolets accident investigation at our academy. We are waiting for that time....

[Yemelyanenko] I personally see in all of this, putting it mildly, the Main Naval Staff's and to some degree the

governmental commission's inconsistency. They have appealed to the press many times to restrain themselves from any sort of articles or broadcasts whatsoever about the Komsomolets until the commission's final conclusions. We have heeded, we have been silent, and we have patiently awaited the official conclusion. And at the same time, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, VOYENNO-MORSKOY SBORNIK, SOVETSKIY VOIN, NA STRAZHE ZAPOLYARYA Fleet Newspaper, and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA are publishing article after article with input from the Navy's highest ranking officials....

[Chernov] They, strictly speaking, used a prohibited method in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. They published a photograph of the submariners and in the caption to it proposed that everyone who has a different point of view than the command authorities look the deceased in the eyes and... bite their tongues. This same newspaper has been reduced to such a degree of pejorative self-revelation that it is simply amazing: It turns out that we do not have a military navy but a collection of extremely unreliable old tubs in which it is even a risk to put to sea.... This is not how we assess the state of our naval forces.

[Yemelyanenko] Incidentally, about revelations. The American [Newspaper] WALL STREET JOURNAL recently quoted the words of Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks, commander of U.S. Naval Intelligence: "Glasnost has permitted us to acquire such invaluable information... about the Soviet Union the collection of which would have caused us to spend millions of dollars and to expend many years of effort (using traditional intelligence [collection] methods)." He named the accident on the submarine Komsomolets as an example, having said at the same time: "No matter how improved our intelligence information collection systems become, we certainly could never have gathered the information that the Soviets have published." It is true that these words give us something to think about....

[Chernov] Especially when something like the lead article from the weekly ZA RUBEZHOM No. 25 strikes your eye. A correspondent from the Magazine KVIK [Transliterated] which is published in Munich stressed with self-satisfaction that he had access to the Komsomolets' watch log in Moscow based on which he also made his "exclusive" article for KVIK. I can only guess who the Western journalist's benefactor was and why he gave him access to the document which it was proposed that we publish at one time, but which was not done due to considerations of secrecy. Let those whose duty it is look into this case do so. And let them reward [the guilty party] according to his deserts. I just want to say that the reprint in ZA RUBEZHOM Weekly [Magazine] was the last straw that caused internal indignation to spill forth. If they are already talking about the technical details of our catastrophe in Munich's beer halls, then what is left for the professionals to do?!

[Yemelyanenko] Yevgeniy Dmitriyevich, you had the opportunity to become acquainted with letters that arrived in answer to certain KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA articles regarding this tragedy. Did you sense support in them or did they only add doubts?

[Chernov] The absolute majority of responses belong to submariners among whom I encountered many familiar names. Many of them are already in the reserve and are engaged in peaceful matters but the disaster that occurred in the Navy stirred them all. It turns out that practically every other one at one time addressed proposals to the command authorities and to the government and expressed concern about the worsening state of affairs in the submarine force but all they managed to get were formal replies: "The problem has been studied... We are taking the required steps...." Exhaustive measures were not taken after the 1986 tragedy in the Atlantic and experienced submariners were already sounding the alarm and predicting new victims at that time....

Therefore, today a discussion is needed in a professional circle because I already do not believe that the current leadership of the Main Directorate of Operations and Repair can objectively understand this situation. They will not do this because of a basic stubbornness. It has already eaten into the blood. The discussion should be conducted, as it is ordered in the military industrial commission directive, in Leningrad along with the design bureau at the Naval Institute facility where there are experienced knowledgeable experts who have been engaged in submarine operations in the recent past.

If necessary, let us recount something, make something more precise, or conduct additional experiments—and let us immediately disseminate the results obtained to submarine fleet personnel.

But for now I nevertheless recommend that submariners take advantage of parts one and two of the "Analysis...." which I did not do in order to cause a stir but in order to somewhat alleviate severe submarine operating conditions for crews.

P.S. News arrived while this conversation that had been prepared for print awaited publication. The Naval Commander in Chief signed a recommendation about the indefatigable vice admiral's release to the reserve.

In the situation that has developed, SOBESEDNIK, with the support of a group of USSR people's deputies, has taken the initiative and responsibility to organize a meeting of professional submariners and shipbuilders that Ye.D. Chernov had unsuccessfully attempted to do for several months. We plan to also have journalists and authors of the most principled publications participate in the dialogue who hold substantially divergent views on the situation surrounding the Komsomolets. USSR Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry I.V. Koksanov has already officially expressed his support of this meeting. We will tell our readers about preparations for it and its results and we will send all of the materials that we

currently have on hand to the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and State Security.

### **Sovetskaya Gavan Strike-Meeting on Nuclear Sub Stationing**

90UM0777A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
26 Jul 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by Lt. Colonel V. Knyazev: "In an Atmosphere of Distrust"]

[Text] The Port of Vanino was the site of a strike-warning meeting held on 21 July from 0900 to 1100 hours.

A large number of workers assembled on Peace Square at the House of Unions where they demanded that the nuclear submarines of the Pacific Ocean Fleet be removed from Postovaya Bay. The workers' passion had begun to heat up as early as the spring when rumors surfaced that spent nuclear fuel from outdated submarines was going to be dumped directly into the bay. Many refused to believe the guarantees presented in a letter from the Commander of the Pacific Ocean Fleet, Admiral G. Khvatov, that such work was not planned for the bay. Telegrams were sent immediately to Moscow, Khabarovsk, and Vladivostok. Meetings were called and picketing began. Many local residents were still not convinced by the efforts of the Chief of the Sovetskaya Gavan Naval Garrison, Rear Admiral V. Kuroedov, who gave permission to public leaders to go aboard any submarine and see for themselves that spent nuclear fuel was not being dumped into the bay, and that radiation levels were normal.

In accordance with the decision of the Commander of the Pacific Ocean Fleet, the withdrawal of vessels from Postovaya Bay will begin in 1991 and will be completed in 1994. Due to technical considerations the withdrawal cannot begin earlier, despite the demands by the Vanino "Greens" to withdraw them immediately.

Not long before the strike-meeting Rear Admiral V. Kuroedov assured the local authorities and public leaders that the Navy will consent to independent monitoring in an attempt to confirm that the submarines do not pose an ecological threat. But even these assurances failed to dispel the atmosphere of distrust.

### **Experiment with Professional Submarine Crews**

90UM0782A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
27 Jul 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Captain 3rd Rank P. Ishchenko, Northern Fleet: "Professionals from 'Midget' [Submarines]: On the Experience of Manning Submarine Crews on a Professional Basis Which Has Existed for a Long Time in the Navy and Which Should Not Be Forgotten"]

[Text]

#### **Let Us Tell You First of all**

Nuclear submarines whose crews have been manned on a professional basis have been a part of the Navy for

many years. Some of them have been withdrawn from the Navy upon expiration of their operating period. What has the practice of their use demonstrated?

These submarines are the smallest domestically-produced nuclear-powered submarines. But nearly the most notable distinguishing feature of the nuclear "midget"—is the small size of its crew. Later, crews were increased somewhat. But nevertheless this submarine's "population density" remained the lowest of all submarines. For example, the submarine crew led by Captain 2nd Rank S. Zverev (it has still not been disbanded) totals just over 30 men. There is only one seaman (an instructor cook) among them. This is already truly a family without children.

Considerations of secrecy—as it was been understood until just yesterday—did not permit us to talk about this previously. Today we cannot only do this but we need to analyze the results of using professional submarine crews—according to their manning principle and not just according to training level. Especially since the Navy will soon begin an experiment during which several ship task forces will be manned using professionals.

Everyone I managed to talk to was unanimous in their high assessment of the combat capabilities of this type of submarine and the results of their use. Northern Fleet Commander Admiral F. Gromov expressed the same point of view during a conversation with me, adding that this project's nuclear submarines have successfully accomplished missions assigned to them and have made a substantial contribution toward heightening the Fleet's combat readiness.

There is no point in saying that the professional submariners' high level of training, the overwhelming majority of whom are officers, has first of all facilitated this. This concentration of engineering and technical intellect is an important advantage of a professional crew. "Besides, a special spirit of mutual aid and mutual assistance reigns among us," says Turbine Technician Warrant Officer V. Ananin. "Warrant officers strive to bring themselves up to the officer level in everything [they do]. And young officers are not embarrassed to learn from experienced warrant officers. And generally among the crew—this is a peculiarity of our boats—there is no appreciable division between officers and warrant officers."

The very absence of seamen and chief petty officers forms precisely this type of interrelations among all officers and warrant officers—that do not impact on duty interests. Yes and can it be otherwise if even the ship's captain, a captain 1st rank, has his area to clean up and handles a rag and a bar of soap even at sea on a par with any officer or warrant officer (whether this is good or poor is another story).



Well what about it, does the experience of using submarine crews manned by professionals have one sign—a "plus"? Then why has Captain 1st Rank M. Kuznetsov, deputy commander of the task force that these ships were formerly part of, called all of this a "wasted experiment"? Let us hear his arguments.

"The idea was wonderful, but it did not receive the required material and technical reinforcement. The so-called aircraft principle should have been the foundation of small submarine maintenance: The sailing crew returned from sea, turned the ship over to the technical crew, and went on leave or to training. Later they accept a submarine that is in operating condition and ready to sail from the technical crew. But really nothing like this happened. The technical crews' capability to muster turned out to be inadequate and the sailing crew was compelled to use its own men to carry out repairs just like on ordinary submarines where the crew consists of all categories of servicemen."

Captain-Lieutenant V. Pronin, who began serving on a technical crew more than 10 years ago, recalls how high the requirements were for officers, warrant officers, and seamen who were assigned there. For example, compulsory service servicemen positions were manned by those who had a middle or higher technical education.

"I passed my qualification tests for certification to carry out my duties along with a seaman, we learned from each other," said Pronin. "But right now many technical crew seamen cannot convert watts into kilowatts. And sailing crews have simply been compelled to become involved in repairs and equipment servicing after returning from sea...."

"And should professionals, which is what they consider us to be, really serve in the shore galley, perform patrol duty, and carry out other duties that are not directly related with accomplishing combat training missions?" Submarine Commander Captain 1st Rank V. Koropets continued the conversation. "It turns out that we are professionals at sea but not at the base."

"Well, why does such a small crew need dozens of officers?" says Captain 2nd Rank Zverev. "Six would be quite sufficient. The remaining positions do not really have to be manned by warrant officers—they could also be extended service seamen but with higher or middle technical educations. Of course, we need to interest them with high salaries and the opportunity to be released into the reserve after a definite period of service."

We must also talk about this problem. The workload of officers and warrant officers on the crew of a small boat is higher than on "typical" submarine crews. But they are not materially compensated for this in any way. "What can be said about this if no methodology exists to determine an officer's expenditure of labor," says Submarine Radio Technical Command Department Commander Captain-Lieutenant V. Yevseyev.

Doctors have their view on the professional crew problem.

"The intensive physical, moral, and psychological load on officers and warrant officers results in the fact that their sickness rate increases one and a half to two times—in comparison with classical submarine crews," points out Medical Service Lt Col A. Zaozerskiy. "Design-wise this submarine is quite ill-equipped for its current crew size."

Accompanied by Captain 1st Rank B. Kolyada (He was senior on board the Komsomolets which was lost last year and previously commanded a submarine for several years) while touring the ship from the first compartment to the last, I was equally surprised both by the abundance of automated equipment and by the crowded conditions in the corridors, cabins, and wardrooms. The shower room, the only one on the boat and designed for one person, sooner reminds one of a wall closet by its size and a heavily built submariner can hardly turn around at all in the washroom. The designers' attempt to utilize each cubic centimeter of space within the solid hull to its maximum effectiveness is understandable. But it is permissible to be interested: What kind of real professional and under what conditions will agree to literally wall himself up in this iron box for the long weeks of a cruise?

"Perhaps the strangest and most alarming thing consists of the fact," Political Worker Captain 3rd Rank I. Nidziyev certified with chagrin, "that practically no one has studied the experience of professional crews—the organization of their service, life style, manning problems, adequacy of educational work, etc. In my opinion, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has been the first to show interest in this."

I also managed to hear something similar from other officers—commanders, engineers, and political workers. Will the experience really completely disappear without a trace when the crews are disbanded? With this attitude toward our own experience, it will not be surprising if shortcomings "suddenly" appear in those ship task forces where they already intend to conduct the experiment mentioned above.

### **Navy Brings Suit for Slander on Submarine Disposal**

90UM0815A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
5 Aug 90 First Edition p 1

[Article by Senior Lieutenant A. Ivanov: "Navy Brings Suit"]

[Text] Passions concerning the "disposal" of older generation nuclear submarines in Postovaya Bay in the Khabarovsk Kray (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published an article on 28 June concerning the lack of reality in this claim.) are still running high.

Recently a group of officers from the Headquarters of the Pacific Ocean Fleet were working in Vanino and in

Sovetskaya Gavan under the command of the Deputy Fleet Commander for Service and Maintenance, Captain First Rank V. Topilin. During meetings with the local citizenry, the authorities, and activists representing various ecological causes, the following official announcement was made: "There will be no work carried out involving the unloading of the active zones of nuclear reactors in Postovaya Bay. Moreover, by 1995 the Navy will relocate the nuclear vessels which have been based here over the past few years." But there continue to be individual outcries against the trustworthiness of military officials.

Recently the Pacific Ocean Fleet Command brought a libel suit against E. Chayka, a reserve officer and employee of the Vanino newspaper, VOSKHOD. For it was this very journalist who insisted in the newspaper that the navy is trying to turn Postovaya Bay into a "butcher's block for 19 nuclear submarines". This was the start of the hysterical "anti-vessel" campaign. It appears that it is to someone's advantage to keep this situation simmering, rather than deal with the realities of the situation.

#### **66% of Coastal Surveillance Facilities Require Construction**

90UM0824A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
8 Aug 90 First Edition p 2

[A letter from Captain 1st Rank V. Drigola and response by Captain 1st Rank A. Kuzmenko of the Radiotechnical Directorate of the Navy under the rubric: "In Review": "When Will Views Coincide?" First paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction.]

[Text] More than two years ago KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published the article "View from the Observation Post" by Captain 2nd Rank V. Drigola. In it he recounted problems in the North Sea Fleet's surveillance system and proposed ways of solving them. What has changed since then?

Rereading what I wrote, I come to the conclusion that the method of displaying and receiving information is still behind the times. Now, just as before, the manual method dominates. As before there is much to be desired in the established manner of providing electronic surveillance posts with their allotted quantity of provisions. The supply of cargo handling equipment at posts needed for laying in winter supplies remains beneath all criticism. As before, all winter long the crews of many surveillance posts drink melted snow water with no mineralization.

In the interim not only have the old problems worsened, but new ones have arisen. Not the least of these are difficulties with the construction and maintenance of surveillance posts. In the past ten years, not a single new post has been constructed. Sixty-six percent of existing posts are in need of capital repair. An example is the surveillance post being constructed for the company commanded by Senior Lieutenant N. Merkushev. This

standard model post has been under construction for the last three years. The miserly supplies issued for construction and repair of posts are either not being used to the full or being cut back. The problem could be solved if a special organization was founded with the exclusive task of constructing our posts.

We also have complaints about the quality of equipment at surveillance posts. In many ways it is both physically and morally out of date. Development of modern devices is going badly. Most of them are reworkings of the old ones.

Other losses come from an imperfect organizational structure. For instance there is the remote electronic post where Captain 3rd Rank B. Uzharovskiy serves. It has outlived its usefulness because its equipment is worn out and cannot give the resolution required by current demands. But this post is more than a military and economic loss; it is bad for morale as well. The people know that they are not doing anything worthwhile. Nevertheless we are forced to keep the post as an active unit because not even the fleet commander is able to authorize its closing. The situation is even more paradoxical in view of a lack of personnel at other posts that sometimes is sufficient to require outside specialists to work on the equipment.

Other items on the list of "ailments" of the coastal surveillance system include the chronic lack of floating craft—often the only means of reaching remote posts—the absence of vegetables in winter and meat and many other things in summer. But I'm afraid that the 'view from the surveillance post is fading into the distance just as it was two years ago.

Captain 1st Rank V. Drigola

Captain 1st Rank A. Kuzmenko, commander of the Navy Electronic Command, comments on Captain 1st Rank V. Drigola's letter.

All the problems mentioned by Comrade Drigola accord with the situation of surveillance posts in all fleets in varying degrees. Several of them must be resolved locally. One example of this is providing electronic surveillance posts with their allotted quantity of provisions. The central authorities provide the fleets with funds every year for leasing aircraft from civil aviation. Unfortunately the author of this letter does not mention how these are used in the Northern Fleet. He also did not produce any examples that would demonstrate who is really responsible for the chronic shortage of floating craft. And just who was consulted about mineralization of water and improving the sailors' diet? I don't think that constant appeals to the center have assisted in solving the problems.

Some of these problems do not fall within the direct competence of the Electronic Command but they are of course a constant concern for us. Take for instance the construction of posts (including their cargo handling equipment). In the Fifties building a post, installing

equipment and putting it into use took about three years. From the Seventies on this period has risen to five years or more. The organizational structure is also in need of improvement. An instance of this is the problem of raising the rank of command for commanders of Navy electronics companies. In spite of all our efforts it has not been raised to Captain 3rd Rank even though the rank of command of radar companies in the Air Defence Troops has already been raised one level and Navy companies are in equally complex geographic and climatic conditions.

Captain 1st Rank Drigola is correct about the manual method of transmitting and displaying information,

unfortunately it does dominate at most electronic posts. Automated means of information processing and integration in the fleets are in the planning phase. The periods in which this plan are to be completed must be known to the author. But it must be kept in mind that a reduced defense budget may affect the number of posts to be fitted with new technology.

The role of the coastal surveillance system will expand within the context of a defensive doctrine. The attention given to them by members of the Navy high command should also be increased.



### Presence of Missiles in Katakurgan Denied

90UM0825A Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT  
in Russian No 30, 23-29 Jul 90 p 3

[Article by V. Karimov: "There are no Missiles in Katakurgan"]

[Text] In the first edition of the "USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Chronicle" for 1990, there appeared for the first time a list of all the populated areas where missile operating bases in the USSR, and missile support facilities in the U. S., are located. (ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No. 6, 1990)

Also listed among the 44 "points" is Katakurgan, a town located 70 kilometers from Samarkand. Soon after the publication appeared I met with a military officer by the name of Nikolay Tarasovich Gisyuk.

"I've read it," he said. AIF [ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] published outdated information. We have no missiles here. You can attest for yourself. One of our officers, M. Agafonov, will accompany you."

One hour later Mikhail Petrovich and I were at the so-called "point", located on the Karnabchul Steppe, where the rocket troops had been based. I had learned of their presence here earlier after we had mistakenly taken a right turn where the road forked and our vehicle was halted by a soldier who informed us that the area was off limits. We apologized, turned around and drove off with an ambiguous sense that some secret, unauthorized activity was taking place.

That was then. But this time the soldier opened the iron gates and gestured in a such a way that we knew we were welcome. We were met by an officer named Vadim Konstantinovich Ogatov.

"This is the first 'point'," he explained. In the past rocket troops were based here."

He pointed out the bays where earlier prime movers for the missiles were maintained in safekeeping. Now Kamazes [trucks] with trailers were nestled in these shelters. Other parts of the hanger were empty. The last missiles were removed from here for destruction in July of last year. In that same month the rocket troop detachment was disbanded.

"And a month later, in August, the American inspectors arrived here to monitor compliance with the INF Treaty signed between the USSR and the USA," recollected Mikhail Petrovich. "They looked around, were convinced that everything was in order, spent the night in a hotel especially equipped for them, then departed.

"The American inspectors visited the missile operating base again in March of this year. The visit was very short this time, only a few hours. They showed up, looked around, checked their identifying markings (to prove that they are looking at the right complexes), and left.

According to the provisions of the Treaty the visiting side will conduct such unannounced visits for a period of 13 years. During their first visit they inspected all three "points", but only the first "point" during the second visit.

And what was at the other two "points"? I am told that when they were operating they served as a support facility for "points" one and three. The third "point" was perhaps the most inspiring in the sense of military equipment and facilities. But in all likelihood it will have the same sad destiny. This complex was a highly classified facility in its day, for here were located strategic missiles.

If you were to remove the fences and barriers which consist of three rows of barbed wire, as well as the guard towers with their weapons ports, then the importance of this highly protected complex would not be readily apparent. No one would ever think that there are secret underground shafts on these premises which once hid destructive forces of titanic proportions. Above ground everything was covered with gigantic innocuous hoods. Just try and guess what was underneath. This is where practice missile launches were carried out. Near each silo on a concrete footstone stars were drawn, signifying the number of launches that were executed.

"On the eve of the launches, explained the Director of the State Breeding Sovkhoz, I. Atakurbanov, the commander would arrive and alert us that on the next day at a certain time the exercise would begin, and that the local populace should not be afraid, but that they should not graze their sheep within a certain radius of the base. Then at the appointed hour a rumble could be heard, the earth would quake, window panes would rattle, and two or three powerful missiles would rise into the sky in a trail of fire.

"The first time it was horrifying. But then we got used to it. We made friends with the soldiers. We lived together in harmony and friendship. That's all there is to it. As for ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, their information is outdated. There are no longer missiles in Katakurgan. I believe the editors should act more responsibly in publications of this type.

"But I'd like to return to the third "point". I cannot talk about its present situation without some pain. It looks like a bombed-out area. I can still picture how much attention, diligence, and effort went into building this complex, all the way from the first nail to the most intricate instruments.

"But now the missile unit has been dissolved. Now there are only a few soldiers, commanded by a warrant officer, left to guard the complex. The local people tell how the doors from the buildings, the window frames, and the floors have disappeared, all at the hands of the warrant officer, who started up a real trade in dealing fixed government property. If you need flooring, put up your money and take it. They have carried away everything possible, down to the reinforced concrete slabs.

"And by the way, just as soon as the rocket troops evacuated their home of many years, the sovkhos managers requested of the appropriate authorities that they be allowed to purchase all the buildings. But the "powers that be" asked such a high price, that a deal was not possible. If an agreeable price could be set, you would find one of the sovkhos departments located in an autonomous town with all the amenities built in.

"However, reason and diligence were supplanted by mismanagement and carelessness. And where? In the army, where it would seem that interest in this matter would be the greatest. And when you look at the cost of all of this neglect you begin to understand why we are so poor. And with such an attitude toward our national wealth we will never prosper.

### Initial Response to Chernobyl Fire Recalled

90UM05194 Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA  
in Russian No 4, Apr 90 pp 22-24

[Article by N. Korchagina, under the rubric "Civil Defense": "It Was a Day Like Any Other Day,"]

[Text] Just as Nikolay Ivanovich once did. I was going along the boulevard under the leafy crowns of the chestnut trees toward the republic's civil defense headquarters. Then the sky was just like it is now and the trees were also casting shadows. Nothing presaged disaster.

[Shkondin] On 25 April, I arrived at work by 8:00 AM as always. First—the prescribed briefing, then I relieved the preceding operator. I familiarized myself with the situation in the republic and reported to the national headquarters that everything was quiet and the headquarters commander was on duty.

The person with whom I am talking is Nikolay Ivanovich Shkondin, the operations duty officer at the Ukrainian SSR civil defense headquarters, who received the notification of the fire at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant (AES) and transmitted the information to Moscow.

How many times have I already asked him to disengage himself from today's knowledge of that day preceding the tragedy and try to recall: did he realize, did he have a premonition, after receiving the notification, what really happened?

[Shkondin] No, no...—he repeats over and over again.—It was a very ordinary day and a most usual watch. But our days are not quiet at all.

[Korchagina] Have you had occasion before to sound the alarm to the authorities?

[Shkondin] Of course. During the two years that I have worked at the headquarters, there have been severe floods and flash floods in Ivano-Frankovsk and Voroshilovgrad Oblasts and in the Transcarpathian, and also blizzards in the southern Ukraine. A cattle plague and railroad accidents—information about various incidents in all oblasts, and there are 25 oblasts, flow into the headquarters. And false alarms? During civil defense exercises, one rayon transmitted, without switching off the urban broadcasting network, the scenario instruction: "The dam has burst, the water level is 10 meters". Can you imagine what kind of panic there was?

And nevertheless, we try to "wind up," like a roll of film, that night, which has become a peacetime point of reckoning of its own kind—before and after Chernobyl—and which has been compared, if at all, perhaps, to the Apocalypse. Returning to the past—from today to 26 April 1986—in chronological order—beginning with the sounding of the alarm.

At 3:27 the telephone rang. The operations duty officer in Kiev Oblast reported: at 1:20, a fire broke out at the Chernobyl AES. The commander of the AES civil

defense headquarters reported this to him three minutes ago. More specific information is being obtained.

...Human destiny was balancing on a scale for two hours...

Nikolay Ivanovich did what he is supposed to do with the punctuality of a military man (he is a former pilot, Major-General, war veteran, and a recipient of eight decorations)—he immediately telephoned the commander of his headquarters, Bondarchuk. Nikolay Stepanovich said that it was not necessary to send a car for him (he lives close by) and that he was already on his way. He opened the notification packet and telephoned the headquarter's deputy commander and the main department heads, who should be called in on the alarm. As is stipulated in the plans, he sent cars for them. He transmitted the report to Moscow at 3:40.

Having done everything that was required, he started calling Chernobyl. There was no answer from the plant. He managed to get through to a militiaman on duty.

—There is some sort of fire at the plant, we are not certain, we are investigating...

The tragedy at Chernobyl started from a monstrous lie. It does not matter whether it was willful or unintentional. At first, the accident itself and the presence of radiation were concealed, and later—the scope of the disaster. Upon what were the plant managers relying? Did these nuclear power specialists think that the radiation would dissipate and vanish like the morning fog? It is impossible that they did not conceive, if only elementarily, what the effect of radiation—in quantities which sent the instruments off the scale!—would be on the human organism. Of course, words of truth would not have restored the ruptured reactor, but the residents of the Ukraine and Belorussia, who were in the path of the radioactive cloud, would have had the opportunity to decide for themselves their fate: to walk around outside or to caulk the cracks in their apartments. And thus, after finding out about the scope of what had happened from relatives abroad, they lightheartedly brushed it aside: rumors! And... they trusted the authorities implicitly!

The headquarter's commander arrived first. After him, around 4:00, all the others began to arrive. At 7:00 AM, a team of experts drove out to the accident site. A mobile detachment from a civil defense unit in the Kiev Military District departed for Pripjat in response to the alarm. At 10:00, soldiers in a combat reconnaissance vehicle reconnoitered near the fourth uranium slug...

[Korchagina] And what happened then?

[Shkondin] I carried out management's instructions,—Nikolay Ivanovich stood up and walked over to the window. Using my old connections (and this was difficult as was later explained to me,—N. K.), I telephoned the airport ground crew so that they would change the flight plan of the aircraft arriving from Moscow... And I do not recall anything else in particular.



[Korchagina] After returning home, did you tell your wife about the fire?

[Shkondin] Yes, you know...

[Korchagina] Did you always act in this manner?

[Shkondin] No. But here was a special case. There was an uneasiness in the depth of my consciousness. No matter what you say, this was a nuclear power station.

General Petrokhalko was explicit in his assessment of the events of that memorable day.—That day, neither Nikolay Ivanovich, nor I, nor anyone who was with us experienced any sort of dread—nor did we have any idea about the scope of what had happened.

Aleksey Alekseyevich Petrokhalko, who at that time was still the deputy commander of the republic's civil defense headquarters, during the first days, headed the information group that was working around the clock. They analyzed the incoming information and twice a day they submitted written reports on the situation in the region to the republic's government. He started working at the plant on 28 April.

[Petrokhalko] I understood that a tragedy had occurred only at the plant, near the reactor, when I saw the extreme readings on the instruments. And I realized the depth of our helplessness at the operations meetings. It was an incredible scene: the country's most eminent scientists, academicians, and members of the government are sitting and almost making wild guesses instead of "plugging up" the fire spewing orifice of the man-made volcano...

The usual gesture was to lift one's hands in dismay: they were not aware, did not know, and did not foresee. And nuclear power plants were scattered all over the country, literally by thrusting a finger onto a map. How else can one explain the fact that the Crimean and Armenian nuclear power plants were built in dangerous seismic zones and the Chernobyl nuclear power plant was built at the intersection of geological faults and on the most active point in the Ukraine?!

The scientists sang the praises of these technological monsters in chorus: "they are both economical and ecologically safe and accidents at the plants have been precluded." But there were accidents—both in England and in America. That is how it was in their countries. But did that mean the Soviet plants were reliable and everlasting?..

A. Petrokhalko stated,—As it turned out, no one was prepared for Chernobyl: neither the state nor military apparatus, including civil defense. No, not the republic, oblast, or Prip'yat civil defense. The whole system was unprepared because it was not backed up by the manpower, resources, nor equipment. And our regiments, with respect to authorized manning levels and equipment, were not prepared for conducting rescue operations.

At civil defense training exercises everyone harmoniously prepared for war and studied the nature of nuclear explosions. But it turned out that a radiation environment could be different—it could retain its destructive characteristics for a long time and encompass hundreds of kilometers. We contended with the radioactive dust, washed the roads, and built new ones. But all of this was not enough, because the reactor's emissions continued and the radioactive dust migrated.

Who would have thought that we would have to decontaminate the territory, structures, and equipment at the plant not only in the immediate aftermath, but even four years later, and after thoroughly washing and literally scraping thousands of hectares of land, we would over and over again have to take the contaminated soil to new "burial grounds" and replace thousands of "damaged" roofs on the houses of the villages' inhabitants?

We have practiced this many times at civil defense training exercises. But, as the troublesome days of ignorance in Chernobyl have related, only the principal of one school did everything as she was instructed: she forbade the children to go outside and ordered them to make their apartments airtight. And she was immediately rebuked by redoubtable authorities: do not spread panic!

Even science turned out to be essentially helpless in the emergency. How does one protect himself from radiation, what effect do small doses have on a person, and where are the safest places to stay? And for these and many other questions there were no ready-made answers. And the fact that "a reflex action" was actively undertaken, proved to be futile.

If only it were possible to turn back time and at the same time impress upon everyone invested with power and the experts, who made the decisions, that they do not have the right to conduct experiments on people?! Perhaps, then hours, and not days, would be required for evacuation? And would they not begin to move the residents to nearby villages? And would they not have to invest the people's hard-earned millions in ruined land: to build schools, bathhouses, and stores in a place where it is generally dangerous to live?

We found out only later that three-quarters of the reactor's emissions fell on villages in Belorussia, that a restricted area appeared, and about the tragedy in Narodicheskiy Rayon and of the woman from Zhitomir, but was there really only these? And even now those, who assured us that one could live in these places, are prospering. Is it possible they do not feel their guilt for the fate of the children from the so-called uncontaminated villages, the majority of whom require hospitalization and a restoration of their health. It took three and a half years to admit: it was necessary to evacuate people from 12 villages in Zhitomir Oblast and from two villages in Kiev Oblast (having spent over 8.5 million rubles beforehand on the construction of social and cultural facilities).

Four years have passed since that tragic night. We all have had radiation phobia and are tired of asking: give everyone a dosimeter. Our faith in doctors and scientists has diminished somewhat, because, alas, their many optimistic prognoses have not come true. We assiduously open our umbrellas at the first drops of rain. We learned with horror, for instance, that the concentration of radioactive matter in dried medicinal herbs has increased by 30 times. And even fishermen, who risked putting a line into the water, no longer keep repeating as before: "Fish large and small, take the bait." Rather let small ones take the bait, because fish accumulate radionuclides and now they are most plentiful in four-year-old pike, crucian carp, and zander.

Have you heard about the zone of limited forest utilization yet? The plan for it was recently published in the republic's newspaper. Thousands of local forestry specialists with dosimeters in hand crossed every field, meadow, bog, and strip of forest in order to warn us: one cannot gather mushrooms, berries, and medicinal herbs in this place and it is better to stay away from that place altogether for a little longer. A grey grid of hachures covers the map from Kamen-Kashirskiy to Semenovka and from Chernobyl to Vatutino...

The years are passing and the Chernobyl tragedy is being written about and discussed less and less frequently. And just how much was it discussed afterwards. Allegedly, we have already written about everything, shared our recollections, summarized our mistakes, and discussed the lessons at all levels. But have we learned anything from this?

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"Patriot", "Voyennyye znaniya", 1990

### Work, Living Conditions of Troops in Chernobyl Zone

90UM0534A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
26 Apr 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Special Correspondent Major Yu. Mamchur: "Chernobyl: Four Years Later—During that Time 340,000 Servicemen and Persons Subject to the Draft Have Passed Through this 'Zone'"]

[Text] April 26, 1986—The warning sign of a nuclear apocalypse. One of the most tragic dates that mankind has ever experienced. Due to a shortage of information at the beginning and under the influence of the information breakthrough in recent months, our perceptions of the accident at Chernobyl AES [Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant] and its aftereffects have passed through an enormous distance: From superstitious astonishment before the prophetic [name] "Chernobyl—Black Event" to consciousness of ourselves as the culprits and victims of this largest catastrophe of the 20th Century and a misfortune of planetary scale. There are 18,000 square

kilometers of territory contaminated by radiation. Three million people who live on it. "Cesium patches" the size of several oblasts....

It took three years to remove the "secrecy" from the materials upon which the lives and health of many, many people depend. Four years to recognize the need to develop a single, global state program to eliminate the aftereffects of the accident. But even during those days when the country and the world was kept in the dark and now when people with shoulder boards have carried out and are carrying out the lion's share of the work in the affected areas. Military personnel "have stopped up" the mouth of the reactor. Military personnel have participated in erecting the sarcophagus and the utilities under it. Military personnel have chopped down the "red forest." They have decontaminated and they are decontaminating enormous areas of contaminated territory. And this is understandable. Since it is also the Army that will use itself to shield the country during the hour of misfortune in order to give us time to gather the forces of the entire Homeland—since the forces of the Army itself are not limitless....

At one time a quiet and generous Ukrainian village, Terekhi is now the deployment location of the 2nd sector operational task force to eliminate the aftereffects of the accident at the Chernobyl AES. They still have not gotten rid of the old scent from the orphaned peasant huts—grain, hay, and a warm stove. It has been abruptly mixed with others—cheap black shoe polish, tobacco, and soldier's sweat.

The odor of war.

In the office of Colonel V. Gribnyak, chief of the sector political section, the window "registers" 1,000 in radioactive decay. That is from the inside. But there is nothing near the desk and one can work.

"We are conducting radiation reconnaissance. Decontamination of territory and facilities. Localization of buildings. We are cleaning radioactive wastes from the earth...."

During the years that have passed since the accident, the troops have decontaminated nearly 950 villages, settlements, and cities. Many of them, especially those near the so-called cesium patches—several times. This is how it looks. If, let us say, a house's roof is contaminated—the roof is replaced. If contamination has ended up in a well—the well is scooped out. If the earth is contaminated—the earth is removed. Street by street and house by house. One hundred seventy thousand homesteads. Millions of cubic meters of shoveled and transported "dirty" and "clean" earth.

The invisible, insidious, treacherous enemy—radiation—can only be located using instruments. You feel a tickling sensation—in the throat. The thyroid gland resists and the legs carry [you forward]. The eyes are afraid and the hands work. Someone has to go and do it.

Military personnel are also working with nuclear industry workers, various experts, and volunteer security guards at the nuclear power plant.

The fourth power unit.... The point of the reading. In time and space. A window onto nonexistence and eternity. A black hole. Old women who live in settlements by themselves and illegal residents of surrounding villages assert: It is God's retribution. Russian peasants are unceremonious: This is our little dragon, our wretch.

The fourth power unit—everything has been measured. Stupidity and genius, strength and weakness, honesty and dishonesty—the human in man.

The sarcophagus is an enclosure or, in the local dialect—a small stove and, under a certain fantasy, it is really similar to a dragon. Only much worse than the fire-breathing kind. This one "exhales" radiation. You are struck by the outer dimensions when you get up close to the gloomy crypt with the reinforced concrete ribs. The Army helicopter that fell at its feet appears to be a toy in the photo. The crew of the MI-8 helicopter met its death near the fourth [power] unit on October 2, 1986. Captain Vladimir Vorobyev. Senior Lieutenant Aleksandr Yugnind. Sr Lt Leonid Khristich. Warrant Officer Nikolay Ganzhuk. The fourth unit has killed 31 people altogether. It slowly but surely continues to kill—countless numbers [of people].

It is difficult to get to the plant. Even if the entry "robot," having sniffed [you] from head to foot, opens the door to "clean"—you will not go far.

"Documents!"

You almost pinch yourself—it is that same cap with the red star.

"Are there many of you here?"

The unapproachable person sniffed the air and lowered his head:

"That is a military secret!"

It is a quite transparent secret. A hubbub was raised in the press several months ago that a regiment of internal troops had been deployed in the 30-kilometer zone to guard the plant. After the intervention of the Main Military Procurator, the regiment was withdrawn from the zone but it is still accomplishing its previous missions. With just this difference that previously soldiers and officers were at the AES for six hours per day and now the distance has been increased and they perform their military duty 24 hours running. To make up for that, it is once every four days. The calculation is simple: Divide 24 by 4 and we get the daily standard.

We show our pass to the guard.

"How old are you?"

The freckled-faced lad smiles from ear to ear: nineteen.

They have not succeeded in hiring security guards to replace them, they say, for any sum of money...

Military personnel are working at 72 points in the plant. You could say the work is ordinary. The rooms are washed using special solutions. The territory is being cleaned. Loading, transporting, and burying RAO [Radioactive Wastes]. Repeat decontamination is perhaps the most labor-intensive: Replacement of assemblies, coverings, and facings—in short, everything that "was lit up." But there is even a bit more complex mission. This is when you hit the dragon with a jack hammer. Again, whom do you send? Forward, soldier! Do not be frightened, conscript. A regular officer is alongside. Run there. Ten minutes of diabolical chopping. Run back. In shifts. Day in and day out....

The meaning and purpose of the military personnel's activities at the plant is the creation of acceptable working conditions for the experts.

Based on statements to the Collegium of the Main Military Procurator's Office, Kombinat Production Association is consciously sending military unit personnel to the most dangerous operations sectors at the AES thus striving to reduce the radiation exposure of their own personnel. There is the same apathetic attitude with regard to the fact that, since the time of the accident, no technical systems have been created to facilitate work or to make it safe. Servicemen remove radioactive substances from the premises and wipe floors and walls using the most primitive tools—shovels, mops, and rags. Dosimeters have not been provided to everyone. The majority of them receive the maximum allowable dose, five rem, during three to four months and are then transferred to work in support of vital activities of units and subunits. In 1989, Kombinat experts received a total dose of two rem for the entire year.

Shop Senior Radiation Safety Engineer A. Korneyev thinks that the troops need to be removed from the plant and a special decontamination shop needs to be established. OGOZ [Special Zone Operations Task Force] Commander Colonel A. Kuznetsov and his subordinates share that same point of view.

The OGOZ is a Special Zone Operations Task Force. Fifteen officers coordinate military and civilian efforts. How do they assess their work at the plant?

"Very highly," says ChAES Chief Engineer N. Sorokin. "The Army has performed the primary [task] at the plant. We would not have been able to cope without it. Even today we cannot get by [without the Army]."

But then again, Nikolay Mikhaylovich understands that the Armed Forces has another purpose and that the AES's transition to being "self-supporting" is justified and inevitable.



"We calculate [the transition] in 1991. Although without the Army," repeats the chief engineer, "it will be oh so difficult...."

We will add from our own [observations]: And keenly felt in Minatomenergoprom's [Ministry of the Nuclear Power Industry] pocket. Someone nevertheless has to use the jack hammer—on the dragon. Most likely the security guard. The Volunteer. Of course, for a sum that is not commensurate with what they pay military personnel at the same points.

The security guards cause complex feelings among military personnel, especially conscripted personnel. Hostility? No, how could that be there! They work side by side and they essentially perform the same duties. Envy? The plant is not the place where you could become envious of someone. But perhaps there is a deeply hidden sense of true infringement and second rate status.

Colonel Gribnyak had just begun this job and assumed his position when a phone call rang from the duty officer one night: There is a "strike" in one battalion! "Partisans" are holding meetings....

I did not immediately look at the desk behind the thick clouds of cigarette smoke in the center of the tent. A somewhat venerable soldier sat behind it....

Gribnyak introduced himself: He is the new sector political officer.... And he dashed off! Why is a security guard in Finnish modular housing with all of the comforts and why are they in old tents with rotted floors and moreover in two tiers? Why is there such a difference in food? Why do they transport security guards to the plant in buses and they are transported in Ural trucks both in intense heat and in severe cold? No, this is not a childish whim. The dust forces itself into the truck body that, like the tent, is not battened down. "Dirty." They return after washing—sweaty and wet to get one thing—a cold. And generally on what basis do they keep them, the conscripts, here for six months if the Law on Universal Military Service clearly states: three months?

It cost Gribnyak quite a bit of energy to somewhat reduce the heat of passions. And when they changed their tune to order, the conversation proceeded in a more measured [fashion]. Just what are these six months? At kolkhozes—sowing and digging gardens for now. The city dwellers have their [complaint]: The teams are on cost-accounting and "that fellow" is sticking out for whose interest? And who will wait six months for a cooperator? You will return to nothing—the trade union will not grant you anything and you will not get close to the personnel department. There is also no justice in pay. Let us say it is doubled in the zone. But there is double and then there is double. Take the rural chauffeur and that same miner. One got 120 [rubles] and the other got nearly 700. Well, multiply by two. And really, you swallow dust in the Ural [truck] and they sleep on neighboring cots.

They met until morning. And the time arrived and they stood up with buzzing heads and went to their work areas: We need to work. Yes and the Colonel did not equivocate and was not troublesome, but answered honestly....

As far as the six months is concerned, even the soldiers themselves understand: Neither the chief of the political department nor the sector operational task force commander can resolve that problem.

The CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers March 29 1986 Resolution tasks the Ministry of Defense with operations to decontaminate territory, buildings, and structures in zones with heightened levels of radioactive contamination. This same resolution authorized [the MOD] to draft persons subject to the draft into special active duty stints for periods of up to six months to carry out the work. The resolution was subsequently approved by a USSR Supreme Soviet Decree dated April 9 1987.

The USSR Procurator General proposed to the Council of Ministers that conscription of persons subject to the draft for special active duty stints that are not associated with defense missions be terminated. This practice contradicts the Constitution of the USSR and the Law on Universal Military Obligation. This issue has also been repeatedly raised by the Ministry of Defense leadership. However, there has been no fundamental decision till now. Conscription for a six month period is continuing. This is what is causing, putting it mildly, the population's negative reaction in many regions. The number of people who have refused to serve has exceeded two dozen in the Kiev Military District alone. A rally took place at Sumy.

The Law of the USSR "On the Legal Regime of a State of Emergency" was published on April 10 where first and second sector personnel read: "... persons subject to the draft-specialists needed to eliminate the aftereffects of natural disasters, major accidents, or catastrophes can be drafted for a period of up to two months...."

For up to two months!

And the following mounted and resounded throughout the zone: Let us go home!

The soldiers were told: Wait a while, old men, who will we send into the zone? They immediately blurted out everything. Both about perestroika. And about the rule-of-law state. And about laws....

That was a dreadful day—for commanders, political workers, and communists.

An uneasy night passed. Morning was approaching. Toward midday it became clear: All personnel went to work, including to the enclosure. To a man.

"We need to pray for these people," said Civil Defense Operational Task Force Commander Major General Yu. Zakharov.



"Well peasants!" That is all Lieutenant A. Kamaletdinov, decontamination company commander, said.

Albert Kamaletdinov and Vladimir Matviyenko are lieutenants—two of a kind. If one is not dark-haired and the other is light and curly haired, you cannot immediately distinguish between them. And their biographies look like they are twins. They are former Suворov students. They graduated from the tank command school last year. They do not concede anything to each other. Albert recognizes Volodya's individual pre-eminence in only one thing: Volodya arrived here a full week earlier on December 4, 1989. Generally officer cadres are sent here for a three month temporary duty assignment. They cannot find any replacements for the lieutenants. Neither in the sector nor in the military district.

"When the conscripts learned what our birth year is and how long we have been here, they raised such a commotion!" They confess: "We barely calmed them down..."

We can understand the conscripts. They are being drafted to Chernobyl if they are between the ages of 30-45. Just how did 22 year old's like Kamaletdinov and Matviyenko turn up here? Just like several dozen other officers who are far from 30 years old? Unfortunately, we did not succeed in getting a persuasive answer even at the procurator's office.

In short, yesterday's cadets are dealing with their companies.

"No problems whatsoever!" they assure us in one voice. "Our subordinates are mature, serious people and heads of families. They are peasants—solid gold."

And they began to try to outdo each other to prove whose "peasants" were better. How they threw pea jackets on vehicles during winter and they patched up equipment from morning till night—without spare parts, wrenches, or tools—just to get things going by Spring. And they did! Even what was written off. They supplied them with worthless equipment. Dump trucks, loaders, road graders, scrapers, and logging tractors—everything is actually contaminated.

They described how they extinguished a fire in a contaminated forest—everything that was at hand—those same pea jackets, shovels, branches, they stamped their feet, and later they "set off" the exposure monitor.

Information from the USSR Ministry of Defense Central Military Medical Directorate. Despite precisely defined contradictory evidence on the state of health of persons subject to the draft being sent to perform active duty stints to eliminate the aftereffects of the accident at the Chernobyl AES, local public health organs frequently have a formal attitude toward their medical examinations. A particularly alarming situation has developed in Donetsk, Cherkassy, Kharkov, Chernigov, and Vitebsk Oblasts, and in the cities of Kiev and Minsk. In a number of cases, a medical examination has not been conducted at all. About half of the 600 persons subject to the draft

who were conscripted onto active duty stints last year from Donetsk Oblast arrived without a medical release on the possibility for use in the 30 kilometer zone....

Matviyenko has forty visits to the enclosure. Kamaletdinov has not counted them but he has given two months to the little stove. Before dispatching people to the facility, they conduct dosimetric monitoring themselves. No one has checked them. "So that people do not foolishly burn."

Veterans did not stand for it. The most "solid" in age took Albert aside.

"Comrade commander, the company begs you: Do not go farther than the 27th [kilometer] mark. And do not go to the little stove at all. We promise you everything will be in order...."

Kamaletdinov both lost his head and became angry. I am not a youngster, he said, I myself know how to act. Then the gray haired subordinate added something not in accordance with regulations:

"Do not go, little son. You still need to serve and to have children."

Good lads, comrade lieutenants! Excuse me, I am also talking not in accordance with regulations. I do not know if they will give you the award and the citation which already came out in February. But I firmly know: Both the Kharkov Guards and the Kazan Red Banner can be proud of you.

The entire Army and the entire country can be proud of you.

If it was not so painful and shameful....

Can it be that what we understand by the word "Chernobyl" and what we consider to be a "state of emergency" or anyway the greatest catastrophe of the 20th Century needs an entirely special status? What should the principle of operational organization be in the affected regions? How and what men and equipment must be used while carrying out the global program to eliminate the aftereffects of the accident being discussed today?

According to USSR Civil Defense Headquarters data, 340,000 servicemen have served in the four years since Chernobyl. A significant number of persons subject to the draft have been enlisted to eliminate the aftereffects of the accident while complying with prescribed limitations for the draft (health condition, age, studies at day or correspondence higher and middle educational institutions, and the presence of three or more children) has resulted in the expenditure of the conscription resource of the Armed Forces reserve.

In order to select five(!) specialists for work in the zone, Kiev's Zaliznichnyy Rayvoyenkomat [Rayon Military Commissariat] had to "pass over" more than 300 persons subject to the draft.

According to data of personnel organs, the overwhelming majority of chemical troops, engineer troops, and civil defense officers in the central military districts and also to a significant degree in military districts in the eastern portion of the country—participated in the elimination of the aftereffects of the accident from one to three times and absorbed the prescribed radiation dose limit during that time.

Furthermore, judging by the current year's operations plans, the Army must decontaminate 116,000 yards, replace 30,000 roofs and 1,600 kilometers of fence, tear down and bury 2,500 dilapidated structures, dig more than 5,000 wells, and remove and transport 806,000 cubic meters of earth....

Really can no one else "raise" this volume of work besides the Armed Forces? Is it not time to establish specialized volunteer formations to eliminate the aftereffects of the accident? Yes, this will cost us a pretty kopek: We will have to pay the volunteers quite a bit of money. But in this case, as they say, haggling is inappropriate.

It is impossible to endlessly test the patience of people even if these people are in military uniform. Lieutenant General V. Sharygin, member of the military soviet and chief of the Kiev Military District Political Directorate, also adheres to this point of view:

"Undoubtedly, we could not refuse to use the Army for short periods, especially to decontaminate terrain. Nevertheless, it would be appropriate as a first step to transfer the units involved here to Minatomenergoprom salaries. Then this department would not be asking for people by the thousands, as they are right now, but would "count" each man. What has been confirmed in practice is that a portion of the men and equipment is not being effectively utilized...."

We are not talking about the Army wanting to "wash" its hands. But about a more sensible, rational, or if you wish, civilized statement of the matter.

But life takes its normal course.

Reserve Private A. Tkachenko will accompany his son into the Army. The son of Reserve Private V. Rogachevskiy decided to get married. Of course, maybe they could ask for leave, but a round trip—what about the send-off and what about the wedding? The soldiers are straining to go into the very hell. In order to get five rem more quickly. That is—the limit. That is—home.

The majority of them go home in uniform.

It is difficult to put it on and even more difficult to take it off.

Of course, they violate the uniform. On the left pocket—are stars in a row. A star—one month's service.

The newspaper headline is in a visible place in the tent: "Wine takes away [your] mind and health." Someone

has written "and money, too." The experts have calculated: Every month, personnel receive in hand ten times more than the cost of goods offered for sale. The money burns a hole in their pockets. Temptations arise. Even militia cordons cannot stop speculators with the green snake [alcohol].

Here they love to describe how the previous commander, Lt Col Shturkhatskiy, broke bottles of vodka in front of the formation. One hundred forty bottles! He picked a bottle up in his hand and said: "Whose is this?" Silence. And he dashed it to the ground! And so that there would be no doubt that the vodka had been replaced by water, he gave tasters from society the opportunity to sniff it. The former condemned threw themselves at your nose at night in the darkness. But he knocked down the attacker with the first blow....

Shturkhatskiy is a legend. They will remember Shturkhatskiy. A hard-hearted commander but he felt sorry for the people and the shore. While leaving, instead of a long parting words, he said only: "Forgive the state, peasants! As for me—think kindly... The peasants were touched: Well, that was awfully civilized...."

Here, in the zone, everything is temporary. Temporary work. Temporary housing. Temporary positions.... Only people are not temporary. Lt Col A. Inozemtsev, Captain A. Solomkin, Reserve Master Sergeant A. Lyubimov, Reserve Senior Sergeant V. Gormash, Reserve Privates N. Bakh, V. Vadko, I. Vasilyev, V. Bakhar, and thousands of their coworkers are doing everything they can to eliminate the aftereffects of the accident. And there is nothing initial or permanent that unites or brings these people together, or makes it easy for these unlucky temporary workers gathered here but active, purposeful, and inspired strength that operates not through fear but according to conscious. Abandoned huts, lethargic forests, and the deserted banks of the Pripyat—all of this is our land. That we have ruined. And that no one can save but us.

#### Draft Law on Civil Defense in Preparation

90UM0817A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
2 Aug 90 First Edition p 4

[Chief of Staff of the USSR Civil Defense, Colonel-General V. Kozhbakhteyev responds to a question by K. Kuzik from Perm: "Who Will Answer for Inaction?"]

[Text]

[Kuzik] Having switched to a cost accounting economic system, the managers of many enterprises have completely forgotten about civil defense. Apparently they have decided to save money at its expense. But each of them is the chief of civil defense for their facility. Why isn't the leadership of the national Civil Defense organization reminding them of their responsibility?

[Kozhbakhteyev] According to the current Statute on USSR Civil Defense, the chief of the national Civil

Defense organization is responsible for all matters in one way or another connected with carrying out tasks for protecting people from danger through the ministries, departments and councils of ministers of the union and autonomous republics. But, as is known, the chairmen of the councils of ministers are also the chiefs of civil defense for the territory under their jurisdiction. These organs must keep an eye on things at both industrial and agricultural facilities.

It is a different matter, and the reader correctly speaks of this, when, while switching to new forms of economic management, some shortsighted managers under the

guise of economizing are simply doing away with what are largely rather puny life-saving formations and are refusing to finance training programs connected with rescuing people during natural disasters, accidents and catastrophes. They are acting on the principle of "perhaps it will pass."

A draft USSR Law on Civil Defense has been prepared, in which the full measure of the responsibility of managers at all levels is spelled out as to what must be done to protect people and facilities from natural disasters, accidents, and catastrophes. We hope that this law will be passed in the near future.

### Billeting Chief Interviewed on Housing Problems

90UM0487A Moscow *KOMMUNIST*  
*VOORUZHENNYKH SIL* in Russian No 5, Mar 90  
(Signed to press 22 Feb 90) pp 47-53

[Interview with Lt Gen Nikolay Viktorovich Gryaznov, chief of the Main Billeting and Maintenance Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense: "A Roof Over One's Head"]

[Text] Housing is one of the most acute problems in the army and navy. We still have many officers and warrant officers who literally do not know where to rest their heads when they return from a flying mission or a lengthy cruise.

Various measures are being implemented to provide housing to servicemen. Some of them have already been communicated to readers. Nonetheless judging from the editor's mail, the currently implemented measures cannot be said to be satisfactory. Readers ask what else is being done to provide servicemen with housing, so that figuratively speaking there would be a roof over the heads of the family of every officer, warrant officer and extended-service serviceman.

Lieutenant-General Nikolay Viktorovich Gryaznov, chief of the Main Billeting and Maintenance Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, replies to questions from readers associated with this problem.

Nikolay Viktorovich Gryaznov has been in the USSR Armed Forces since 1950. He has been a member of the CPSU since 1955. He graduated from the Military Engineering Academy imeni V. V. Kuybyshev. Gryaznov has served in the following positions: work superintendent, work supervisor's section chief, chief of the Engineering Directorate of the Far Eastern Military District, Chief of the Construction Directorate of the Leningrad Military District, Deputy Commander for Construction and Billeting (Carpathian Military District, Western Group of Forces), and Chief Engineer of the Main Military Construction Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense. "The 27th CPSU Congress posed the task of providing every family its own apartment. Am I right in assuming that this pertains to the families of servicemen as well? What in such a case is the USSR Ministry of Defense doing to carry out the task posed by the party congress?" Colonel A. Kosenko, Central Group of Forces

The task of providing a separate apartment or home to each family by the year 2000 also pertains to every serviceman. The USSR Ministry of Defense developed and is implementing additional measures to increase the volume of housing construction.

For these purposes over 1.5 billion rubles of capital investments were appropriated to housing construction for servicemen (in addition to the initially established allocations) in the current five-year plan, on coordination with the USSR Gosplan. These appropriations are to appear in annual plans at the expense of a decrease in

the volume of construction of productive facilities. This will provide a possibility for placing a total area of 19.4 million square meters of housing for military families into operation in 1986-1990.

However, solving the problem of providing fully equipped housing to army and navy servicemen lacking housing is made difficult by the fact that the executive committees of local soviets are working at a snail's pace to provide housing to servicemen discharged into the reserves. This is why the USSR Ministry of Defense is forced to allocate 7,500 apartments in residential buildings presently under construction to these servicemen this year. This is of course not very much—the number of reservists has risen in connection with the reduction of the armed forces. But we also have to build housing to replace destroyed residential buildings in military garrisons in the Armenian SSR. This is approximately 2,000 apartments.

Writing the program of housing construction and of providing housing to servicemen and blue and white collar workers of the Soviet Army and Navy for the period to the year 2000, we have to account for everything. We will have to erect residential buildings with a total area of 22.5 million square meters in 1991-1995 and 25 million square meters in 1996-2000.

In order to ensure that this housing space is placed into operation, the USSR Ministry of Defense turned to the USSR Gosplan with a request to allocate 7.1 billion rubles in the 13th and 8.3 billion rubles in the 14th Five-Year Plan to the USSR Ministry of Defense for housing construction; to keep deliveries of parts for large-panel residential buildings and brick to the USSR Ministry of Defense from the national economy at a level not below that of the 12th Five-Year Plan; to encourage contracting organizations of the union republics, construction ministries of the USSR, the Moscow City Executive Committee and the Leningrad City Executive Committee to take part in construction of residential buildings at the Ministry of Defense's expense, so that a total area of 5 million square meters would be placed into operation in 1991-1995 and 6.5 million square meters would be placed into operation in 1996-2000.

Unfortunately we frequently encounter obstacles in solving problems associated with residential construction. Thus executive committees of local soviets sometimes impose unacceptable technical specifications on developing city utility networks when they make their land allocations, thus increasing the expense of housing construction by 20 percent or more. It is taking a very long time to resolve the issues of land allocations in the city of Moscow. The USSR Ministry of Defense has drawn up modern, promising plans for large-panel residential buildings that were approved by the urban construction council of Moscow's Main Architectural Administration. However, land has not yet been allocated for their construction.



Each year we transfer capital investments to union republic councils of ministers by way of the USSR Gosplan to cover our share of housing construction in different cities of the country for military units, institutions and organizations of the USSR Ministry of Defense. However, each year we receive only part of the housing paid for by the share provided by the USSR Ministry of Defense, as a result of which the ministry is currently owed 6,900 apartments.

**"I would like to touch upon the problems of providing housing to officers subject to discharge in connection with the reduction in forces. As we know, there are around 100,000 such officers. Most of them go back to the places from which they had been called up, and there they are put on housing waiting lists. Some of them are already informing the editor's office that the waiting list for apartments and housing is huge in a number of cities, requiring a wait of 5-7 and even 10 years. And there is no money available to buy apartments. Will some sort of benefits be provided to such comrades? In your opinion, has thought been given to everything in solving this problem?"** Lieutenant Colonel (Reserve) P. Lyalin, Sochi

The problem of providing housing to servicemen discharged into the reserves or retired continues to be extremely acute, unfortunately. However, it should be noted that important government documents have been adopted recently in regard to this problem in response to proposals from the USSR Ministry of Defense. Specific measures aimed at hastening provision of housing to servicemen moving to a selected place of residence after discharge were determined in the USSR Council of Ministers decree "On Measures to Improve Provision of Living Space to Officers, Warrant Officers and Extended-Service Servicemen Discharged into the Reserves or Retired" and by the USSR Supreme Soviet decree "On the State Plan for the USSR's Economic and Social Development in 1990." A procedure established by the USSR Council of Ministers will significantly alleviate difficulties experienced earlier by the families of such persons in connection with long waits for housing. Servicemen discharged into the reserves or retired for reasons of health, age or reduction of forces are to be put on record for provision of housing space by executive committees of local soviets of people's deputies without having to present documents indicating departure from the previous place of residence and surrender of occupied housing space. These documents must be presented by them when they actually receive housing space. In other words a serviceman discharged into the reserves or retired can now live at his last place of service until he receives housing in his selected population center. And he does not even have to personally travel to this population center to be put on record.

The USSR Council of Ministers decree obligates the executive committees of local soviets of people's deputies to implement **immediate measures to temporarily accommodate discharged servicemen until they receive permanent housing space. Let me emphasize—immediate.** That is, they will be granted living space in dormitories

irrespective of departmental subordination, vacant residential buildings, communal apartments and so on, and they will be registered irrespective of the amount of housing space.

A desire expressed in numerous letters from servicemen that they might be allowed to acquire housing ahead of time in those population centers in which they intend to live after discharge into the reserves or retirement has also been considered. In addition the decree grants the right of priority entry into housing construction cooperatives and acquisition of land plots for private construction in population centers selected with regard for the existing registration procedure. This right is granted to all officers, warrant officers and extended-service servicemen who have reached the maximum age in active military service established by the USSR law "On Universal Compulsory Military Service," or who have not more than 3 years remaining prior to attaining this maximum age, irrespective of where they undergo active military service.

Before, this right was exercised only in cases of service abroad, in regions of the Far North and in locales equivalent to them, as well as on isolated military posts located outside of major population centers. This right extends also to officers, warrant officers and extended-service servicemen who had been discharged earlier into the reserves or were retired for reason of health, age or reduction in forces and who are subject to resettlement out of closed and isolated military posts.

**"My question is about selling apartments. What does the term 'sale of apartments' mean? To whom? For how much? How is the price determined? Is there a sample list of prices? Can an apartment be purchased on time? In other words, to what extent does the USSR Council of Ministers 2 December 1988 decree apply to the Ministry of Defense? What sort of unique features and differences are there here, and does everything hold under military conditions? In particular, what kind of apartments are subject to sale? New? Old? Who is the 'seller'?"** Lieutenant Colonel A. Kononov, Minsk

The answer to the first part of this question is contained in the name itself of the 2 December 1988 decree No 1400 of the USSR Council of Ministers "On the Sale of Apartments to Citizens as Personal Property in Dwellings Belonging to the State and Public Housing Fund."

When a citizen, including a serviceman, acquires such an apartment, he becomes its owner, with the right to possess, use and dispose of it in accordance with the procedure established by existing legislation—that is, similarly as with the right to possess, use and dispose of a dwelling that is privately owned by a citizen. A privately owned apartment is inherited on a universal basis.

The statute concerning sale of apartments to citizens as personal property and payment of the expenses of their maintenance and repair states that the following may be

sold to citizens as personal property: apartments occupied by them in dwellings of the state and public fund; vacant apartments in dwellings subject to reconstruction and overhaul; all apartments designated as being for sale.

Apartments vacated by the departure of citizens and apartments in newly built dwellings as well as in dwellings rebuilt or overhauled by executive committees of local soviets of people's deputies, enterprises, associations and organizations may be sold only after they are occupied in accordance with the established procedure.

Apartments categorized as official reserved apartments and apartments in dwellings located on closed military posts may not be sold to citizens as personal property.

It is established that when apartments are sold to citizens as private property, the rule is that one family is entitled to occupy only one apartment or private home.

Apartments occupied by citizens, including servicemen, may be sold as private property only with the consent of all adult family members living together. An apartment may be sold to them as communal property if they so desire.

The decision to sell an apartment as private property is made with regard for the composition of the family and the employment and public activities of citizens. In dwellings subject to reconstruction and overhaul, vacant apartments may be sold as personal property in correspondence with the size of the citizen's family, as a rule on the basis of the established norm of housing space per person (12 square meters in the RSFSR), with regard for entitlement to additional housing space.

Apartments are sold to servicemen, including those in the reserves or retired, to blue and white collar workers of the Soviet Army and Navy and to other citizens residing in dwellings belonging to the USSR Ministry of Defense by the corresponding housing administrations, on the basis of decisions adopted (depending on subordination) by district and navy troop commanders and by the chiefs of main and central directorates of the USSR Ministry of Defense, on the basis of petitions of billeting and maintenance organs, coordinated with the housing commissions and garrison chiefs or military unit commanders.

Apartments in dwellings of the housing fund of cost-accounting enterprises and organizations of the USSR Ministry of Defense are sold by these enterprises and organizations on the basis of a joint decision of the administration and the trade union committee.

**"Is there a system of priorities in the sale of apartments? To whom should they be sold on first priority? Is this associated with the purchaser's time of service or his income? In other words, who enjoys benefits in this area?"**  
Major S. Kalashnikov, Red Banner Turkestan Military District

There are naturally no priorities for those who wish to acquire as personal property an apartment they occupy.

Priorities are established only in the sale of vacant apartments in dwellings subject to reconstruction or overhaul. According to an order of the USSR minister of defense apartments in such dwellings must be offered first to servicemen and to blue and white collar workers of the Soviet Army and Navy registered with military units for acquisition of housing and improvement of housing conditions.

Servicemen and blue and white collar workers of the Soviet Army and Navy may also acquire as personal property, on an equal basis with other citizens, vacant apartments in dwellings subject to reconstruction or overhaul and belonging to executive committees of local soviets of people's deputies, enterprises, associations and organizations. In this case the priorities are as follows (in the RSFSR).

First priority—persons registered for improvement of housing conditions in the given population center, and primarily production leaders, participants of the Great Patriotic War, the families of deceased servicemen and persons equivalent to them, extended-service servicemen, warrant officers and officers discharged into the reserves or retired from active military service and from internal affairs organs for reason of age, health or reduction in forces, and other citizens enjoying the right of priority housing acquisition.

Then follow persons residing in communal apartments and in adjacent communicating rooms occupied by two or more families, irrespective of blood relations; persons residing in the same room with persons of opposite sex over 9 years old, except spouses.

Last are persons permanently residing in a given population center; among them, preference is shown for those who possess housing space of less than the established norm per person.

As is evident from the above, the sale of apartments is not directly associated with the serviceman's time of service or his income.

**"What specifically is the paperwork for buying an apartment? In whose name is the application to be filled out? Is there some particular form that is to be used here? Now that a decision has been made on partial compensation for cooperative apartments, is something similar foreseen in the purchase of apartments in dwellings belonging to the housing fund of the USSR Ministry of Defense?"**  
Senior Lieutenant I. Naforntsia, Central Group of Forces

In all matters involving apartment acquisition you should turn to housing administrations, military units, enterprises and organizations. After the decision to sell an apartment is made in accordance with the established procedure, a purchase-sales contract is drawn up, it is registered with the technical inventory bureau of the executive committee of the local soviet of people's deputies, and a registration certificate indicating right of ownership is issued to the apartment owner.

In contrast to the established procedure of providing uncompensated financial assistance to servicemen joining housing construction or housing cooperatives and servicemen who receive loans for private housing construction, such financial assistance is not specifically foreseen by the legislation in regard to the purchase of apartments as personal property by servicemen as well as other citizens.

Payments are made on apartments over a term of not more than 10 years as a rule, on the condition that not less than 50 percent of the apartment's cost (selling price) is paid as a down payment. The remainder is paid by purchasers in different installments at times foreseen by the purchase-sales contract, within a period of 10 years beginning with the month following registration of the apartment purchase-sales contract.

Advantages in acquisition of apartments as personal property may be established for large and low-income families, to include increasing the period of paying for such apartments to a term of 15 years and reducing the down payment to 30 percent of the established cost of the apartment for such families.

**"Some servicemen receive apartments without charge, so to speak. Others have to buy them. Is this not an infringement of someone's rights? What per-person housing space norms are foreseen in regard to apartment sales? How are communal services and repairs paid for? At whose expense? Lieutenant Colonel N. Kovalchuk**

The purchase of apartments in dwellings belonging to the state and public housing fund by citizens as personal property is purely voluntary. Each must decide this for himself.

As was already indicated above, vacant apartments in dwellings subject to reconstruction or overhaul are sold to citizens as personal property in correspondence with family size and on the basis of the per-person housing space norm established by the union republic's legislation, with regard for any entitlements to additional housing space.

Apartments belonging to private owners are maintained and repaired at the expense of the apartment owner. Except in cases where a dwelling is maintained by a cooperative organization and other terms of payment for the services of this organization are foreseen by contract, the expenses associated with technical maintenance and repair of a residential building (section, apartment) are paid by the apartment owners on the basis of rates and terms established for maintenance and repair of dwellings belonging to the state housing fund.

The expenses of home heating and of electric power, gas, water and sewage disposal are paid by apartment owners on the basis of rates established for the state housing fund.

**"I bought an apartment. Tell me, please, can I sell it, or perhaps exchange it for an apartment on a military post?**

**And what am I to do with the apartment when I am transferred to a new station? Is it going to be an obstacle in this matter, or on the other hand might it have a dominant effect on my career advancement? Or let us say if an officer is discharged, what happens with his apartment? Can it be exchanged for an apartment in another city? Will a military post transform into a civilian town in such a case?" Major N. Ivanov, Air Defense Forces**

As I noted earlier, the sale of apartments categorized as official reserved apartments and of apartments in dwellings on closed and isolated military posts is prohibited.

But in general, a serviceman acquiring an apartment as personal property is entitled to subsequently exchange or sell it, to reserve it for another person, and even to transfer it to him as a gift.

Apartments privately owned by citizens are inherited on a universal basis.

What is to become of a purchased apartment when a serviceman is transferred to a new station? If the serviceman desires to obtain an apartment from the state housing fund for his family at this new station, or if he desires to acquire cooperative housing space, or if he desires to acquire an apartment (home) as personal property, then he must resolve the matter of transferring possession of his privately owned apartment at the previous place of service in accordance with the law.

This does not pertain to cases, established by law, in which official reserved housing is provided to the serviceman's family at the new station.

These matters also need to be resolved in similar fashion when servicemen are discharged into the reserves or retired, and they move to a new place of residence.

**"Can a purchased apartment be remodeled? Are add-ons permitted? If a garden plot is present, is it sold together with the apartment, if hypothetically it is on the first story?" Captain 2d Rank N. Borovikov, Red Banner Caspian Flotilla**

Matters involving remodeling, including construction of add-ons, of an apartment acquired as personal property must be resolved by way of the appropriate organs of local soviets of people's deputies.

Apartments in low residential buildings consisting of one or several units may be sold simultaneously with transfer of the right to use a garden plot in connection with transfer of the right of ownership of a structure in cities or of providing a garden plot in rural areas, in accordance with the procedure established by the land legislation of the union republics.

**"Could things be set up such that several years before being discharged into the reserves (and perhaps throughout his entire term of service), an officer could deduct a certain sum for an apartment which he will occupy after his discharge? In the opinion of my fellow workers there is good sense in doing this. It seems to me**



that this approach would make it possible to reduce the acuity of the apartment problem for officers. Why in your opinion has such a reasonable decision not been made yet?" Colonel A. Novikov, Moscow

Three years prior to reaching maximum age, an officer on active military service may join a housing or housing construction cooperative at his selected place of residence on priority, receiving uncompensated financial assistance in doing so. In the same manner he may obtain a lot on which to build his own house, and concurrently receive uncompensated financial assistance in paying off a loan.

**"Back when I was a regiment commander I heard that so-called official reserved apartments exist in a number of armies of socialist countries. They are reserved for officers occupying certain positions. For example there would be the regiment commander's apartment, an apartment for the commander of a battalion, and for a particular political worker. And no one else has the right to occupy these apartments. How do you feel about this approach?" Colonel (Reserve) Yu. Orlov, Tuapse**

Provision of official reserved housing on the basis of official position to certain categories of officers was also foreseen by a number of orders in our country. The corresponding article can also be found in the Statute on Procedures for Providing Housing Space in the Soviet Army and Navy currently in force. But because of the acute lack of housing, including on closed military posts, this system is hardly working.

This idea may be realized to its full extent as the acuity of the housing problem is diminished.

**"During my time of service (I have already served a quarter of a century) I have heard many complaints about serious flaws in the work of housing commissions (intrigues, absence of glasnost, reshuffling of waiting lists). What do you see as reliable guarantees that the work of the commissions would be normalized, considering the acute shortage of housing?" Colonel I. Shk-varko, Kharkov**

Given the acute housing shortage, strict compliance with the principle of fairness in the distribution of housing space acquires special significance. Housing commissions created in military units and garrisons are called upon to play the most important role in accomplishing this end.

Unfortunately, far from all of them are working with due responsibility.

The competency of their members and their responsibility for their work must be raised, and broad glasnost must be ensured in their work.

I feel that given the processes of democratization and glasnost occurring in the army and navy, the time has come to revise the housing commission statute presently in force.

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### **Maj Gen Kurdakov On Military Contributions To Economy**

90UM0838A Kiev *LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA* in Russian  
22 May 90 p 4

[Article by Maj Gen G. G. Kurdakov: "We Won't Allow Ourselves To Grow Weak"]

[Text] Commentary by Major General G. G. Kurdakov, District Deputy Troop Commander for Rear Services and Chief of District Rear Services.

First of all, I want to express my view regarding complaints that the army only "consumes." In my opinion, this stems from the fact that people don't have adequate information. Let's be fair: Even in the military periodical press (with the exception of the journal TYL VOORUZHENNYKH SIL), not to mention civilian publications, extremely seldom does one come across an article about the specialists who work on military sovkhozes and subsidiary farms and other enterprises that produce goods for the country's national economy. Yet our farm and livestock workers make a sizable contribution to providing troops and the public with foodstuffs. During the past agricultural year, all the district's sovkhozes largely fulfilled their assignments.

Some 7,400 tons of grain, 200 tons of meat, and 300 tons of milk was produced over and above the plan.

Qualitative production indices improved: 80 percent of the meat was obtained from livestock of increased fatness, and 85 percent of the milk produced was of top quality. A considerable role in this was played by increased labor productivity on the part of Soviet Army workers and employees of field-crop and livestock-raising brigades, which have switched to full economic accountability, and by increased power availability for labor-intensive processes.

Based on the agricultural year's final results, the district's sovkhozes made over three million rubles in net profit, and profitability stood at 35 per cent.

An important role is assigned to the subsidiary farms of military units, institutions, and higher educational institutions in accomplishing the tasks of increasing the production of agricultural output, especially meat, potatoes, and vegetables.

They cultivate 5,000 hectares of farmland and raise nearly 25,000 pigs, 1,990 head of cattle, 1,738 poultry animals, and 190 horses.

Great attention is being paid to expanding and enhancing subsidiary farms' material and technical facilities. Fifteen hothouses with a total area of 3,900 square meters, nine pig sties for 2,900 head, and three cow barns for 125 head have been built in just the recent past.



This has resulted in the production of 4,900 tons of grain (102 per cent of the plan), 4,765 tons of potatoes and vegetables (101 per cent), 2,408 tons of meat (101 per cent), 268 tons of milk (160 per cent), and 100,000 eggs.

On the pages of LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA today, we salute the work of the specialists of the Rassvet [Day-break] Sovkhoz. And rightly so, for they are our leading workers. Their methods should be disseminated in every possible way. This is a major psychological incentive. I think that other collectives will also try to win this honor in the future.

But even now, not just the Rassvet Sovkhoz but also all the district's farms are making considerable efforts to fill the food program's plans with real results.

The output the sovkhozes and subsidiary farms produce provides the troops a four-month supply of meat, a six-month supply of vegetable oil, and a year's supply of milk.

During the period of perestroyka, people have taken heart, have faith in the revolutionary changes in the countryside, and are becoming true masters of the situation. All the collectives are striving to intensify agricultural production in every possible way, to strengthen organization and discipline, and to overcome poor management. Radical measures are being taken to improve food supplies for soldiers and members of their families. To this end, the district's farms are paying special attention to the production of nonplan output.

For example, the Rassvet Sovkhoz has started operating a shop that produces vegetable oil. Forty tons of high-quality output was channeled into the trade network last year alone. The shelling mills of the Blagodatnyy [Plentiful] and Stepnoy [Steppe] Sovkhozes produce more than 200 tons of cereals. In cooperation with the Krivoy Rog Concentration Combine, the collective of the Stepnoy Sovkhoz has set up a shop to process meat products. The Borispolskiy Sovkhoz has built and is successfully operating shops that make cottage cheese and sour cream (10 tons a year), and a cooperative known as "Home Sausage" has been set up there. And all these things are being done not because they might be fashionable but in order to bring closer the future of perestroyka.

The sovkhozes have made a good start in increasing the production of agricultural output. However, their achievements hardly mean that there are no problems or unresolved issues in the farms' development—there are more than enough of them. This is also graphically illustrated by the Rassvet Sovkhoz's example, which has been discussed in published articles. The effectiveness of continued growth is still being held back by obsolete material and technical facilities in some places, the manual labor that predominates in livestock raising, and a shortage of skilled labor owing to the lack of comfortable housing.

And take unit production costs. They are within the established range. But this index is still high with respect to the production of meat from cattle. This is because of the large outlays for fodder per unit of output. There are problems in labor remuneration for final results, and so forth.

We have written that the food program is a nationwide effort. There is much talk at all levels today about the cities repaying their debt to the countryside. But for the time being, as Rassvet Sovkhoz Director Anatoliy Yegorovich Ponomarenko has rightly pointed out, our farms are keenly feeling the city's "help" in the form of higher prices for equipment, building materials, and electric power.

I remember when not too long ago, at a time when the fanfares were sounded on any pretext and shortcomings were only isolated, a sad joke made the rounds. It was said that a steamship will never make it to its port of destination if it uses 75 percent of its steam to blow the whistle. Today the words "perestroyka," "acceleration," and "renewal" are heard in almost every radio broadcast, on television, and from high-ranking rostrums, and they abound in newspaper pages. But unless we invest these notions with real-life, concrete content, it could turn out that our diesel locomotives, too, will expend their energy mostly on "whistling." And this cannot be allowed.

A great deal of people have a stake in the harvest and in grain production. But its fate nevertheless remains in the growers' hands. And they must first make greater demands on themselves. For almost all the difficulties, if not all of them, can be overcome if we truly love our work. And not out of duty, but from the heart. Such specialists comprise the majority on the Rassvet Sovkhoz as well as other farms.

#### **Riga Defense Plant To Produce Milk Refrigerators, Auto Parts**

90SV0010A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian  
17 Aug 90 p 1

[Article by V. Galyuk under the heading "Conversion":  
"Milk Coolers Instead of Cannons"]

[Text] For many years, tank cannons were brought in for repair to this large production facility of a military enterprise located in the northern part of Riga. These weapons are not delivered here any longer. Just-manufactured tanks for cooling milk take their place, gleaming with their snow-white buffing.

The first batch of these items, needed by consumers, was recently shipped to the cities and rayons of Latvia. Purchasers have rated this product quite highly. It has especially caught the fancy of a new social class—the farmers.

"Each of these containers holds 160 liters," says B. Bolkhovskiy, chief of the technical department at the enterprise. "The containers keep fresh milk four times as long."

The refrigerating units are not the only type of "peace-time" products being sold by this military enterprise within the framework of conversion. They have also set up mass production of about 20 other products that are in critically short supply and needed by our national economy.

I visited another production facility with the chief of the technical department. Along both sides of the passageway are various spare parts for military equipment.

"This is the last batch," says Boris Mikhaylovich [Bolkhovskiy]. "We will not be manufacturing them any longer. Instead, we are setting up mass production of spare parts for 'Zhiguli' and 'Moskvich' passenger cars."

A little farther on is another shop. Before, it was intended for manufacturing military products. Now, they have set up mass production of stands for dismounting wheels from various makes of passenger cars.

The republic's gardeners and truck farmers will also be grateful to the collective of the military enterprise. Production of metal hothouses, gates, and fences has been set up in one of the facilities. Here they have begun manufacturing water intake valves and small concrete mixers.

Among those who were the first to be retrained for production of consumer goods were such experienced production workers as assistant shop foreman I. Plyavinsh; metalworkers G. Saralidze, A. Golubyev, A. Asharin, and I. Saltan; electric welder Ye. Sharonov; blacksmith Ya. Keyselis; and many others. Thanks to their selfless labor, the collective of the military enterprise has the opportunity each month to receive 15 percent of the profit from production of consumer goods. For this, new production capacities are now being built at the enterprise, and many workers are changing skills.

"The state program for conversion is planned for five years," says I. Zhakis, chief of the military enterprise. "Our collective, I hope, will successfully fulfill the tasks set by the country's leadership."

**All-Union Naval Youth League Created***90UM0532A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
26 Apr 90 First Edition p 2*

[Article by Senior Lieutenant A. Kryshkal: "For You Who Love the Sea"]

[Text] The All-Union Naval Youth League has been created. It was established by the Soviet Navy, the Komsomol Central Committee, the USSR State Committee for Education, the Lenin Children's Fund, and several ministries and public organizations.

One hundred thirty eight fully empowered representatives of clubs, recreation groups, scuba diving clubs, sailing clubs and children's flotillas from all over the nation attended the founding conference which was held in Leningrad. Participating in the proceedings of the conference were the Inspector General of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Admiral of the Fleet G. Yegorov; responsible workers from the Komsomol Central Committee, Yu. Tikhomirov, Yu. Igonin, and S. Vyugin; and representatives from the Political Department of the Leningrad Naval Base. Those who met discussed the league's draft charter. After appropriate reworking, the charter will become the basic document controlling the work of the new public organization.

The main purpose of the league is to teach a new generation about the best traditions of the Soviet Navy, to teach young people about the rudiments of the sailor's trade, and to prepare them for service in the navy. The conference participants selected 27 people to serve in the league council. As the result of open alternative voting, Komsomol Central Committee Instructor, S. Vyugin, became the president of the league. Lieutenant Colonel A. Berezkin and USSR Peoples' Deputy, Captain Lieutenant I. Shulgin became members of the Naval Youth League Council.

In order to popularize this young people's organization it is planned to produce a monthly television program to be entitled "The Path to the Sea" and an illustrated magazine.

It was decided that in the spring and summer of this year there will be a competition among adolescents to pick those who will serve as crew members in the voyage of the sailing ship, the "Mir".

**Uzbek Supreme Soviet Considers Law On Military Service***90UM0494C Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian  
3 Apr 90 p 2*

["Text" of report by Chairman of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Legislation, Legality and Law and Order Commission E. Kh. Kalilov: "About the Proposals of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet on Changes and Additions to the USSR Law 'On Compulsory Military Service'"]

[Text] Comrade deputies!

On the eve of today's session the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Legislation, Legality and Law and Order Com-

mission heard a report of the Republic Military Commissar, Deputy Vladimir Nasyrovich Makhmudov on changes and additions to the USSR law "On Compulsory Military Service." A draft of this particular resolution has been handed out to all deputies.

You know, comrades, that lately letters from workers describing serious shortcomings in the way service in the Soviet Army and Navy is organized have been received by state organs, the mass media and the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet. An analysis of the experiences in the military service of our republic's young men shows that the current USSR law "On Compulsory Military Service" is obsolete and does not take into account the social-political changes taking place in the country and does not ensure an adequate respect for the rights of military personnel and their protective network of social services. All this has prompted us to introduce a proposal to the USSR Supreme Soviet with a request to change some of the articles of this law with the goal of taking into account the characteristics of the draft and military service of our recruits and also the improvement of this piece of legislation in the spirit of contemporary requirements.

Yes, time has forced us to change many articles of even the basic laws of the USSR and the republic. And it is not without purpose that the draft laws "On the USSR Defense" and "On Compulsory Military Service" are being discussed today in the USSR Supreme Soviet.

First of all, I would like to talk about what we could do ourselves to improve the quality of the preparation of the republic's young men for active military duty.

An analysis of the joint work of party, soviet, and Komsomol organs, military registration and enlistment offices, and other public organizations of the republic allows us to conclude that in the question of preparing our youth for service and in their military-patriotic education a number of organizational and practical measures have been implemented regarding a realization of the tasks defined by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council Of Ministers resolution, "On the Preparation of Pre-Draft and Draft-Age Young Men for Active Duty Service in the USSR Armed Forces."

The atmosphere and events of today's life which are taking place in connection with ensuring the defense capabilities of the country, the presence of antimilitary sentiments in a certain segment of the population, and the most contradictory rumors possible about the actual situation in the army force us to look at these problems in a new way and to seek additional forms of work.

As the republic military registration and enlistment office emphasized in its report to the commission, each year approximately 180 thousand young men from Uzbekistan enter the ranks of the armed defenders of our Fatherland and take upon themselves one of the most crucial obligations to the people and state on protecting

the security and inviolability of its borders. The overwhelming majority of them carry out their constitutional duty honestly and conscientiously.

Despite this, it is necessary to recognize that we have not been able to achieve fundamental changes in the training of young men for military service or to dramatically improve the quality of the pool of draftees.

For example, in 1989 more than 13,600 young men without a high school education were shipped off to the army and navy. More than six thousand young men, suitable for noncombatant duty, were assigned mainly to military construction units; 810 individuals were removed from the military roles due to health reasons. All this means expenses in our work.

Among the population serious concern is caused by instances of refusal to serve in the military, relationships among military personnel which violate the regulations, accidents with military equipment, violations connected with drunkenness and narcotics use, the death and serious injury of people during their tours of duty.

In addition, in some of our oblasts and rayons an effective system of preparing young men for military service coordinated from a single central authority has not been developed. The planning of this work for the most part is directed towards the creation and improvement of the training and resources base. At the same time questions regarding morality and spirituality among the youth, an increase in activities of the soviet and party organs and the public in resolving these problems are being ignored.

As a result the civic development of young men comes late and their lack of drive in life and desire not to work where society needs them saddens us. We are especially concerned that during recent years in the republic the number of draftees who have never been employed has almost doubled. The proportion of crimes committed by students of general educational schools and professional trade schools remains high; almost every other crime is committed by individuals in this category.

Therefore, along with fully mature and correct attitudes on life and the service, people still come into the army, among whom are people from our republic, with an eroded social consciousness and unfortunately their numbers are not decreasing. What do they bring into the army? This is the issue of issues which needs the daily, thoughtful, military-patriotic work of all officials, from military as well as local party soviet, komsomol, law enforcement organizations and the deputy corps. That is to say, a single, broad front, acting constantly and effectively is needed for the struggle which, I believe, is being initiated today at the first sessions of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet.

Only with close coordination and active mutual assistance can we effectively resolve the many tasks in the

fight against crime among the youth, including crime in the military, and also defend the rights and legitimate interests of citizens.

Then there will be fewer letters, declarations and inquiries sent to the military registration and enlistment offices, republic party and soviet organs from parents and constituents with requests to protect their sons from the "arbitrariness" in the Armed Forces and there will not be a reason for certain extremist forces to stir up antimilitary sentiments and to exacerbate relations among nationalities.

In short, as you see, we have some things to work on with all of society and the entire republic. We must do everything possible so that our boys grow up healthy both physically and morally, have a high overall educational preparation and are ready for labor and defense.

Comrade deputies! You know that in corresponding committees and commissions of the country's parliament draft laws on defense and on compulsory military service have been elaborated which provide for a number of fundamental reforms of Soviet military construction, guaranteeing the protective network of social services for military personnel, their status and a number of other problems. Of course, a solution to these problems cannot be found overnight and such serious political solutions are taken only constitutionally by democratic means, taking into account the interests of all republics and the people living in them.

In addition, many issues regarding the military reform could be resolved in a shorter time period.

In particular, today we Uzbek SSR People's Deputies could make decisions which promote a real acceleration of the military reform in the country without lowering the level of our defense capabilities and combat readiness.

The proposed draft resolution of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet which has been analyzed by the commission point by point, satisfies these requirements. I should emphasize that the members of the commission introduced a number of additions and changes to the resolution draft.

I ask that you pay attention to the fact that we replaced the first paragraph of the resolution. Now it reads as follows: "An analysis of the service record of young men from the Uzbek SSR in recent years, the letters from workers received by various entities, including soviet and party organs, demonstrate that the currently valid USSR law "On Compulsory Military Service" as well as other legislative acts have become obsolete. They do not take into account the social-political changes underway in the country and do not provide for adequate respect for the rights of military personnel and their protective network of social services."



Further on in point number two of the resolution, the last proposal has been removed since it does not correspond to union law. Here in part six the following addition was made, "and permanent monetary allowance" and now reads as follows: "on the establishment of a one-time and permanent monetary allowance for the families of soldiers who perished."

In part ten of the same point we added the following: "Confer republic status to the Uzbek SSR military commissariat and free it from the functions of an oblast military commissariat."

The Supreme Soviet Legislation, Legality and Law and Order Commission, having discussed the draft resolution and having made the indicated additions and corrections, submits it for your review, and if approved, for submission to the USSR Supreme Soviet so that our proposals are taken into account during the elaboration of the law on the defense of the USSR and compulsory military service.

#### Round Table Discussion on Problems With Draft

90UM0633A Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA  
in Russian No 5, May 90 pp 27-29

[Round table discussion under the rubric "Discussion of the Service": "...Or Have We Forgotten About Duty"]

[Text] We have recently encountered a previously unheard-of phenomenon: attacks on our Armed Forces. What do the magazines and newspapers not print! The authors, frequently uninformed about military affairs, propose their own military doctrine for the entire nation (?) under the guise of scientific revelations and advocate replacing active military duty with a professional army.

The objective of the planned action is to sow discord in the immature hearts of the young people and nudge them toward illegal acts. It must be sorrowfully admitted that they are succeeding.

A round table discussion arranged by the magazine VOYENNYE ZNANIYA in Moscow's Perovskiy Rayon was devoted to the moral-psychological, ethical and physical preparation of future soldiers and their legal support. Taking part in it were V. Sinyutin, chief editor of the magazine; Col V. Lapchev, rayon military commissar; Col Justice M. Matakina, chief of Legal Services of the USSR Ministry of Defense; Col Justice V. Shestakov, department chief of the Main Military Procuracy; Lt Col Justice Yu. Tugolukov, senior inspector of the Directorate of Military Tribunals; Col Justice G. Sankovskiy, senior instructor of military law at the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze; V. Uretskaya, head of the rayon [rayon education department]; Maj Militia A. Baturkin, chief of the RUVD [rayon directorate of internal affairs]; S. Laktionov, first secretary of the rayon Komsomol committee; Col (Res) I. Taran, chief of the joint training center; Col (Ret) Yu. Yakovlev, member of the support committee of the RVK [rayon military commissariat]; A. Grebenkov, deputy procurator for Perovskiy Rayon.

Also present were directors and military instructors from schools, SPTU [special vocational and technical schools] and tekhnikums (more than 120), G. Ryabtsev, head of the ideological department of the rayon CPSU committee, N. Goncharova, deputy chairman of the rayon ispolkom, and ispolkom member A. Barabanov.

B. Kostyuk, chairman of the rayon DOSAAF committee, was absent.

(V. Lapchev) Each year hundreds of young men residing in the rayon reach the 18-year mark. A very significant event in the life of each. Only yesterday they were looked upon as teenagers, their mischief overlooked. Now the people and the nation are entitled to count on them for support in all matters, including defense. Do all of them prove ready for this?

Quite recently we would not even have asked this kind of question. And it was not at all a matter of pretension or impressive numbers. The actual state of affairs did not evoke any particular alarm. But today, ... Here are some data for 1989. We were unable to send 364 individuals to military units in the spring; 325 in the fall. A total of 509 draftees proved unsuitable for military service, and 254 had mental disorders. There is food for thought here.

Many do not report upon receiving their notice. We do not know where to find them, since they are never at home. Last year there were 178 evaders and not one of them was punished, even though the cases of some were submitted to the procuracy.

The registration has recently become more complicated. It requires medical certification, and the young men refuse to give blood for testing out of fear of contracting AIDS. They justifiably demand that this be done with disposable equipment. Unfortunately, we do not have it. And entire classes at schools and SPTUs pointedly fail to report. What then? Application of the law forbidding employment or acceptance at educational institutions without a registration card. There are more than 1,000 young men in that situation right now.

You can see that there are many problems. The military commissariat alone cannot solve them. What is needed is a joining of efforts on the part of all the organizations with an interest in the matter, particularly an active stance on the part of law-enforcement agencies, which for some reason view obvious violations of many laws with indifference and do not conduct legal education among the youth.

[A. Grebenkov] I agree with Vasilii Alekseyevich that we are not doing anything. Indeed, the number of draft dodgers is growing, while not a single person has been convicted of this in the rayon. This lack of punishment will lead to no good. We are prepared to combat this negative phenomenon with the full force of the law, but here is the problem. Last year 93 cases of evasion were investigated. More than 50 of the youth had moved and therefore did not receive their notice. The rest also declared that they had not received their official notice.

to appear at the induction center. We established the fact that workers with the military commissariats were not observing the requirement that the notice be hand-delivered to the draftee, his parents or employees of the housing sections and signed for. This creates a criminal situation with which it is difficult to cope. We procurators and judges do not have the legal grounds for instituting legal proceedings.

It would not even be necessary to resort to that extreme measure, however, if the military commissariat were more aggressive. What do I mean by that? I refer to its great administrative authority, including the possibility of levying a fine of up to 50 rubles upon all parties guilty of violating the Law on Universal Military Duty: workers with the housing services who do not take steps to notify the youth of their summons to the induction center, parents and those in charge of educational institutions and enterprises who do not concern themselves with the initial military training of the pre-draft youth. Has this been done? We investigated and found that it has not been done once in the past five years.

I would add that the rayon procuracy has presently taken legal action against seven draft dodgers. That is not many, but then it is also true that the situation will hardly be rectified with punitive measures alone. We are dealing with a sickness which must be treated with preventive measures, with well conceived indoctrinational work with the youth. I have personally talked with many young men. Some of them openly refuse to serve. They say (parroting others, of course) that we need professional Armed Forces, and the like. One feels that they are greatly influenced by articles in the newspapers and magazines which refer negatively to the army.

[V. Uretskaya] Our discussion has taken a sort of accusatory slant from the outset. Some people are assuming the role of judge, others the role of defendant. We shall not get to the truth in this way. And the truth is that each of us understands what has to be done to rectify the situation, to raise the prestige of the military service and thereby reduce the number of draft dodgers.

I am personally hurt to the quick by the following: Every year the nation conducts a registration of young men who have matured and taken wing, as they say. But has any of us heard about it on the radio or television or read about it in a newspaper or magazine? Of course not. The mass media are always publicizing the shortages, corruption and "dedovshchina" in the army. The latter is relished with a certain satisfaction, particularly by certain press organs. It is as though they see this as the key to the restructuring. And where are the colorful pamphlets on the military schools which offer the youth various specialties? They are absent. You can read about the cooperatives or hear about them on television from morning to night. In this situation we will hardly see the day when our young men report willingly to the military commissariats.

[I. Taran] Comrade Grebenkov skilfully countered all criticism leveled at him in connection with the growing incidence of draft evasion. He explained that the procuracy is not an executive agency but an oversight agency for monitoring the observance of existing laws by individuals, organizations and establishments. That is a fact. But there is another matter: the state of that oversight.

In my opinion, it falls below all the requirements in our rayon. It is totally lacking on the part of enterprise heads, responsible by law for the initial military training of the working youth. They bear no accountability for their inaction. Judge for yourselves. We managed with great difficulty to set up a joint training center for children who enter the work force after the 8th grade. There were 124 of them last year, 70 of whom work at enterprises in other Moscow rayons.

By law all of them must take the NVP [initial military training] course, but in fact only around 20 visit the center. The rest do not attend, and no one in the rayon is disturbed by this. Neither the administrators with a duty to implement the Law on Universal Military Duty nor the procuracy.

It is particularly difficult to deal with the heads of enterprises in other rayons at which our young men work. They simply do not want to talk with us. We have our own agencies, they say, and you do not tell us what to do. The matter could be resolved by the city military commissariat, to which we have appealed. This is the response we received: "Show more independence, initiative and creativity. You have to work out your own difficulties." It has gone on like this for years. The classrooms at the training center are empty, the future fightingmen are ignored, and everyone pretends that nothing in particular is happening.

[V. Sinyutin] The situation is indeed complicated. And this is in a rayon which was designated one of the best with respect to NVP in 1989. One issue of our magazine told how thousands of draftees are entering the army without NVP. Naturally, this is greatly affecting the group of replenishments entering the army and navy.

We have recently also published articles rebuffing ideologically harmful articles appearing in the magazine OGONEK and the newspaper MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS. From the content of these press organs, which distort the role of the Armed Forces in the life of our society, sprout the seeds of nihilism, apathy, political indifference and dependence.

To rectify the situation the CPSU Central Committee passed a decree on the establishment of military consultants to the press organs, radio and television to improve the level of patriotic propaganda and instill a love for the homeland and the Armed Forces.

A great deal could be done locally, however. It is embarrassing to visit the rayon induction center. But this is where the young men begin to learn about the army and

its ways, where they meet the people in shoulderboards. What sort of impression does it make on the draftee? Clearly a negative one.

Initiative is what we lack. A council of former soldier/internationalists operates in Moscow's Timiryazevskiy Rayon, for example. The activists have become involved at as many as 10 schools and special vocational and technical schools and set up sections there. A good thing? Unquestionably. But it is being disseminated sluggishly.

Or take this matter. A total of 70% of the articles published in our magazine are oriented toward boys and girls. We are the only organ in the nation covering NVP matters and the applied sports. Only individual students read VOYENNYE ZNANIYA, however. The military instructors and the chairman of primary DOSAAF organizations make little use of it in their work with the children.

[S. Laktionov] Many NVP activities are not conducted because they lack the financial support. We need to set up a "Draftee" fund in the rayon, let us say. The money for it should come from enterprises, organizations and even private parties who are concerned about the nation's future. We could then set up clubs for special activities and build sports facilities where the kids could develop the qualities needed in the army. I believe that the draft evasion rate would drop as a result.

Take the members of the Young Paratrooper club headed by former soldier/internationalist A. Sorokin. After two years of participation in club activities all of the members want to join the army. Why? Why because they have self-confidence and are not afraid either of "dedovshchina" (they can rebuff anyone) or the physical load. But take a look at the club's circumstances. It is squeezed into a basement. For three years A. Sorokin has left no stone unturned in his attempt to get rayon establishments to turn over to him the building of a former kindergarten on Perovskaya Street. It is vacant, but they will not turn over the keys to the Young Paratrooper. That is a pity. I believe that the rayon ispolkom and the party rayon should work more vigorously toward preparing the youth for the military service.

[Yu. Yakovlev] It is the opinion of the rayon induction commission, of which I am a member, that most draftees are totally indifferent toward the nation's political life and the military service. Such sentiments are to a certain degree produced in the youth by the publication of negative articles on the Armed Forces. And just look at what the video stores offer: disgusting pictures of sex, violence and cruelty. Film director S. Govorukhin is right when he says that while we cannot catch up with America with respect to meat and milk, as soon as the opportunity presented itself we immediately moved ahead in the area of violence, sex and pornography. We are now reaping the fruits produced with a common effort: increased hooliganism, crime and draft evasion, which have become a common thing.

In my opinion, the legal education of the draftees is conducted at an intolerably low level, which is contributing to the increase in draft evasion. Workers with law-enforcement agencies and in the justice system must present lectures and conduct talks at schools, special vocational and technical schools and tekhnikums. We need to print a special booklet for draftees (I address this suggestion primarily to the journalists and legal specialists present) which would explain the rights and duties of the future soldiers and possible drastic situations which might be encountered in the army, especially at the beginning. In general, we need to think and to act. Only then will we be able to eliminate the things which are disturbing us.

[M. Matakini] We military legal specialists are greatly in arrears to the draftees. We do little analyzing and are not working out needed recommendations. For now, we are only registering the negative. Most of the young men do indeed enter the army in total legal ignorance. This aspect receives almost no attention in the schools and other educational institutions. We need special literature written for the future fightingmen, of course. Comrade Yakovlev is right about that.

Everyone is concerned about how we can enhance the army's prestige. Glasnost has illuminated many negative aspects of the military collectives: authoritarianism on the part of superiors, corruption and crime. This is especially true of the construction troops, which provide free labor for many ministries and departments. For your information, the matter of separating them from the Armed Forces is presently being considered.

Measures are presently being worked out to convert the Navy to a 2-year service term. In addition, a draft Law on Defense and amendments to the Law on Universal Military Duty have been prepared, which are to more precisely define all of the urgent matters pertaining to the NVP.

[S. Sankovskiy] Last year around 60 officers and more than 20 warrant officers died at the hands of criminals. This is the society's attitude toward the army and military personnel, who find themselves legally unprotected. At the present time we are only making our way toward the adoption of a statute defining their status within the state.

The draftees are the ones most deprived of rights, however. We need to recognize this and work out a solid legal basis for their status. We must enhance the prestige of the NVP. Why not work out specific incentives for the young men, the military instructors and directors for success in this work? Pay increments, for example, and other types of material incentives?

[V. Shestakov] The youth's negative regard for the military service has reached the critical point. Such a thing has never existed before. The diagnosis of the comrades who have previously spoken is correct: a decline of morals in the society and deterioration of the patriotic indoctrination of the youth. Anonymous sociological



polls of draftees conducted in the cities of Tashkent, Lvov, Fergana and Kishinev have shown that 21-25% do not want to serve, every fourth one plans to form his own ethnic group in the army, 30% have no interest in NVP, and they are not familiar with the military occupations. Only a fourth of them have met the GTO [ready for work and defense] standards, and only every other one believes that he is capable of bearing the hardships of military service. Many of them fear "dedovshchina" and are afraid of being ridiculed.

I must state that decisive steps have reduced the incidence of ridicule and deprecation of the personal dignity of the young soldiers.

With respect to the draft deserters, this has to do with the climate of all-forgiveness. There were hundreds in Moscow last year, while only three were convicted. And not one information agency reacted to that. Any commentary would be superfluous.

Also speaking during the discussion were school directors, military instructors and heads of military-patriotic associations. The overall attitude was that we need to stop talking and do something, to deal specifically with the problems of the youth. It is the sacred duty of every citizen of the homeland to serve in the ranks of the Armed Forces. This is the way it has been and the way it must be.

Draft evaders are the same as deserters. The full force of the law must be applied to them.

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#### **Lithuanian Military Commissar Discusses Spring Draft**

90UM0751A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian  
19 May 90 p 2

[Interview with Maj Gen Algimantas Visockis, military commissar of Lithuania, by ELTA correspondent A. Mankevicius: "Only in Accordance With the Laws of the USSR"]

[Text] Maj Gen Algimantas Visockis, military commissar of Lithuania, did not immediately agree to be interviewed. He warned us that he is a military man and carries out orders only from the USSR Minister of Defense.

[Mankevicius] Operations of the military commissariats in Lithuania were suspended. They are not receiving material support. Just how are they operating now?

[Visockis] They are operating the same as before. All the military commissariats are a part of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Baltic Military District and carry out only their orders. Until they order these establishments to be shut down, the latter will continue to operate.

The military draft comprises only one fifth of our work, which includes paying pensions to servicemen and their families, providing them with apartments and handling matters pertaining to various benefits.

We devote a great deal of attention to the search for the burial sites of those who died and the graves of their children and other family members. We have to locate the documents of those who were in POW camps in Lithuania and those hospitalized following the war. We keep registries of all men between the ages of 14 and 60. Should they be destroyed?

Will Lithuania not have a need for these documents?

[Mankevicius] You previously stated that you were against Lithuania's withdrawal from the USSR. From what you have said, however, you seem not to rule out the possibility that Lithuania will become an independent state. Does this mean that the status of the Soviet Army in the republic might change?

[Visockis] Say what you may, but Lithuania will not survive without the Armed Forces of the USSR. I do not believe that the republic authorities will ever ask the army to leave. Why do I say this? Because Lithuania is not in a position to maintain an army. That requires a great deal, and everything is too expensive today. I believe, for example, that at least a couple of divisions from the USSR should be kept on the Soviet-Polish border. Why? For a long time there was a confrontation of two forces, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, which did not attempt to test each other. As soon as Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia become independent, however, and Poland and Germany stand on their own, territorial questions will surface.

[Mankevicius] While an opponent of Lithuania's independence, you still seem to be modeling a situation, as it were, in which an independent Lithuania could exist. But the youth are still being drafted into the Armed Forces of the USSR.

[Visockis] I do not doubt that recognition of Lithuania's independence will come about in accordance with the laws of the USSR. The youth are therefore bound to obey them for the next 5-10 years. Those who do not enter the army this year will answer before the law. Approximately half of 5,800 draftees have now been approved by the medical commissions and will be drafted into the army before 19 June. Most of them will serve in the Baltic area; the rest, in the Ground Forces in the European part of the USSR (they will not serve in the border or missile forces, naval or railway units or those of the Ministry of Internal Affairs). Those who do not show up will be arrested. The police, the procuracy and the courts of the USSR constitute a large force. I am confident that no one will succeed in evading the service!



Maj Gen A. Visockis ended the interview by saying that all the problems would be solved if presidential government were introduced as rapidly as possible and a situation created in which no Union republic could ever leave the USSR.

### Georgia: Law on Labor (Alternative) Service

90UM0751B Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian  
3 Jul 90 p 1

[Law of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic on Labor (Alternative) Service, issued 20 June 1990 by the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium]

#### [Text] Chapter I. GENERAL PROVISIONS

**Article 1.** Labor service is an alternative to military service. It constitutes a labor obligation of a citizen of the Georgian SSR to serve at enterprises and organizations of the Georgian SSR.

**Article 2.** Labor service implies the performance of heavy, auxiliary jobs (involving harmful or dangerous conditions) particularly important to the society, as well as jobs involved in mopping up after accidents and other natural disasters.

**Article 3.** Citizens of the Georgian SSR between the ages of 18 and 27 years who are on the military register and are subject to induction for active military duty but who refuse to serve in the Armed Forces for political or religious reasons or on pacifist grounds.

**Article 4.** The term of labor service is 24 months; 12 months for graduates of higher educational institutions.

Following the performance of labor service, labor reservists may be drafted under a labor mobilization for a period of up to three months to participate in mopping up operations following accidents, natural or ecological disasters in the absence of the grounds specified in Part II of Article 8 of this Law.

**Article 5.** Citizens perform labor service within Georgia at locations specified by labor service commissions.

**Article 6.** Upon being registered for labor service, a citizen is exempted from military service.

A military reservist has the right, on the grounds specified in Article 3 of this Law, to refuse military service and demand to be registered for labor service.

**Article 7.** The following are not drafted for labor service:

- 1) individuals who have performed their compulsory military service;
- 2) individuals unsuitable for active military duty for reasons of health;
- 3) disabled individuals in groups I and II;
- 4) individuals judged handicapped by a court;

- 5) citizens with military draft deferments;
- 6) full-time students at higher educational institutions;
- 7) students at religious educational institutions;
- 8) members of the clergy.

**Article 8.** Labor reservists are removed from the labor service registries upon reaching the age of 50 years.

Labor reservists are removed from the registry early, if they:

- a) have become unsuitable for labor service due to deteriorated health;
- b) have suffered a group I or II disability;
- c) are judged handicapped by a court.

#### Chapter II. INDUCTION FOR LABOR SERVICE

**Article 9.** Induction for labor service is organized and monitored by the Main Labor Service Commission under the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers.

Rayon (city) labor service commissions are set up under the ispolkoms of rayon (city) soviets of people's deputies.

**Article 10.** Citizens refusing on the grounds indicated in Article 3 of this Law to serve in the Armed Forces submit a request to perform labor service to the rayon (city) labor service commission at their place of residence prior to the next induction for active military duty.

The rayon (city) labor service commission is required to consider the request and render a decision within 10 days.

From the moment an affirmative decision is rendered the citizen is considered a labor reservist and is accordingly exempted from registering for the draft at the military commissariat.

**Article 11.** If the citizen's request is approved, the rayon (city) labor service commission sends a copy of its decision to the citizen concerned and to the appropriate military commissariat within a 3-day period.

**Article 12.** The procedure for the organization and the functioning of a rayon (city) commission and the Main Labor Service Commission is defined by the Statute on Labor (Alternative) Service Commissions passed by the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers.

#### Chapter III. THE PROCEDURE FOR RESOLVING DISPUTES

**Chapter 13.** A refusal by a rayon (city) labor service commission to draft an individual for labor service may be appealed to the Main Labor Service Commission within a 10-day period from the time of the refusal. The Main Labor Service Commission reviews the complaint within a 14-day period from the date the request is received.

If the citizen does not agree with the decision of the Main Labor Service Commission, he may appeal to the rayon (city) people's court by the procedure and within the deadlines established in the Civil Procedural Code of the Georgian SSR.

A decision of a rayon (city) people's court may be appealed by the procedure and within the deadlines set by civilian legal procedure.

**Article 14.** Prior to final resolution of the dispute, the citizen is not subject to the draft for compulsory military duty.

**Chapter 15.** If the citizen's request is not approved, the citizen may not submit [another] request on the same grounds.

#### Chapter IV. THE PERFORMANCE OF LABOR SERVICE

**Article 16.** A decision by a labor service commission is grounds for induction into labor service.

**Article 17.** At the instruction of the labor service commission the labor reservist is sent to a work site designated by that commission.

The labor reservist is required to report to that work site and by that date specified by the commission.

**Article 18.** Based on the instructions of the labor service commission, the administration of the enterprise, establishment or organization is required to conclude an agreement with the labor reservist by the procedure specified in labor laws.

The term of labor service is calculated from the day the citizen is accepted for the job, of which fact the administration informs the appropriate labor service commission.

Labor service is added to the citizen's overall length of service.

**Chapter 19.** The procedure and the terms for the performance of labor service are defined in the Statute on Labor Service passed by the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers.

#### Chapter V. GROUNDS FOR TERMINATING LABOR SERVICE

**Chapter 20.** The following are grounds for terminating labor service:

- 1) early release of a citizen from labor service;
- 2) completion of the labor service within the established period.

**Article 21.** The matter of early release from labor service is decided by the Main Labor Service Commission at the recommendation of the appropriate rayon (city) labor service commission in the following instances:

- 1) deterioration of the citizen's health making it impossible for him to continue to perform labor service;
- 2) the individual suffers a group I or II disability;
- 3) the individual becomes the only breadwinner for the family;
- 4) a second child is born;
- 5) imprisonment for a period of more than three years; imprisonment for a period of less than three years if the individual turns twenty-seven while serving the sentence;
- 6) the individual requests to serve in the Armed Forces.

Early release from labor service is reported to the appropriate military commissariat.

**Article 22.** The terms and the grounds for terminating labor service are defined in the Statute on Labor Service.

**Article 23.** The appropriate rayon (city) labor service commission reports to the administration of the enterprise, institution or organization on the date of completion of the citizen's labor service no later than 1 month prior to the citizen's completion of the labor (alternative) service.

**Article 24.** If, upon completion of the labor service, the citizen expresses a desire to [continue] working at the same enterprise or establishment or in the same organization, he concludes a new agreement with the administration in accordance with labor law.

**Article 25.** After completing his labor service a labor reservist has the right to return to the job he performed prior to his induction.

#### Chapter VI. CONCLUDING PROVISIONS

**Article 26.** Questions of responsibility pertaining to labor (alternative) service are decided in accordance with current legislation.

**Article 27.** This law remains in force in case of martial law or military operations, unless new legislation is enacted.

#### Decree of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet on Labor (Alternative) Service

The Supreme Soviet of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic decrees:

1. that the Presidium of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet is to work out and approve the procedure for placing into effect the Law of the Georgian SSR On Labor (Alternative) Service;

2. that the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers

—is to work out the Statute on the Procedure and the Terms for Performing Labor (Alternative) Service and on the Labor (Alternative) Service Commissions.

- is to specify the list of jobs (construction, transport, municipal services, public health and others) particularly important to the society and the list of jobs involved in mopping up after accidents and natural or economic disasters at which citizens performing labor (alternative) service are to work;
- to call for corresponding changes in the plan for the republic's economic and social development.

### Summary Results of Spring Draft

90UM0843A Moscow SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH  
in Russian 24 Jul 90 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Telltale Statistics": "Summary Results of the Spring Draft"]

[Text] According to data from the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, 96 percent of the quota for the unionwide spring draft was fulfilled (including the Baltic republics, whose independence is being ignored by the Ministry of Defense). True, this figure is somewhat at variance with the following figure, taken from the same source. At present, the USSR Armed Forces are 400,000 men under strength. If one considers that this personnel shortage arose due to those who did not report to induction centers this year, it turns out that the Soviet Armed Forces would number 10,000,000 men in all.

This is somewhat out of line with previously published data. Perhaps this shortage has been accumulating for many years. If so, why hasn't it been discussed anywhere before? Be that as it may, 400,000 men is quite a number. Won't the defense capability of the nation suffer from this? It turns out, not very much, since, in the words of a representative from the General Staff, the shortage has made itself felt basically in the manning of motor transport battalions for hauling grain. This year we managed to provide drivers only for every fourth vehicle. We had to call upon reservists for the rest of the vehicles. Of course, this also is not good. Grain must be transported. Nevertheless, let us hope that in the very near future servicemen will not have to engage in work that is outside of their purview.

A most unfavorable situation regarding the draft has arisen in the Baltic and Transcaucasian republics. In Estonia the draft was extended for two weeks, but all the same more than half of the unit-assigned reservists did not report to induction centers. In Lithuania the scene is the same. In Armenia and Georgia this index is even more distressing. The draft has practically been reduced to naught there. The same symptoms are being observed in Moldavia, the Ukraine, Belorussia, and in the RSFSR. True, the number of personnel not reporting to induction centers in those places is small on the whole, but a tendency toward growth is evident.

### **Shortage of Trawlers Hinders Minelaying Training**

90UM08594 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
17 Aug 90 First Edition p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Captain 1st Rank A. Zlydnev: "Critical Situation in Military Readiness: Mines Laid by... Hydrographers"]

[Text] Officers of the training department of the Leningrad Naval Base told me of their troubles: the base has lost its trawlers. They have been deactivated because they have exceeded their service-life and not yet replaced. So have they suspended training? No, they've found a way out of a difficult situation. For instance in violation of the requirements of the regulations for the task of laying "mine" clusters they use harbor trawlers, which are not fitted out for the mission, in order to continue training missions. In heavy weather they have to call in... hydrographic ships, whose crews know about minesweeping, as they say, by word of mouth. It goes without saying that these exercises cannot be expected to be of high quality.

The officers complain that the situation is, at the very least, alarming. The highest naval authorities know of

the situation. For the last seven years the command of the base has repeatedly requested that the coastal defense forces be bolstered with much-needed ships. But as of this date the request has not been answered. It is unknown if it will be answered in the near future either. It is somewhat encouraging that the reference report prepared by a group of officers of the Navy's Combat Training [Directorate] led by Vice Admiral A. Kuzmin for the Commander-In-Chief included this problem.

Only time can tell how it will turn out. It is to be hoped that it will not drag on for years. This is a possibility that the officers would find all the more distasteful in view of the two trawlers that are in Leningrad right now. These ships could at least partially assuage the situation. They were recently built for sale to a friendly country, but for some reason the sale did not go through.

The timing would be perfect if these ships could be turned over to the base. The crews could perform their first training mission and start their jobs this year on them rather than spending a long time transferring to another fleet. Of course the Naval Main Staff knows better where the ships should be sent, but they really are desperately needed here.



**Review: Anfilov on German Defeat at Moscow**

90UM0530B Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 26 Apr 90 First Edition p 2

[Review by Major Yu. Rubtsov of the books by V.A. Anfilov "Krusheniye pokhoda Gitlera na Moskvu, 1941" [Collapse of Hitler's Campaign Against Moscow, 1941], Moscow, Nauka, 1989, 351 pages, 1 ruble 40 kopecks, and "Nezabyvayemyy sorok pervyy" [Unforgettable 1941], Moscow, Sov. Rossiya, 2d Revised and Enlarged Edition, 1989, 368 pages, price 1 ruble 20 kopecks]

[Text] The phrase "Don't go to Moscow...", according to the assertion of the English Field Marshal Montgomery, is "the first rule inscribed on the first page of the war book." Each person who has endeavored to escape this has inevitably suffered the fiercest defeat. The last to try this was the unsuccessful builder of the "Thousand-Year Reich"...

The events linking the collapse of Hitler's offensive against Moscow and which brought the blitzkrieg strategy to bankruptcy are the subject of two books written by Doctor of Historical Sciences, Prof. Col (Ret) V.A. Anfilov and which were published on the threshold of the 45th anniversary of the victory.

A person would err if he felt that the books of such a close subject matter overlap. In no way. We, the readers, do not have such a frequent opportunity to watch how one author simultaneously plays two roles. In "Collapse of the Campaign...", Anfilov is a strict, emotionally restrained historian but in "Unforgettable 1941" he is an excellent historical writer and a truly passionate chronicler.

Whatever stage in the first period of the war, whatever engagement of 1941 Anfilov is examining—the battles in the border area, the Smolensk Engagement, the tragedy of the Southwestern Front, Kiev which was defended to the end or the Moscow Battle, he searches in them for the material and spiritual sources of the objective impossibility of our defeat. The further the enemy pushes into the interior of the Russian land, the stronger—remembering Lev Tolstoy—the club of the people's war drove it to a halt. "The losses of the attackers," the author quotes an entry from the combat log of the Gepner Group enveloping Mozhaysk, "are very high.... A further offensive will bog down. From here to the Kremlin it is 84 km. The goal of the offensive is so close and at the same time unattainably far."

Let us not forget—and the material of the reviewed books shows this clearly—that because of our heavy losses in killed, wounded and captured, the enemy's numerical superiority became even greater than at the beginning of the war and that the hurried evacuation of industry into the rear weakened our economic potential. As at no time previously, the outcome of the clash would be determined by the strength of the people's spirit.

The words of the author describing the dramatic pages of the defense of Moscow are full of harsh truth. On 7 October, the loop of encirclement caught a significant portion of the troops of the Western and Reserve Fronts. Headquarters did not have major reserves in the Moscow region. The worst days fraught with uncertainty came for the capital. A disaster was avoided because, the author feels, our command was able to make full use of the diverting of the main enemy forces by the Soviet troops fighting in an encirclement to the west of Vyazma and Bryansk. During this time, a new strategic defensive perimeter was established. Its line was split and bent, it gave way, reaching the gates of the capital, but the enemy was unable to breach it.

"By the committing of the strategic reserves to the engagement at the end of November," writes Anfilov, "the Soviet Supreme High Command gradually changed the balance of forces and seized initiative in its hands. This fact marked the beginning of the turning point in the course of the entire war." On 5 December, the counteroffensive by our troops commenced.

...The tragedy of ideas often involves the tragedy of humans. Even in 1966, the Publishing House Nauka was preparing to set the book of V.A. Anfilov "Bessmertnyy podvig" [An Immortal Feat], where he voiced many views which were reflected in the books we are describing but, we should say frankly, did not fit within the then atmosphere of the commenced move to rehabilitate Stalinism. Moreover, Viktor Aleksandrovich [Anfilov], in speaking at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, made his ideas felt in assessing the initial period of the war and this diverted from the official viewpoint. The result was not long in coming and Anfilov, who by that time was a senior instructor at the Military Academy of the General Staff and a graduate of three military academies and a promising scientist, was discharged into the reserves. The bookplates were broken up.

To the honor of Viktor Aleksandrovich, he found within himself the strength to endure. He defended a doctoral dissertation and became a professor. He settled up with his "offenders" as a real scientist should, by books. The subject of the heroic defense of Moscow has become the main one in his scientific creativity. The presently reviewed books show this yet again.

**Description of 1960 Shoot-Down of Powers' U-2**

90UM0530A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
27 Apr 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Lt-Col A. Dokuchayev, KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Duel In the Stratosphere: How the Spy Flight of F. Powers Was Stopped"]

[Text] At 0853 hours on 1 May 1960, over Sverdlovsk, Soviet missile troops destroyed the American spy plane piloted by Powers. The pilot bailed out. And 30 minutes later, the test pilot, Sr Lt Sergey Safronov, who had sortied to intercept the target, perished tragically....

Today we, for the first time, are describing in detail the dramatic events of 30 years ago.

Khrushchev was nervous on the reviewing stand of the Mausoleum. However, restraining his feelings, he smiled cordially at the columns of Muscovites who had turned out for the First of May parade. Early in the morning, he had been informed that a foreign aircraft had crossed the state frontier in the south and at a great height was traveling toward the Urals. What was the purpose of the mission and who had initiated it? What if the aircraft was carrying weapons? There was no answer to these questions. The decision was taken to stop the flight, but....

Nikita Sergeyevich called over MSU Biryuzov who was on the reviewing stand and ordered:

"Sergey Semenovitch find out how things are going...."

The Marshal returned but did not bring good news. Then a person who was carefully watching the reviewing stand could see Khrushchev shaking hands with one of the military leaders. Having left the mausoleum a second time, the then Commander-in-Chief of the National Air Defense Troops brought back joyous news that the aircraft had been downed with the first missile. And Khrushchev immediately, on the reviewing stand, congratulated the Marshal.

...The start of the drama-packed event was at 0536 hours. At that moment the American reconnaissance aircraft, a Lockheed U-2 which had taken off from the Peshawar Airfield in Pakistan crossed into the USSR in the Kirovabad area. The 30-year-old pilot, Senior Lieutenant in the U.S. Air Force, Francis Powers, had a difficult task: to cross the territory of the Soviet Union from the region of the Pamir to the Kola Peninsula in the aim of reconnoitering military and industrial installations for the purpose of photographing them and disclosing the radar network. In order not to give himself away, the pilot was strictly prohibited from maintaining radio contact both with the airfield in Peshawar and with the American Base in Injirlike (Turkey), where the 10-10 spy air subunit was stationed.

The former military pilot, Major (Ret) Boris Grayrovich Ayvazyan related:

"I recall those times, the colds which were bone chilling.... Each day there was a combat alert. And this was in the center of the nation. The American aircraft were causing concern. On 9 April, one violated the frontier in the south. Moreover, air balloons were being launched following the jetstream. We shot them down. We were constantly at the airfield, in our pressurized suits ready for an immediate sortie. It was particularly difficult for Captain Gennadiy Gusev, the commander of the interceptor squadron as they were on duty most of all. The MIG-19 with radar had not then been mastered by all of us...."

Would it be possible to stop the spy plane before the Urals? Certainly, but only in the areas where the antiaircraft missile complexes were located. And later, commented Marshal of the Soviet Union R.Ya. Malinovskiy, the aircraft was downed at a place where the pilot could not give the excuse of an accidental violation of our airspace. In a word, the combat mission had to be carried out by the Urals.

"No one was certain that we could guarantee a downing of the target," recalled the former pilot, Col (Ret) N. Gorlov, and hence our nervous tension. Everyone was excited from the commander of the air defense fighter aviation Gen Yevgeniy Yakovlevich Savitskiy down to the ordinary pilot and missileman. The target was traveling too high...."

On that day, May 1st, the alert duty was being stood by the deputy squadron commander, Capt Boris Ayvazyan and the pilot Sr Lt Sergey Safronov. Upon the combat alert they scrambled at 0703 hours. Some 32 minutes later they were at the airfield of Koltsova in Sverdlovsk. And then.... Let us give the floor to B. Ayvazyan, a direct participant in those events:

"In Sverdlovsk the aircraft immediately began refueling. The tanks of Sergey's fighter were filling faster. As the leader, I shifted to his aircraft ready to take off upon orders to intercept the enemy. However, the take-off was delayed for 1 hour and 8 minutes (the pilot had kept his flight sheet.—A.D.). Suddenly, a Su-9 aircraft appeared at the airfield and Capt Mityagin had flown the fighter from the plant to the unit. The aircraft was more advanced than the MIG-19 and most importantly it had an operating ceiling of up to 20,000 m. In truth, it was not ready for fighting as it lacked weapons and the pilot did not have a pressure suit.

"At the command post they had accurately determined the altitude of the invader aircraft and realized that only the Su-9 could reach it. Capt Mityagin was ordered to intercept the U-2 on the approaches to Sverdlovsk. Over the open radio I heard the conversations between the command post and the pilot. 'The task is to destroy the target, to ram it,' came the voice of the fighter controller. There was a second of silence and then: 'Dragon (the code name of Savitskiy) ordered this.'

"I do not know whether Savitskiy himself had phoned or whether the order was reinforced by his name, but I realized that the pilot was doomed and was going to a certain death. To execute a ram at such an altitude without a pressure suit and without an oxygen mask.... Obviously, the command had no other alternative at that moment. 'But what about missiles?' a reader might argue. The problem was that the assault was to be carried out to the south of Sverdlovsk. The pilot could skirt the city and avoid the positions of the missile battalions.

"Switching on his afterburner, Capt Mityagin reached the altitude of Powers. 'Distance is 10 km, 8...the target is ahead of us,' reported the radio. Mityagin could not see the target and his aircraft began to fly past the U-2 as

the speeds were different. The controller became muddled and demanded that the pilot switch off the afterburner. 'I cannot switch off the afterburner,' replied Mityagin. 'Switch off the afterburner,' the controller shouted, 'Dragon has ordered this.' Mityagin switched off the afterburner and the aircraft in reducing speed lost altitude. And he could not regain it as his fuel was running out. 'Come in for a landing,' came the next command for him, and for us it was a take-off.

"We took off. Powers was somewhere above us, but where? I looked all around but there was no one. In those seconds, I spotted an explosion and five spots dropping toward the ground. If only I had realized then that this was the breaking up U-2. I took the explosion as the self-destruction of the missile and informed the command post of this. Powers' aircraft understandably was not found as it had already been destroyed by the missilemen. And if he had continued his flight, would we have detected him? I could have reached an altitude of 20,000 m (the ceiling of the MIG was 2,000-3,000 lower) using a combat hump. In truth, there was one chance in a thousand of spotting the aircraft at the peak and launching the missiles. However, we were going to try it...."

Let us interrupt the story of Boris Grayrovich and move to the antiaircraft missile unit near Sverdlovsk.

"The missile troops received the order to destroy the target with excitement," related Maj Gen (Ret) Semen Potapovich Panzhinskiy, at that time the chief of the political department. "The duties of the commander (Lt Col I. Shishov was away on a training mission) were being carried out by the battalion chief of staff, Maj Mikhail Romanovich Voronov. He was a frontline veteran. He had fought the Nazis on the Don, at Kursk and Warsaw.... The operators of the acquisition and guidance radar, Sgt V. Yagushkin, Pfc V. Nekrasov and Pvt A. Khabargin had accurately determined the target data. Communication between the command posts was stretched to a peak. By that time, the guidance officer Lt Eduard Feldblyum and the operators headed by Sgt Valeriy Shuster were steadily tracking the enemy. Suddenly there came the voice of Voronov: 'Destroy target.' The launchers, the crew of Sgt A. Fedorov worked flawlessly. Wreathed in flames, the missile, scorching the earth, rushed up toward the unknown aircraft.

"And then...then came a delay. The second and third missiles did not leave the launcher. What was the matter? A breakdown? Questions were arising for Voronov. There was an immediate report to Col S. Gayderov. The chief engineer of the unit, Maj V. Vorovtsov, who was with Gayderov recommended: 'Look at the blocking angle.' What had happened was extremely rare: the guidance cabin was between the missile and the aircraft and Voronov breathed easier as the reason for the delay was objective. And in the meanwhile the missile had reached its target."

Powers at his trial related:

"All of a sudden I heard a dull explosion and saw an orange glow. The aircraft all of a sudden nosed down

and, as it seemed, its wings and tail broke off. I do not know precisely in what position my aircraft was falling as during the fall I could see only the sky.... The idea flashed into my mind that possibly the engine had exploded but I looked forward and saw that the engine was alright. I think this happened at an elevation of approximately 68,000 feet...."

Powers did not even try to blow up the aircraft (the button was next to the seat), however in accord with the CIA instructions, he was obliged to do this. Three pounds of cyclonite would have blown not only the aircraft but also the pilot to smithereens.

The missile exploded behind the aircraft and its fragments shattered the tail and wings but did not touch the cockpit. Powers made his way out of the falling aircraft and used his parachute. Seconds before this, Capt Nikolay Sheludko, the commander of the adjacent battalion, received orders to fire on the U-2 again as a guarantee of the hit was required. The battalion fired but the missiles reached just the fragments of the aircraft.

On the radar screens the target dissolved into interference. The guidance officer of the Voronov combat crew, Sr Lt Feldblyum, decided that this had been used by the enemy in escaping somehow from the missile, possibly by dropping a container with metal strips. Voronov agreed with this view. Mikhail Romanovich himself described it as follows:

"In actuality, the screen was covered with aircraft fragments, particularly as after the volley of the Sheludko battalion there were even more of them. Minutes later, we realized that these actually were fragments dropping to the ground. We reported to the unit command post and then up the line of command." But there they felt that the enemy, in using jamming, was still continuing the flight. In a word, the final report on the destruction of the U-2 came only when Powers descended on his parachute, approximately 30 minutes later.

Over 30 minutes after the destruction of the target, at the command post they still considered that the enemy target was continuing its flight. Specialists from the radio technical battalion (it was headed by Lt Col I. Repin) were also confused by the passive interference. And for this reason, the fighter pilots who reached the new area were given the previous mission of attacking the enemy if detected. In a turn, Ayvazyan explained, he suddenly lost contact with his wingman. Sergey Safronov was silent. In the clear sky Ayvazyan saw an unusual cloud and dived abruptly. This saved his life.

In the battalion under the command of Maj A. Shugayev, they perceived the appearing blip from the fighters as the enemy target which had dropped to 11,000 m. They reported to the command post and from there orders were issued from Maj Gen I. Solodovnikov to open fire. Maj Voronov reported the destruction of the U-2 a little later.



Sr Lt Safronov was killed in the sight of many citizens who had come out for the May Day parade. He was 30, the same age as Francis Powers. He came from the suburban Moscow town of Gus-Khrustalnyy. He had completed the Borisoglebsk Military Pilot School imeni V.P. Chkalov. He had mastered the LA-5 and three versions of MIGs.

The son of Sergey Safronov, Aleksandr, is now older than his father when he died. The mother, Anna Vasilyevna, raised him along with Boris Grayrovich Ayvazyan, whom she subsequently married.

In May 1960, an Ukase was promulgated on decorating the soldiers for the destruction of the spy aircraft. Some 21 persons were awarded orders and medals. Orders of the Red Banner were presented to Sr Lt Sergey Ivanovich Safronov (the word "posthumously" was omitted) and the battalion commanders, Nikolay Ivanovich Sheludko and Maj Mikhail Romanovich Voronov. For Voronov the Commander-in-Chief of the National Air Defense Troops, Mar Biryuzov, twice wrote a petition for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, but both times he tore up the document already signed by him, swearing as he should have reported 10 minutes earlier. At present, it is now clear that the reason for the increased dynamism and a certain lack of coordination in actions was not a lack of experience or the unusual nature of the combat duel. The antiaircraft missile units had just been constituted and they were just learning how to control them, together with the fighter aviation, and the necessary air defense structures were in the process of organization.

At the same time, a guaranteed, dependable hitting of a high-altitude air target over the Urals shows that the wagering on force, on superiority in one or another type of weapons, particularly in a rivalry between great powers, is not a promising undertaking. Some 30 years ago, the Americans wagered on the advanced nature of their aviation equipment. The U-2 was a subsonic, single-seat monoplane but.... It was equipped with a Pratt and Whitney high-altitude turbojet engine making it possible to reach altitudes of 20,000-22,000 m. Overseas they considered that the Soviets could not do anything.

They understood that the Powers flight would be viewed by the leadership of our nation and the Armed Forces not merely as a reconnaissance flight which somehow could be "swallowed," but rather something more. A

complete flight across would show that the Soviet Union was unprotected against aviation operating at high altitudes. By that time, the United States, along with the series-produced B-52, had begun turning out the new strategic bomber B-58 Hustler with an operating ceiling of 21,000 m. The Royal Air Force was armed with the medium bombers Valiant, Victor and Vulcan with a ceiling of 19,000 m.

However, overseas they underestimated the capabilities of the USSR. The merits of high-altitude aircraft were equalized by the antiaircraft missile complex which we had introduced. The missile could hit targets at altitudes over 25,000 m. In the air units they began introducing the Su-9 high-altitude fighter capable of reaching the Powers altitudes. Yes, our pilots were short several months so that then, in May 1960, they could have effectively employed the interceptors. But the interceptors did exist and in the regiments of the air defense fighter aviation, intense combat training was underway.

And what were the fates of the main characters in that memorable duel? The missile troops and pilots as of now live in different corners of the nation. All the officers are retired and some have died. The other pilot flying with Sr Lt Safronov, Boris Grayrovich Ayvazyan, is a Muscovite. The commander of the battalion launch battery which hit the target, Nikolay Ivanovich Kolosov, lives in Sverdlovsk and is a colonel (retired). Eduard Emilevich Feldblyum lives in Kazan. Mikhail Romanovich Voronov is in Tuapse. He was transferred from the post of battalion chief of staff to the combat command bodies of a field force. There he served five years. He was elected a delegate to the 22d CPSU Congress. In 1966, he was discharged due to reasons of health.

And the fate of Powers? The Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court in an open session of 19 August 1960, sentenced him to 10 years of loss of liberty with the serving of the first three years of the sentence in prison. However, on 10 February 1962, on the Glinikebruke Bridge linking the GDR capital and West Berlin near Potsdam, the Soviet side exchanged him for the intelligence officer Rudolf Abel. Upon his return to the United States, Powers worked in the CIA. On 2 August 1977, the American press announced that Francis Powers who made an espionage flight to the USSR, had perished near Los Angeles in a helicopter accident.



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